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Human rights advocates have championed the establishment of a regime of  
international legal accountability for grave violations of human rights, including 
genocide. Despite recent advances in establishing a regime of responsibility for 
individuals, when the International Court of Justice pronounced its 2007 judgment on the 
first case of state responsibility for genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro, it exonerated Serbia of the most serious charges. Key to the Court’s 
judgment was its spatialized definition of genocide as ‘destruction in part’ and its 
acceptance of Serbia’s calculated strategy of legal immunization of establishing the 
Bosnian territory it sought to annex as a formally separate political entity. Considering 
the Court’s latitude of interpretation regarding these spatial and territorial factors in light 
of the law, this thesis argues that geopolitical considerations influenced a judgment that 
will greatly limit the future possibility of any state or individual being found responsible 
for genocide.  
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1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The enormity of the crime of genocide can hardly be exaggerated, and any treaty for its 
repression deserves the most generous interpretation.”1 
ICJ, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, Hsu Mo, pg. 36 
 
1.1. The Decision 
The 2007 judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of the 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) was a landmark decision 
in the history of international law. For the first time in history, the Court determined that 
a state could be held responsible for genocide. Yet many humanitarian law scholars and 
anti-genocide activists greeted its verdict with dismay.2 It ruled that in a conflict marked 
by widespread and systematic ethnically targeted killings, killings that claimed a 
minimum of 100,000 lives and indeed possibly twice that number,3 only a single 
massacre of 8,000 constituted genocide. Serbia4 was found not responsible for genocide 
                                                
1 ICJ, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, Hsu Mo, 36. 
2 Cassese, “The Judicial Massacre of Srebrenica”; Luban, “Timid Justice”; Shaw, “The International Court 
of Justice: Serbia, Bosnia, and Genocide”; Tosh, “Genocide Acquittal Provokes Legal Debate”; Asuncion, 
“Pulling the Stops on Genocide: The State or the Individual?”; Clearwater, “Holding States Accountable 
for the Crime of Crimes: An Analysis of Direct State Responsibility for Genocide in Light of the ICJ’s 
2007 Decision in Bosnia v Serbia”; Gibney, “Genocide and State Responsibility.” 
3 RDC, “Ljudski gubici u BiH 1991-95  : Bošnjaci−ubijeni i nestali 91-95”; Tabeau and Bijak, “War-related 
Deaths in the 1992-1995 Armed Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
4 When the case was initiated, Serbia and its formerly autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo 
were a part of federation with Montenegro, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)—later renamed 
Serbia and Montenegro. When Montenegro declared its independence in 2006, Serbia continued as the sole 
Respondent. By the time the Judgment was delivered, Kosovo was no longer under the jurisdiction of 
Serbia but an international protectorate. 
  
 
2 
or complicity in genocide and found responsible only for failure to prevent and to punish. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was not awarded any compensation; the Court only awarded it a 
declaration that Serbia had breached its obligations under the Convention. Intrinsic to the 
verdict was the Court's spatialized definition of genocide as destruction “in part” of a 
targeted group and its treatment of the political geographic structure, the Republika 
Srpska parastate, that Serbia had established in an attempt to immunize itself for its 
violations of international law, the formally separate parastate of the Republika Srpska.5  
Because this case was the first of its kind, the decision of the Court has 
determined the contours of the international regime of state accountability for genocide 
by simultaneously realizing and negating the semantic potential inherent in the 
Convention. The Court determined effectively that genocide as destruction “in part” of a 
targeted group refers to the total destruction of a part of a group in a limited area, rather 
than the partial destruction of the group over a wider area. The Court also upheld the 
principle that a state could be responsible for genocide, not just its leaders and agents as 
individuals. At the same time, it established standards of evidence and attribution that 
make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to find a state responsible if it acts 
through proxy forces—even if only nominally. The relationship between Serbia and the 
Serb nationalist forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a near-limit case of 
intimacy and identity between a state and proxy force The Serb nationalist parastate in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, was not formally a part of Serbia 
according to the latter’s internal law, although the constitution of the Republika Srpska 
                                                
5 Liotta, Dismembering the state. A parastate is a state-like structure acting within, against, and in place of 
the officially recognized state. The term for these political structures parallels the descriptor 'paramilitary' 
often used to identify their armed forces. The prefix in each case indicates a lack. A parastate lacks the full 
functions and capacities of an official state, and lacks of the legitimacy conferred by international 
recognition. 
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declared that it was. Serbia did not just bankroll the separatist parastate. Serbia created 
the armed forces of the Republika Srpska by transferring Serbs of Bosnian origin into the 
federal Yugoslav military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and those who were not 
out) and then it formally transferred those forces to the authority of the Republika 
Srpska.6 Serbia continued to provide essential logistical and other support to the now 
formally separate Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS). That other support included 
paying the salaries of its high-ranking officers, who retained their rank in the federal 
army and whose personnel matters it continued to administer.7  
In this case, the Court found that even in those instances where genocide has been 
unambiguously committed, if a force committing genocide exhibited any margin of 
independence from its sponsor, its sponsor would escape attribution for genocide. Even if 
the forces of the sponsor state had participated directly in that genocide, the Court ruled 
that it would assume, unless proven otherwise, that those forces acted under the direction 
and control of the proxy force and, again, the sponsor would escape attribution. For 
complicity in genocide, the Court found that a state could not be held responsible even if 
it provided aid and assistance with knowledge of the grave risk of it being used to commit 
genocide; it would only be responsible if it provided that aid or assistance with certain 
knowledge that it would be so used. The Court relaxed its rules of attribution for failure 
to prevent. To be found responsible for breach of this responsibility, the Court upheld that 
knowledge of the grave risk that aid or assistance would be used in the commission of 
genocide was sufficient. However, when it came to the award of financial compensation 
as reparation for failure to prevent, the Court reversed the standard of knowledge and 
                                                
6 Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing.” 
7 ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia, Dissenting Op. Al-Khasawneh. 
  
 
4 
required certain knowledge. Absent that, the Court would simply issue a declaration 
affirming the failure to prevent by the responsible state.  
Close attention to how the Court achieved its judgment is needed to reveal 
precisely the extent to which this case has established parastate formation as an effective 
strategy of legal immunization for territorial acquisition achieved through the 
commission of genocide and other grave human rights violations. In pursuit of that end, 
this thesis identifies the Court’s latitude of interpretation, the conscious choices it made 
about the construction of the Convention’s terms and provisions, in order to advance an 
argument that the outcome of this case, its determination of the legal structure of state 
accountability for genocide, was profoundly shaped by geopolitical considerations that 
trumped any desire to advance the aims and purposes of the Genocide Convention. These 
geopolitical calculations include those that pertain to the direct parties to the dispute, to 
concerns about potential legal liability for the numerous states that intervened in the 
conflict, and to broader concerns about the threat a regime of international juridical 
accountability might pose to the liberty of state power.  
The interpretation and application of law is a creative act whereby the justices of a 
court act upon the very law they are called upon to employ as a measure or standard. The 
creativity of adjudication is an elaboration, a further development of the coming-into-
being of the law itself.8 Law contains an inherent potentiality, a range of possible 
meanings. Adjudication establishes precedent that determines which of those possible 
meanings can or will likely be upheld in subsequent jurisprudence. Hart observes that 
“neither in interpreting statutes nor precedents are judges confined to the alternatives of 
                                                
8 Lefebvre, The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza. 
  
 
5 
blind, arbitrary choice, or ‘mechanical’ deduction from rules with predetermined 
meaning;” judges instead weigh and balance different interests.9 Genocide as a legal term 
is a discursive construct, a particular partitioning of the socio-material universe of events 
that works to group together that which is dissimilar as similar by selectively 
emphasizing particular traits and particular ranges of variation of those traits.10 Hence 
there is no singular definition of what genocide is, but rather a multiplicity of possible 
definitions. Each definition is the product of particular power relations, each is an attempt 
to exert power through the word, the concept.11 The definition of genocide in 
international customary law precedes and departs from the definition agreed upon by the 
assembly of state representatives during the drafting of the Convention.12 The findings of 
the Court in this case must be understood as an instantiation of politics, of geopolitics. 
 
1.2. Geopolitics 
This thesis analyzes the decision and its legal constructions in a geopolitical 
frame. That is, I treat the International Court of Justice as a forum of struggle where 
fundamental norms of the international system and the rules of their application are 
negotiated and contested in a process guided by the geopolitical calculations of its 
members. The term geopolitics is widely used in contemporary discourses with a 
multiplicity of varying definitions.13 Because the international adjudication of a territorial 
                                                
9 Hart, The Concept of Law, 204; Dawson and Boynton, “Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding 
and Abetting Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals,” 279. 
10 Derrida, Of Grammatology. 
11 Tyner, The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide and the Unmaking of Space. 
12 Quigley, The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis. 
13 Mamadouh, “Geopolitics in the nineties.” 
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conflict invokes a multiplicity of scales, the term as I use it has several simultaneous 
inflections. The geopolitical calculations of the immediate parties to the dispute, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Serbia, fit into the most classical conception of geopolitics as the 
product of state interests in the relationship of power and territory.14 These concerns 
pertain to the perceived strategic value of certain territories to the state as well as the way 
particular territories are bound up with issues of identity and affect, issues that can be 
politically mobilized by political actors.  
The determinative geopolitics of the decision, however, were those of justices 
whose countries were not direct parties to the case. Although the Statute of the Court 
provides that each party to the dispute may appoint an ad hoc judge to the bench to hear 
the case if they do not already have a judge as a sitting member of the Court,15 their votes 
will cancel each other on important matters in dispute. The geopolitical considerations of 
states other than Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia can be divided into calculations of 
the impact of the decision upon the two parties to the dispute, the implications of a 
decision for those states that intervened in the conflict—several of whom had judges on 
the Court—and the broader implications for states involved in conflicts unrelated to the 
former Yugoslavia. First, the impact of an adverse decision could have had, at least in the 
near term, a negative effect on European and US efforts to stabilize the Balkans and on 
their efforts to extricate themselves from the military, diplomatic, and financial 
investment needed to assist the region in transitioning to a post-socialist economy. The 
domestic political situation in Serbia was fairly balanced between those who favored a 
more Western European orientation for Serbia, aspiring to EU membership, and more 
                                                
14 Ibid.; Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. 
15 United Nations, “Statute of the International Court of Justice.” 
  
 
7 
radical nationalists who favored an aggressive posture toward Serbia’s neighbors and 
integration into the Russian sphere of influence. An adverse judgment could have 
resulted in billions in reparations. Assuming Serbia attempted to pay it would have 
complicated efforts at economic transition and would have bolstered the radical 
nationalist opposition of Milošević’s former party and their far right allies. Even if Serbia 
had not attempted to pay, an adverse judgment would still have bolstered anti-Western 
European forces. Its refusal to pay would have served as an impediment to clearing the 
country’s way to EU membership. If the more radical nationalist forces were able to ride 
a wave of popular anger over an adverse decision to power, Serbia would again threaten 
to assert control by force over the breakaway region of Kosovo—now an international 
protectorate—and support the final secession of the Republika Srpska from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Given the existing relations of power in the region, a decision more 
amenable to Serbia, the stronger party, would pose fewer difficulties for enforcement 
than one for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Beyond these concerns for the impact of a decision upon the stabilization of the 
region, the politics of the Judgment may reflect a post-conflict juridical manifestation of 
the same geopolitical considerations that guided the military and diplomatic intervention 
during the conflict. The history of that intervention is one of the bleakest chapters in the 
history of the United Nations.16 After the outbreak of war in Croatia and before that 
state’s international recognition, the British government suggested to the Milošević 
regime that it request the imposition of a blanket arms embargo over the whole of 
                                                
16 UN General Assembly, 54th session, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly 
resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999. 
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Yugoslavia.17 At the time, Serbia and Serbian nationalists, who dominated the federal 
army that had disarmed the Territorial Defense forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
preparation for war, possessed an overwhelming advantage in heavy weaponry. The arms 
embargo locked in that overwhelming military advantage. Given low morale and 
problems with desertion, the arms embargo was critical to maintaining the ability of the 
Serb nationalists to hold their own and prevail in the field.18 In Operation Sharp Guard, 
NATO and WEU naval forces in the Adriatic enacted a blockade to enforce the arms 
embargo. The arms embargo itself was of profoundly dubious legality and became the 
focus of international outrage, the UN General Assembly twice voted with crushing 
majorities to repeal the Security Council’s embargo.19 But Great Britain staunchly 
defended the arms embargo until the very end, dispatching its diplomats to persuade other 
Security Council members to stay their opposition and vociferously threatening to veto 
any effort to overturn it.20 In addition to the arms embargo, the UN brokered and 
dispatched troops to monitor and enforce a peace agreement between Croatia and Serbia 
that allowed the latter to withdraw its heavy weaponry to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
prosecute war there unhindered.21 At the same time it refused a request by the leader of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to dispatch peacekeeping troops to prevent the outbreak of 
violent conflict there.22 It did honor a request from Macedonia for the dispatch of UN 
troops to its borders with Serbia, deflecting any attempt by Serbia to assert its irredentist 
                                                
17 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans. 
18 Cigar, The Right to Defence: Thoughts on the Bosnian Arms Embargo. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans; Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. 
21 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans. 
22 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. 
  
 
9 
claims there, concentrating (containing) Serb nationalist violence in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
Immediately after the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the French 
government fought successfully for a ‘humanitarian’ rather than military response to the 
conflict. The British and French dispatched ‘peacekeeping’ troops under the UN flag to 
oversee the provision of food and medicine while fighting to keep the arms embargo in 
place on the Security Council. However, the UN forces made no effort to use force, 
available to them under their UN mandate, to protect the delivery of aid, allowing the 
Serb nationalist forces to plunder and restrict the flow of aid. Under the guise of 
‘humanitarian relief,’ the UN effectively operated a logistical resupply operation for the 
Serb nationalist forces while depriving the Bosnians of the means to defend themselves. 
The aid that did reach the enclaves where Bosnian government supporters were holding 
out served merely to establish them as open air concentration camps. The resulting 
containment of refugee flows allowed the surrounding countries and Europe as a whole to 
avoid having to host the displaced populations, a burden that would have served as an 
incentive to intervene to bring the conflict to a close.23 These enclaves served also as 
bargaining chips insofar as the Serb nationalist forces treated their trapped populations as 
hostages. Whenever the Serb nationalist forces were threatened by Bosnian government 
military advances elsewhere, they made threatening moves toward the Safe Areas. 
Throughout, UN military commanders in Bosnia and Herzegovina such as General Lewis 
Mackenzie of Canada and General Sir Michael Rose of the United Kingdom 
demonstrated a remarkable partiality toward the Serb nationalists, often making 
                                                
23 In contrast, the inability to contain refugee flows in the Kosovo conflict a few years later arguably 
contributed to the decision to intervene there. 
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unsubstantiated allegations against the Bosnian government forces and refusing to fulfill 
their mandate when it would have required the use of force against the Serb nationalists.24 
The fulfillment of that mandate and the lives of the Bosnians became hostage to the 
safety of British and French troops on the ground. Their respective governments justified 
their opposition to robust measures to stop attacks against Bosnian civilians, both to their 
own publics and to the wider world, by citing the safety and security of their own troops 
as their first priority.25 Where the UN itself might have impeded the full execution of 
British and French interventionist policies, agents on the ground in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina simply ignored it. As Venezuela’s representative on the UN Security 
Council, Diego Arria, observed with dismay after visiting the Srebrenica enclave, a just 
declared UN-protected Safe Area in 1993:  
 
That’s when we understood perfectly well that there were two United 
Nations, one in New York and one on the ground, which was not really the 
United Nations operation. It was British and French. The commanders on 
the ground were following the directions of their governments, not the UN 
Security Council, which was theoretically the conductor of the operation. It 
was very shocking”26 
 
The UN mission reached its apogee at Srebrenica in July of 1995 when the Serb 
nationalist forces overran the enclave and massacred some 8,000 men and boys they were 
                                                
24 Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. 
25 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. 
26 Lebor, “Complicity with Evil”: The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide, 42-3. 
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able to capture. The UN high command had refused to defend a population it had sworn 
to protect. Dutch UN troops on the ground collaborated in the genocidal massacres by 
assisting the Serb nationalists to separate the men and women.27 
This brief résumé of the conduct of the British and French and other Atlantic 
powers during the Bosnian conflict is intended to indicate the degree of partisanship and 
the lengths these powers would go to support the Serbian nationalists in their attempt to 
realize an anti-Bosnian project of political reterritorialization through war crimes. These 
policies may have been guided by various geopolitical rationales. Britain, France, and 
Russia have historically regarded Serbia as an important ally, as a bulwark against 
German (and Austrian) expansion southeast toward the Mediterranean and Southwest 
Asia, and against German power within Europe more generally.28 In addition, a 
geographic imaginary of a Europe as an Enlightenment-reformed Christendom without 
Muslims—as anything other than a precarious and disenfranchised underclass—appears 
to have been at work as well. Taylor Branch reports that President Clinton of the US 
favored a more evenhanded approach but was unwilling to go against the staunch 
opposition of the British and French leadership. These sought to provide the Serb 
nationalists with every advantage because “an independent Bosnia would be ‘unnatural’ 
as the only Muslim nation in Europe.”29 Policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina must be 
seen within a larger context of concerns about mass immigration and the social, 
economic, and political crisis that had beset Europe and that had led to an increasing 
                                                
27 Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre since World War II. 
28 Conversi, German-bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. 
29 Branch, The Clinton tapes, 10. 
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discriminatory animus toward its Muslim inhabitants.30 The effort to construct a pan-
European identity upon which to found the new European polity of the EU around a 
sense of a shared cultural heritage had contributed to a redrawing of the imaginary 
boundaries of inside and outside.31 Whereas the Bosnian Muslims had been included in—
even showcased as central to— the territorial project and geopolitical positioning of 
Tito’s Yugoslavia, 32 they were not welcome in the new conception of Europe.  
Beyond evidence of partisanship and interest, this history of intervention meant 
that numerous international actors, including those represented on the Court, had a fairly 
direct stake in the outcome of the case. A more expansive definition of genocide as 
destruction ‘in part’ and less daunting rules of attribution would have resulted in some of 
these states potentially finding themselves at risk for being found responsible for 
complicity in genocide. Indeed, shortly after initiating its case against Serbia, counsel for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina filed a formal declaration of intent with the ICJ to initiate 
proceedings against the United Kingdom for alleged breaches of its responsibilities under 
the UN Genocide Convention. Under intense pressure, Bosnia and Herzegovina withdrew 
that declaration.33 As the case proceeded, it could not but have been on the mind of the 
President of the Court, Roslyn Higgins of the United Kingdom. Differences between the 
US under Clinton and Britain under the Conservatives and France under the Socialists led 
to a serious rift, and changes of government in both Britain and France enabled a 
                                                
30 Pred, Even in Sweden. 
31 Balibar, We, the people of Europe?; Nowotny, “Ethnos or Demos?: Ideological Implications within the 
Discourse on ‘European Culture’”; Bialasiewicz, “‘The Death of the West’”; Ó Tuathail, Critical 
Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. 
32 Ramet, Balkan babel. 
33 Boyle and International Court of Justice, The Bosnian People Charge Genocide: Proceedings at the 
International Court of Justice concerning Bosnia v. Serbia on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide. 
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significant alteration in policy.34 Yet even if subsequent governments had conducted 
themselves differently, the legal liability of the state remains—and the state interest in 
avoiding the attribution of responsibility. 
These concerns about the implications of the Judgment for the international legal 
responsibility of states would have been shared more widely. The Judgment was arguably 
both a response to the immediate concerns presented by the conflict between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serbia and the larger systemic imperatives of shaping the international 
legal regime in a way that served to protect the interests of states. These interests are not 
simply reducible to a desire to bolster and affirm territorial sovereignty as the preeminent 
norm of the international system against encroachment by an emerging international legal 
regime of accountability, as the issue is frequently framed.35 After all, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as an internationally recognized state, sought through initiating the case to 
defend both its population and its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Human rights and 
territorial sovereignty can, in specific instances, be complementary rather than opposed. 
Specifically, in instances of territorial aggression by another state, directly or via proxy, 
humanitarian law is a resource that can be used to defend territorial sovereignty and 
integrity. It is in instances of what is legally and politically ‘internal repression’ that 
humanitarian and human rights law enters into conflict with the imperative of territorial 
sovereignty. Such a legal regime conflicts with the sovereignty of states carrying out 
external intervention as well. Thus there is a confluence of interest between states 
carrying out internal repression and states engaged in external intervention. We may 
speak of the interests of states dividing the international community into four (not 
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necessarily exclusive) camps: states carrying out or concerned to preserve the right to 
carry out internal repression; states concerned to carry out external intervention in the 
affairs of other states; states faced with such external intervention that see the legal 
regime as a means to defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty; and ‘neutral’ states 
neither engaged in repression of internal challenges to their dominion nor faced with the 
threat of external intervention. The outcome of the case can, in a strongly but not wholly 
determinative manner, be traced to the distribution of representation on the Court of 
judges from states falling somewhere in a field defined by the poles of these camps, a 
reflection of their distribution within the international system at large.  
 
1.3. Lawfare  
A significant aspect of contemporary concerns about the emerging regime of 
international accountability for humanitarian and human rights law violations within 
foreign policy is encapsulated by the term ‘lawfare.’ The evolving regime of the 
international adjudication of the conduct of violent conflict is a matter of concern for 
military and political elites in many states, including the US.36 The term “lawfare,” 
conceptualizes law not in terms of the quest for justice and stability but as a means of 
power for state opponents. The conceptualization of lawfare in a geostrategic sense 
derives from a publication of two officers of the People’s Liberation Army of China. The 
term there referred to the role of law within a full spectrum conceptualization of interstate 
struggle, one that situated law within a broader context of economic and media ‘warfare,’ 
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cyberwarfare, and other nonmilitary and military means.37  
The term has come to have a more specific and polemical meaning as the use of 
international humanitarian law to assist militarily weaker states in their confrontations 
with those stronger, by hobbling superior military capacities with a web of legal 
prohibition.38 The term has also been used to describe the incorporation of legal expertise 
in the planning and conduct of military operations, defensively as it were, by powerful 
states, as well as the use of legal, nonviolent means to obtain, or assist the realization of, 
military objectives.39 Despite the efforts of polemicists to construct lawfare as a practice 
only of the weak against the strong, the strong have in fact long used law to obtain 
military objectives. The US continues to conduct its ‘war on terror’ in part through law.40 
Nonetheless, concerns about lawfare have led to an attitude of increasing contempt for 
international law among US policy elites.41 US concerns to counter the perceived threat 
of ‘lawfare’ are reflected in the fact that the US is not a signatory of the Rome Treaty 
establishing the International Criminal Court and by the passing of the US Service 
Members Protection Act of 200242 that threatened military action if its personnel were to 
be subject to international trial before a UN court. Indeed, the US did not ratify the UN 
Genocide Convention until 1986 and did not adopt the required legislation until 1988.43 
International concern about a regime of state accountability for genocide is 
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reflected in the text of the Convention itself. The text is overwhelmingly an international 
criminal law document. Most of the operative articles deal with measures for the 
prosecution and punishment of individuals. The contested nature of the principle of state 
responsibility during the drafting meant that the notion is mentioned in only one article of 
the Convention, a jurisdictional article at that. The article, Article IX, does however 
explicitly refer to the responsibility of states for genocide and other offenses such as 
complicity when it establishes that disputes concerning the interpretation of the treaty fall 
under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Of the 132 signatories to the 
Genocide Convention, 16 have filed reservations to Article IX of the Convention, 
including the United States and China. Both reject the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, 
the United States insisting that its special consent is required in each and every case and 
China simply declaring that it was not bound by Article IX. The United Kingdom is the 
only Permanent Member of the UN Security Council still subject to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ. The United Kingdom has objected to such reservations by other 
states, declaring its belief that they are contrary to the aims and purposes of the 
Convention.44 
The Court, like the Security Council, was an international institution created as 
part of the United Nations in order to prevent violent conflict and promote the peaceful 
resolution of conflict. The lack of support among states for the institution of the Court as 
a means of resolving international disputes is seen in their reluctance to subject 
themselves to the Court’s jurisdiction. Posner asserts that the International Court of 
Justice is in decline as and institution as evidenced by the falling number of contentious 
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cases being filed.45 Such quantitative analysis is, however, of limited utility. It abstracts 
the filing of cases from a whole host of contextual circumstances. It tells us nothing about 
the number of disputes in existence, their type, the functioning of alternate dispute 
resolution mechanisms, bilateral or otherwise. Convincingly however, Posner backs up 
his argument by citing the overall decline in the number of states that have filed 
declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, from 60% to 34%. 
Numerous states have also withdrawn previously submitted declarations of submission to 
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. In particular, powerful states such as the US, France, 
and China have all withdrawn; among the permanent members of the Security Council, 
only the UK remains subject.46  
 
1.4. The Court as an Institution of Global Power 
As states attempt to advance their interests through the Court, the particular 
characteristics of the Court as an institution of particular relations of power, exerts an 
influence upon the jurisprudence that emerges from it. There is the intrinsic interest of the 
Court itself, one not wholly separate from and not wholly reducible to the stake that states 
that seek to exert power through the Court have in the power of the Court itself as an 
institution. The members of the Court must make calculations that take into consideration 
the Court’s limited power in the face of the system of international states upon which it 
seeks to exert power and influence. Birkland suggests that in this case the Court needed 
to maintain a perception of legitimacy and so was constrained by the reigning 
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expectations of states.47 Shany considers the outcome of the case the product of a 
particular judicial politics, the effort to promote transactional or conciliatory justice, an 
attempt to satisfy the interests of all parties to the dispute, something he regards as “under 
current international conditions a ‘lesser evil.’”48 Understanding the outcome of the case 
thus requires understanding the distribution of power within the Court, and the relative 
power of the Court as an institution within the overall context of national and 
international institutions. 
First, the International Court of Justice is the highest court within the United 
Nations judiciary and its principal judicial organ. As nominally the highest-ranking court 
in the world, it is often referred to as the World Court. By statute, the decisions of the 
Court are binding only on the states that are party to a given case. However, the Court in 
practice treats previous decisions by the body as established precedent, and other courts, 
such as the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court, 
will likely treat its interpretations of matters of law as binding precedent.49 Unlike the 
criminal courts, the ICJ was established to resolve disputes between states, and only 
states can appear before it as either Applicants or Respondents. The Court sees its work 
as operating in complementary fashion with that of the UN Security Council. Officials of 
the Court discursively construct the work of the Security Council as political and hence 
separate from the judicial work of the Court. As the Court has stated, “The Council has 
functions of a political nature assigned to it, whereas the Court exercises purely judicial 
functions. Both organs can therefore perform their separate but complementary functions 
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with respect to the same events.”50 Fatefully for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had 
initiated the case in significant part as an attempt to get the Court to issue provisional 
measures overturning the UN Security Council imposed arms embargo that had 
grievously affected its ability to defend itself, the Court does not view its role to include 
subjecting the decisions of the Security Council to judicial review. At the same time, in 
the case of noncompliance with a decision of the Court, international efforts to enforce 
those decisions are the responsibility of the Security Council. Permanent Members of the 
Security Council retain the right to veto those decisions to enforce.51 
The Court relies to a great extent upon the authority of the work of the 
International Law Commission (ILC), a body of scholars established by the UN in order 
to codify and progressively develop international law.52 The work of the ILC forms the 
basis for numerous international conventions adopted by member states of the UN. Both 
for the interpretation of the crimes of the Convention—the Draft Code on Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind [sic]—and for the principles of international state 
responsibility—Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts—the Court deferred to the ILC. However the uncritical reliance upon the work of 
the ILC is problematic for several reasons. First, members of the ILC are often elected to 
the ICJ and the resulting “cozy” relationship of the ILC and the ICJ creates a “feedback 
loop” of reciprocal citation. The ICJ relies on draft articles of the ILC to derive principles 
of legal interpretation and in turn the ILC utilizes decisions of the ICJ as a source of 
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judicial practice authority from which these principles are derived. This may result in 
articles that may codify customary international law or, when the ICJ departs from 
customary international law, it may perpetuate “certain doctrines of uncertain origin or 
dubious validity.”53 Of course, this ICJ/ILC feedback loop—however significant it may 
be for an individual article or commentary—is only one influence upon the formulation 
of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. Crawford contests the importance of the 
ICJ/ILC feedback loop by emphasizing that the ILC also took into consideration feedback 
from some 50 states during the drafting of the articles.54 But this merely introduces into 
the ICJ/ILC feedback loop an awareness of the preferences of some states of the 
international system—those with the resources and inclination to involve themselves in 
the process—an awareness that becomes a factor in the geopolitics of adjudication. 
Second, neither the ILC Articles nor the Draft Code has in fact the force of law. They are 
merely the proposals of a scholarly commission. After the conclusion of the work of the 
ILC on the Articles, the UN General assembly did not debate and draft an international 
convention on state responsibility based on the ILC’s work that would in fact have the 
force of law.55 The General Assembly merely adopted a resolution that welcomed the 
conclusion of the ILC’s work and commended the Articles to the attention of 
governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other 
appropriate action.” Third, the Articles are published in the form of a treaty or 
convention—which they are not—and the Commentaries associated with them do not 
always acknowledge the diversity of opinion during the drafting of the articles. Fourth, 
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the Articles and their Commentaries do not necessarily reflect customary international 
law. The task of the ILC was both to codify and progressively develop international 
law.56 The source of authority for individual articles is thus variable. Bederman notes in 
relation to Article 59 on countermeasures that it is based solely on the “conclusory” 
pronouncement of the ICJ in one of its recent decisions, a decision that promulgated a 
particular legal standard that was at variance with decades of prior state practice and the 
findings of arbitral commissions.57 To conclude, given that the ILC articles have not been 
formally debated by the UN General Assembly and incorporated into an international 
convention, and because individual articles have a variable relationship with state 
practice and judicial precedent, to uncritically accept aspects of ICJ decisions that rely 
solely on the authority of the ILC Articles would amount to tacit acquiescence in the 
surrender of the legislative functions of the General Assembly and the Security Council 
to the ICJ. 
 The process and criteria by which the justices of the Court are selected produces a 
particular distribution of power within the Court as an institution. The selection process 
reflects both the provisions of the Court’s statute and a set of tacit, nonstatutory 
understandings. First, according to the Statute of the Court, justices are to be chosen so as 
to ensure that there will be representation of the “main forms of civilization and of the 
principal legal systems of the world.”58 In practice, the main forms of civilization are 
assumed to correspond to major geographic regions, and states organized into regional 
groupings nominate judges in a manner that distributes membership equally among these 
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regions. In practice, the apportionment parallels that established in Article 22 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the article specifying the composition of the Security 
Council.59 Second, a tacit understanding ensures that the five permanent members of the 
Security Council will always have a representative on the Court.60 The five permanent 
members of the Security Council also exert significant influence through the Court both 
through representation on the Court and influence over the election of judges. The Statute 
of the Court specifies that judges must be elected both by the Security Council and the 
General Assembly by a majority vote. Unlike the Security Council however, justices of 
the five permanent Security Council members do not have veto power over the decisions 
of the Court. 
The degree of influence over the decisions of the Court conferred upon states that 
have a judge who is a national sitting on the Court is debated. Justices are in theory 
elected as individuals and not as state representatives. The Statute of the Court formally 
insists on judicial independence and provides explicit requirements that attempt to ensure 
this. Justices must resign any governmental office before assuming their position on the 
Court.61 But the degree of judicial autonomy a justice exhibits depends a great deal on the 
judicial-political culture of the state from which they originate. There can be a divergence 
on a given matter between a sitting national government and a justice of the Court if there 
is a difference of party or ideological affiliation. At the same time, regardless of 
differences in party or ideology certain state interests remain constant, not least the 
interest in avoiding an adverse judgment that would require the payment of reparations. 
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The biographies of the judges who have served on the Court unsurprisingly reveal long 
histories of service to their respective states.62 It is not unreasonable to assert that this is 
an important filtration mechanism ensuring a degree of consonance between the interests 
of a state and the positions of a judge.  
Researchers conducting empirical and quantitative studies to ascertain whether 
judges vote for the interests of their respective states have arrived at differing 
conclusions. Smith asserts that judicial nationalism is overemphasized and that judges 
vote against the interests of their own state in cases in which that state is a party to the 
proceeding one-fifth of the time, while cautioning that simply because a judge votes in 
the interest of her or his own state does not necessarily indicate partiality.63 Posner asserts 
that only judges from western countries, and infrequently at that, have ever voted against 
the interests of their own state.64 The insistence on the part of the Permanent Members of 
the Security Council that they always have a representative on the Court suggests that in 
practice the expectation of judicial independence is limited. Moreover, the assumption of 
that state interest shapes judicial opinion is incorporated into the Statute of the Court 
itself. The Statute provides that states that are parties to a case may appoint ad hoc 
justices to the bench if they do not currently have a national on the Court.65 
Smith suggests that the consideration of national criteria in the appointment of 
justices, based on an assumption of judicial bias corresponding to nationality, casts the 
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Court as a judicial institution with as much an arbitral as adjudicative character.66 The 
selection of judges by parties to a dispute is typical of arbitration rather than adjudication. 
But unlike in adjudication, in arbitration parties can also be free to determine the set of 
rules by which a matter will be settled. This is not the case with the ICJ. However, 
Smith's observation provides insight into the nature of international adjudication, at least 
as represented by the ICJ. The essence of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes is 
‘mediatory’ or ‘conciliatory.’ The distribution of power on the Court makes it clear that 
the parties to be conciliated in a given dispute—because of the adjudicative nature of 
deciding upon a common set of binding norms—are as much or more the great powers 
seated upon the Security Council as the actual parties to the dispute at hand. 
Having a court with an at least partially arbitral rather than adjudicative character 
can be necessary given the lack of an overarching sovereign to enforce its decisions. 
Having powerful actors ‘on board’ is important, if they are powerful enough that they can 
ignore the Court without facing any serious consequence. Less powerful actors can 
presumably be subject to a degree of pressure to force compliance; absent that their 
noncompliance may be less threatening to the overall system of order. Powerful states 
defying decisions of the Court would fatally undermine its legitimacy and expose the 
hollowness of an adjudicative pretence in international power politics. A partly arbitral 
rather that purely adjudicative character also makes sense given the purpose of the Court 
to serve dispute resolution and the prevention of armed conflict. Even if the Court had the 
power to impose decisions, the alienation and resentment created could fester and lead to 
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renewed conflict. As with the UN Security Council, the emphasis is on preventing great 
power conflict.  
 
1.5. Methodology 
Taking into consideration these characteristics of the Court as an institution and 
reading the decision in light of the law and the particular geopolitical circumstances of 
the case and the broader implications of its interpretation, the basic argument of this 
thesis is that the outcome of this case was the product in significant part of state interests. 
I do not proceed from a simplistic assumption of an exact correspondence between the 
interests of a state and the position of the justice from that state.67 Such a correspondence 
is one factor, albeit an extremely important one. The particular juridical and political 
culture of a given state can certainly influence the degree of autonomy a judge might 
exhibit. Further, any socio-biographical analysis of the individual justices is beyond the 
scope of the present study. The socialization through education that occurs for justices 
from various parts of the world to obtain the legal competence that allows them to 
participate in an institution such as an international court of the UN, also problematizes 
the assumption of a singular determinative causation between the interests of a state and 
the position of a jurist. Likewise, a micro-sociological or anthropological analysis of the 
interactions of members of the Court with each other and with the larger communities 
and bureaucracies of which they are a part is beyond the scope of the present study.68 Nor 
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do I propose to analyze the geopolitics of identity, and consider how the outcome can be 
explained in terms of affective identification with either the perpetrators or victims or the 
lack of identification with either or both, except again to note the influence of identity 
and its role in shaping perceptions of state interest. In terms of the possible influence of 
territorial imaginaries on the outcome of the case, I simply suggest that the perceptions of 
state interest are likely influenced by such imaginaries. The territorial imaginary of 
Europe as an Enlightenment-reformed Christendom, a place where Muslims may exist 
but cannot enjoy meaningful political power, apparently guided British and French 
foreign policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina during much of the conflict.69 But the 
interest of the state in protecting itself from legal accountability that derives from the 
policies devised to realize those imaginaries remains the same. 
The ambition of the current thesis is thus relatively modest. I aim only to make a 
contribution to a “preponderance of the evidence” argument. My contribution relies on 
interrogating key features of the decision, the definition of genocide as destruction in part 
and the findings on state responsibility in light of the potential for the Court to have 
decided differently. To resort to a mathematical analogy, what I do is sketch out a 
topology of the definition of genocide within the terms of the Convention. I parse the 
statement of intent into its constituent elements and examine the range of meanings—
values—that could be plausibly attributed to each. Different values for each term in 
varying combinations produce different states, different points or regions of the 
definitional manifold. Each state corresponds to a different legal topography ‘on the 
ground’ of which acts are characterized as genocide and which are not. Each possible 
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topography of genocide as the product of a legal category applied to the specific ontology 
of the Bosnian conflict corresponds to a different distribution of legal responsibility 
among the many actors involved in the conflict. Sketching out the range of possibility for 
a legally justifiable definition of genocide and for the construction of principles of state 
responsibility establishes a discursive space within which to assert that the decisions 
made by the Court were the result of a concern to neutralize to the greatest degree 
possible the Genocide Convention as a tool of state accountability.  
In the next chapter, I delineate the Court’s findings on the definition of genocide 
as destruction “in part” of an ethnic group. In doing so I advance an argument that those 
findings were tailor made to both affirm the judicial precedent of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) determination that the massacres 
of Srebrenica did constitute genocide while denying that other atrocities separately or in 
the aggregate did. The Court’s particular constrained spatialization of the definition of 
genocide as destruction in part served to delimit the possibility of Serbia in this conflict 
or other international actors in any other conflict being found responsible for genocide. In 
the following chapter, I examine how the Court found that the Convention embraced the 
principle of state responsibility for genocide. How it did, and the staunch opposition of 
many judges to this finding, demonstrates how profoundly contested the principle 
remains. In Chapter IV, I lay out the specifics of the Court’s criteria for state 
responsibility for genocide. These are so restrictive as to effectively negate the possibility 
of a state being found responsible. In Chapter V, I examine how the Court established its 
criteria for complicity and other ancillary offenses. Again, the Court imposed such strict 
criterion that states acting through proxy forces can do so almost with impunity. In 
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Chapter VI, I examine how the Court loosened its standards of attribution for breach of 
the responsibility to prevent and to punish but reimposed highly restrictive criteria for the 
reward of financial compensation as reparation for these breaches. In Chapter VII, I 
conclude the thesis with reflections on the significance of the decision for the 
international regime of accountability for genocide and its implications for how 
geographers may contribute to genocide prevention. In Appendix A, I revisit the question 
of the definition of genocide as destruction in part of a targeted group in light of the work 
of the originator of the term, Rafael Lemkin, and suggest a definition that differs from the 
Court. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE COURT’S SPATIALIZED DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 To address the question of whether Serbia was responsible for genocide as a result 
of its involvement in the Bosnian conflict, the Court had first to determine whether 
genocide had in fact been committed. Only then could it proceed to address the question 
of whether responsibility for atrocities that could be legally characterized as genocide 
could be attributed to Serbia. The two issues are however inseparable. Genocide is 
defined in international law as a crime consisting of both physical and mental elements. 
Those mental elements that together comprise the specific intent of genocide have to 
belong to someone. Any finding of which acts amounted to genocide would have 
unavoidable implications for the attribution of responsibility. And that potential 
attribution of responsibility extended far wider than just to Serbia itself, given the 
extensive involvement in the conflict of a multitude of actors, including the UN itself. 
The Court’s resulting determination, its simultaneous affirmation that Srebrenica 
amounted to genocide as destruction “in part” and denial that the other ethnically targeted 
acts of killing and related abuses in the conflict did, is at first glance rather astonishing. In 
the aggregate, these other atrocities claimed a far larger number of victims from the 
targeted group.70 If the massacre at Srebrenica amounted to genocide, these other 
ethnically targeted killings then seem consistent with a definition of genocide that 
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conforms to the plain meaning of acts “committed with intent to destroy a group, in 
whole or in part, as such.”71 Viewed abstractly, all that would appear to distinguish the 
Srebrenica massacres from these other killings is the degree of spatiotemporal intensity. 
But the key to resolving the Court’s seemingly paradoxical ruling, and to understanding 
its implications for any future case, is to understand how the Court effectively spatialized 
the legal definition of genocide as destruction “in part” of a targeted group. The 
determination of whether the destruction of some number of persons from a targeted 
group amounts to genocide as destruction in part can be viewed as a version of the areal 
boundary problem. How are boundaries imposed around particular events or 
constellations of events such that the destruction is regarded as sufficiently substantial? 
There are the imminent boundaries of the targeted group’s distribution in space and, 
overlying these, boundaries created by political and military power. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s submissions asserted that genocide as destruction in part of a targeted 
group can apply to its partial destruction over a given geographic area. Its boundary of 
what constituted genocide extended to the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory 
for the duration of the conflict. The Court in contrast found that destruction in part refers 
to the total destruction of a part of a group within a limited geographic area—in this case, 
only to Srebrenica for a few days in July 1995. The Court’s chosen spatial delimitation of 
genocide is a result of both how it chose to interpret the Convention and the particular 
facts ‘on the ground’ of the case at hand. That its spatially constrained definition of 
genocide served to greatly limit the possibility that Serbia (or any other actor intervening 
in the conflict) would be found responsible for genocide or complicity in genocide is not, 
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in my view, incidental to the decision. I argue that out of the particular geopolitical 
circumstances and concerns of this case and those concerning an international juridical 
regime of accountability for grave abuses of human rights more generally, a definition of 
genocide as destruction in part has been produced that will influence any future case 
before the International Court of Justice. To advance my argument, I will parse the 
interpretive moves made by the Court and make the case that the resulting definition of 
genocide as destruction in part is not inherently more compelling than the conception 
advanced by Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case. These interpretive moves concern how 
the Court constructed the relationship between the intent of genocide and other possible 
intents, its effective spatialization of the definition of genocide, and its finding regarding 
the possibility of determining genocidal intent via spatial inference. 
 
2.2. Genocidal Intent and ‘Persecution’ as a Crime Against Humanity  
The first interpretive move by the Court was to partition crimes against humanity 
on the basis of additional intent. This partitioning interpolated the category of the crime 
of persecution between ordinary crimes against humanity and genocide. The Court 
adopted the interpolation of the crime of persecution between ordinary crimes against 
humanity and the crime of genocide from the ICTY Trial Chamber decision in Kupreškić 
et al.72 Crimes against humanity, as defined by the Statute of the Court and the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg from which it is derived, consist of the 
following acts: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, 
rape, and other inhumane acts committed in a widespread or systematic manner during an 
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armed conflict and targeting a civilian population.73 For the Trial Chamber, the crime of 
persecution as a crime against humanity occurs when such acts are committed in a 
manner that specifically targets political, racial, and religious groups. Discrimination is 
the additional intent that defines persecution as a special category of crimes against 
humanity. The crime of genocide occurs when acts of persecution are committed, but 
with an additional intent beyond discrimination, that of seeking to destroy the targeted 
groups “in whole or in part” “as such.” Genocide is an extreme form of persecution for 
Kupreškić et al. The Trial Chamber admitted that this construction of persecution as a 
war crime was its own and that no authoritative definition of persecution as a war crime 
existed in customary international law. Persecution in terms of the Charter could be 
constructed instead to refer to discriminatory acts other than murder, extermination, and 
the like committed in support of those acts.74 Advisedly, if one takes aboard this 
construction of genocide and persecution, one must remember that persecution as a crime 
against humanity and genocide overlap only partially. They are materially distinct crimes; 
each requires a finding of fact that the other does not.75 Regarding the potential overlap, it 
should be noted that Kupreškić et al. had mentioned murder but not extermination among 
the acts that could amount to persecution if committed with discriminatory intent.76 But 
when taking this aboard, the Court held that even ‘persecutory’ extermination, 
deliberately massacring members of a group on the basis of their membership in the 
group, did not necessarily amount to genocide.  
                                                
73 UN Security Council, “ICTY Statute”; United Nations, “Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
(IMT).” 
74 ICTY Trial Chamber, Kupreškić et al., sec. 567. 
75 ICTR Appeals Chamber, Musema; ICTY Appeals Chamber, Krstić. 
76 ICTY Trial Chamber, Kupreškić et al., sec. 636. 
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 A construction that interpolates persecution between ordinary crimes against 
humanity and genocide is further made possible by the fact that codifications of 
international law incorporate definitions of international crimes that derive from diverse 
sources, without any effort to reconcile them. The UN International Law Commission's 
Draft Code on Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, upon which the ICTY 
Statute is based, incorporates two overlapping and discrepant definitions of serious 
crimes.77 The article defining Crimes against Humanity is adopted almost verbatim from 
the 1945 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg.78 The article 
on genocide is adopted almost verbatim from the 1948 UN Genocide Convention.79 
Crucially, the term genocide appears neither in the London Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nürnberg nor in the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Trial of German Major War Criminals.80 The Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal 
repeatedly uses the terms extermination and persecution to refer to what would be 
defined a couple of years later in international law as genocide. 
Still, the Court affirms that the crimes through which ‘ethnic cleansing’ is 
committed may be subsumed under the category of either persecution or genocide. The 
Court maintains that the actus reus of genocide, the deliberate and selectively targeted 
killing of a substantial number of members of the group, may be committed in pursuit of 
‘ethnic cleansing,’ yet lack the requisite intent to destroy part of the group as such. On the 
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face of it, this is a very problematic assertion. Genocide can be, and often is, committed 
as a means to some other end; it is not merely committed as an end in itself. Securing 
control over territory is an intrinsic motive for the crime of genocide.81 The destruction of 
a substantial number of persons, even if committed to render an area ‘ethnically pure,’ 
and even if falling short of an intent to destroy the whole group, would appear to be 
consistent with an intent to destroy the targeted group “in part.” The aim of seizing and 
retaining control over territory would appear to be a motive for the crime of genocide or a 
further intent to be achieved through the commission of genocide as destruction in part, 
not a wholly distinct intent.82 So how then does the Court determine when persecutory 
extermination in pursuit of territorial ‘purification’ amounts to genocide and when it does 
not? Answering this question requires examining closely the Court's particular spatialized 
construction of the intent to destroy a group, in part, as such.  
 
2.3. Spatializing the Definition of Genocide 
 If the interpolation of the crime of persecution between ordinary crimes against 
humanity and the crime of genocide creates the possibility that the deliberate widespread 
or systematic extermination of members of a group might not amount to genocide, the 
next construction allows the Court to determine when it does and when it doesn't. Or 
rather, it allows the Court to determine when the requisite intent can be inferred from the 
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acts of destruction themselves and when it cannot. To answer the question of when such 
persecutory extermination would amount to genocide requires examining the particular 
meanings the Court attributes to “to destroy,” “a group,” “in whole or in part,” and “as 
such” and how these are combined to produce a spatialization of the definition of 
genocide as destruction in part.  
Genocide in the Convention is formulated in terms of a criminal offense. As with 
any criminal offense it is composed of both material and mental elements: material acts, 
the actus reus, and a requisite intent, the mens rea. Both material and mental elements as 
specified by the Convention must be present to find that acts amount to genocide. Acts 
that are not enumerated under the Convention as acts of genocide, even if committed with 
genocidal intent, do not amount to genocide. Conversely, acts that are among those 
enumerated in the Convention, when not committed with the requisite intent, do not 
amount to genocide. Or rather they do not legally if it cannot be proven that they are 
committed with the requisite intent. Genocide is defined in Article II of the Convention 
and it contains both the exhaustive enumeration of acts of genocide and a complex 
statement of intent.  
 
2.3.1. Material Element 
Article II of the Convention, which specifies the material and mental elements of 
the crime of genocide, reads in its entirety:  
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such:  
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(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
The enumerated list of acts includes both measures that result in the death of members of 
the group, (a) and (c), and measures that harm the ability of the group to biologically 
reproduce, (d) and (e). Subheading (b) may have both effects and it may have neither, at 
least upon individuals. The inclusion of “mental harm” in the Convention during the 
drafting was at the behest of the Indian and Chinese delegations that sought thereby to 
include the distribution of opium and other drugs by colonial occupiers as an act of 
genocide.83 Measures that impair the functioning of members of a group, falling short of 
causing their death, can thus serve as a means to destroy a group.  
 
2.3.2. Mental Element 
 The chapeau of the Article contains the statement of the mental elements of the 
crime of genocide, the special intent or dolus specialis. The purpose of an intent 
requirement for any crime exists to affirm that the wrongful act was committed 
deliberately. The crime of genocide however has a specific intent. It is not enough that 
the actus reus of genocide be committed deliberately—that is with general intent; it must 
be committed deliberately with a specific end in mind, the destruction of a group, in 
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whole or in part, “as such.” The question of intent however must be distinguished from 
motive. The reason a group of people is targeted for destruction is the motive of the 
crime. That they are deliberately targeted for destruction as a group is the intent, 
regardless of the reason or motive. Some scholars maintain that the fourth element, “as 
such,” is a motive requirement, genocide’s ‘special motive’ if you will, a point I will 
return to below.84 The specification of the requisite intent of the crime of genocide in the 
Convention is a complex articulated structure composed of four constituent parts. Each 
can be considered in turn, but not without reference to other constituent parts. The 
determination of the meaning of each part from the set of possible interpretations enables 
and constrains the possible meanings of the other components. Below I consider each 
constituent part in turn, an exercise that is comparable to rotating a structure to 
foreground a particular component without losing reference to the whole of which it is 
only a part. 
 
2.3.2.1. “To Destroy” 
This enumeration of acts of genocide in Article II, the inclusion of certain 
measures through which a group might be destroyed and the exclusion of others, is the 
basis for arguments and interpretations concerning the first of the four mental elements of 
the crime: what it means “to destroy” a group.85 The question of what it means “to 
destroy” a group within the terms of the Convention actually encompasses two 
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intrinsically related questions—to destroy by what means and in what manner. Broadly 
speaking, both the means of that destruction and the manner of that destruction might be 
either socio-cultural or biological and physical. Groups exist and reproduce themselves 
both socially and culturally as well as physically and biologically.86 That they exist and 
reproduce socially and culturally is implicit in the very groups that the Convention 
protects. Indeed, the social cohesion of the group is the necessary prerequisite of its 
biological reproduction. But the question is, does the Convention restrict destruction 
solely to the physical or biological destruction of a group or can it embrace the 
destruction of the group through its social dissolution? And must the means used to effect 
either form of destruction be restricted exclusively to physical and biological means or 
can it also include social means? Posing the question in this way gives rise to a 
quadripartite distinction of the means and manner in which a perpetrator might destroy a 
group, not each of which would fall under the legal definition of genocide.  
What is most clearly recognizable as genocide for many is the first, the use of 
physical and biological means to effect a physical and biological destruction of a group. 
That is, direct attacks upon the bodily integrity of members of the group that evince an 
intent to prevent the group, in whole or in part, from being able to physically exist or 
biologically reproduce. The effort of the Nazi-controlled German state to use mobile 
execution squads and gas chambers to liquidate occupied Europe’s Jewish population is 
an unmistakable instance.  
The second form of destruction would be to use physical and biological attacks 
upon members of a group in order to effect its social dissolution through its dispersal and 
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eventual disappearance through assimilation. This could be achieved through measures 
designed to terrorize members of a group into fleeing a territory where they were 
concentrated or through killings that target the socio-cultural reproduction of the group, 
by killing those members of the group that have a role in such reproduction: the 
intelligentsia, cultural figures, elders, and the like. By placing emphasis on killings in the 
camps, Bosnia and Herzegovina was effectively making this argument. Persons were 
selected for the camps often on the basis of their membership in the perceived leadership 
of the targeted group.87  
The third form of destruction would be to use social or cultural means to effect the 
physical or biological destruction of a group. The forcible transfer of children from the 
group is clearly an instance of this. The removal of children clearly affects the biological 
viability of the group. But because this form of destruction is effected through the 
integration of the children into another group, that is, their forcible assimilation, it blurs 
the distinction between the third and the fourth type of destruction.  
The fourth type of destruction is the social dissolution of the group through social 
means. Although the effect upon the group is biological, this biological effect is a 
consequence of the partial social dissolution of the group. Hence, through the actus reus 
of the Convention it is possible to conclude that the Convention does in fact embrace a 
notion of the destruction of a group as socially and culturally (as well as biologically) 
reproducing entity.88 This view supports Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions. But the 
transfer of children may be a special case of a social means to effect the destruction of a 
group, whether conceived as social or biological; the transfer of children illustrates the 
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difficulties of conceptually attempting to completely separate the two, given the inherent 
biologically and socio-culturally reproducing nature of such groups as those protected by 
the Convention.  
A more general case illustrative of employing social means to effect a social form 
of destruction would be ‘cultural genocide.’ Cultural genocide is the destruction of a 
group through an attack upon its distinctive social characteristics such as its language or 
religion. What makes such a policy of suppression and substitution genocide for the 
advocates of the concept is the intent to use such measures to destroy the group. But since 
it is effected through means other than those enumerated in Article II, it is not genocide 
in terms of the Convention. The drafters of the Convention consciously rejected any 
amendments that would have categorized this manner of group destruction as genocide, 
despite the advocacy of some states.89 Although the loss of the distinct social and cultural 
characteristics of a group could eventually lead to its disappearance as a distinct 
biologically reproducing collectivity, this is not an immediate consequence. Of course the 
loss of some or many of a group’s distinctive cultural characteristics might not lead to the 
disappearance of the group as such, despite its profound transformation. An example 
would be the continued existence of the Irish people despite the successful past efforts of 
the British government to suppress their language. Whether the destruction of 
distinguishing aspects of a group’s identity leads to the social dissolution of the group in 
its entirety is clearly a matter of specific context related to such factors as the size of the 
group, its concentration and predominance within specific territories, etc. Some 
indigenous rights activists have referred to the coerced transfer of native children to 
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boarding schools as an example of cultural genocide.90 This is clearly something of an 
intermediate case and exposes the difficulty of currently formulated law to grapple with 
situations of degree (or intensity in the language certain strands of contemporary 
theory91) rather than categorical type, a matter that pertains to the Irish example as well. 
But it is one that would fall outside the definition of the actus reus, as the children are 
returned to the biologically reproducing community eventually, even if shorn of their 
cultural identity (to a degree).  
The Court’s position on the means and form of destruction is not clearly specified 
at the outset but buried in its Judgment. It is only in rejecting Bosnia’s submissions that 
the destruction of cultural monuments amounted to genocide that it expressed its position. 
It cited both the ILC Commentary on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind [sic] and the position of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Krstić to refute 
the position that “to destroy” can refer to the destruction of the group as a socially 
reproducing entity.92 Krstić stated that the form of destruction of the targeted group must 
be physical and biological, citing the ILC Commentary. It dismisses the material 
destruction of part of the group intended to effect its social dissolution as merely an 
attempt to “annihilate these elements which give to that group its own identity,” that is as  
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‘cultural genocide.’93 But the ILC Commentary it cites concerns only the rejection of the 
notion of ‘cultural genocide’ when it states:  
the destruction in question is the material destruction of a group either by 
physical or by biological means, not the destruction of the national, 
linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group. The 
national or religious element and the racial or ethnic element are not taken 
into consideration in the definition of the word “destruction”, which must 
be taken only in its material sense, its physical or biological sense.94 
The passage, like many others, drops reference to “in whole or in part” in its discussion 
of destruction and is therefore open to interpretation. The material destruction of a part of 
the group, through physical or biological means, is quite different from the destruction of 
the group’s identity through acts other than those enumerated in the Convention. Yet it is 
intrinsic to the Court’s assertion that persecutory extermination need not amount to 
genocide, and its spatialization of when it does, that “to destroy” refer to both physical or 
biological means and form of destruction.  
The Krstić passage cited by the Court asserted that this was the position of 
customary international law. However, this is not necessarily the case. The passage was 
refuting several cases in which German courts have convicted individuals for genocide, 
complicity in genocide, and aiding and abetting genocide for crimes committed elsewhere 
than Srebrenica.95 Such jurisprudence is an indication of state practice and opinio juris; 
the ILC Commentary is a scholarly work not to be automatically considered a 
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codification of customary international law.96 The German Federal Supreme Court, in 
upholding the conviction of one individual, explicitly affirmed that “to destroy” can refer 
to the destruction of the group as a “distinct social unit, and is not necessarily confined to 
its physical or biological elimination.”97 As an indicator of the diversity of opinion even 
within the UN court system, ICTY Trial Chambers have twice affirmed that “to destroy” 
can refer to the social destruction of a group, as did Justice Shahabuddeen in his 
Dissenting Opinion in Krstić.98 
 
2.3.2.2. “A Group” 
Article II defines four categories of groups protected by the Convention: national, 
ethnical, racial, and religious. It is an exhaustive list and notably excludes political and 
economic groups. Questions arise though in applying these abstract categories to the 
complexities of actually existing groups and the multiplicity of ways they are 
distinguished. It is obvious for example that some overlap can exist between the four 
groups. An ‘objective’ approach would insist upon general criteria precisely defining 
what a group is while a subjective approach would uphold that it is the perceptions of the 
perpetrators or victims that matter.99 Reference to the travaux preparatoires to clarify the 
meaning of the particular terms is not helpful. In the case of ethnic groups, the term was 
proposed in order to clarify that groups that did not have a titular state were protected. 
But it passed by a margin of one vote and states both for and against differed in their 
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opinion as to what the word meant.100 Robinson asserts that ‘ethnical’ was added so that 
national would not be interpreted to mean political groups.101 Schabas helpfully suggests 
that the four terms be considered “corner posts” defining a field within which protected 
groups fall.102 
Bosnia’s submissions referred to genocide against the “non-Serb” group in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, meaning not only Bosniaks but Croats, Hungarians, Albanians and 
others. The Court rejected Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions however and insisted 
that the group had to be defined according to positive characteristics.103 Accordingly, it 
proceeded to consider almost solely crimes against the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) group. 
Given that this group had been overwhelmingly targeted, most of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s submissions related to it. The Court could have chosen to disaggregate the 
‘non-Serb’ group into its constituent ethnicities and to consider each separately. However 
it did not; it restricted itself to considering crimes targeting members of the Bosniak 
ethnic group. Again, taking into consideration the nature of Bosnia’s submissions, the 
Court effectively treated the Bosnian government as the representative of the Bosniak 
ethnic group. There is a political context for this move by the Court. During the conflict, 
international mediators and forces insisted on referring to the Bosnian government as the 
“Bosnian Muslims,” undercutting its claims to stand for, represent, and defend a multi-
ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus reproducing the ethnicist logic of the Serb and 
Croat nationalists who sought to divide and annex Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory. 
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The Bosnian government’s civic conception of the Bosnian nation had its own 
concomitant territorial dimension, a sovereign and undivided Bosnia and Herzegovina 
within its republican borders.  
But even Bosnia and Herzegovina’s own submissions defining the targeted group 
as ‘non-Serb’ reproduced an ethnicist approach to the conflict. Had Bosnia and 
Herzegovina attempted to define the targeted group as ‘Bosnians,’ as a civic nation rather 
than an ethnic nation, it would have offered an opportunity to establish this definition as 
an acceptable way of interpreting what was meant by a ‘national’ group under the 
Convention. Such a definition would be clearly appropriate to efforts to multiethnic 
societies where the fault lines defining the targeted victims include members of the 
perpetrators’ group who resist ethnonationalist projects of reterritorialization. It will be 
for a future case before the Court to determine if a civic nation is a political group and 
hence not protected. 
  
2.3.2.3. “In Whole or in Part” 
 The amendment to include partial destruction of a group within the definition of 
genocide passed almost unanimously and is thus, at least in terms of the drafting history, 
one of the least controversial. Yet the Convention provides no guidance on exactly what 
it means. The International Law Commission Commentary on its article on genocide in 
the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind [sic] states rather 
simply that: “It is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a group 
from every corner of the globe. None the less the crime of genocide by its very nature 
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requires the intention to destroy at least a substantial part of a particular group.”104 The 
Court takes up the two main points here, the implication that destruction in part can refer 
to a geographically delimited portion of a group—derived from a rather literal reading of 
the first provision’s language—and that the destruction must be substantial when it 
appropriates its threefold criterion for destruction “in part” from the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber ruling in Krstić.105 In rank order of importance they are: substantiality, 
opportunity, and qualitative criteria. The substantiality requirement is an implicitly 
quantitative assessment of the size of the portion of the group destroyed as a measure of 
the impact of its destruction on the group as a whole.106 The second, opportunity, allows 
that genocide may be perpetrated in a geographically limited area, the area defined by the 
perpetrator's effective control.107 The Court insists that this criterion must be weighed 
against the first criterion of substantiality. If the portion of the targeted group falling 
within the perpetrator’s effective control is too small, its destruction does not amount to 
genocide as destruction “in part.” And the third, qualitative criteria, suggests that the 
symbolic or functional importance of the portion of the group targeted, rather than its 
numerical size, may allow it to meet the substantiality criterion.108 With characteristic 
vagueness, the Court finishes by stating that this list is not exhaustive and that: “Much 
will depend on the Court’s assessment of those and all other relevant factors in any 
particular case.”109 In regard to the tripartite criteria explicitly articulated, it should be 
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noted that the ICTY Trial Chamber in Krstić, whose reasoning that the massacres at 
Srebrenica constituted genocide was upheld by the Appeals Chamber, interpreted “in 
part” to refer to a “distinct part” rather than “an accumulation of isolated individuals.” 
And it interpreted this “distinct part” in spatial-geographic terms rather than social-
functional terms, articulating the position later adopted by the Court in the present case:  
A campaign resulting in the killings, in different places spread over a 
broad geographical area, of a finite number of members of a protected 
group might not thus qualify as genocide, despite the high total number of 
casualties, because it would not show an intent by the perpetrators to 
target the very existence of the group as such.110 
Conversely, in ruling that the attempt to eliminate almost the entire adult and adolescent 
male population at Srebrenica amounted to genocide, the Court found that it met all three 
criteria to meet “in part” as an element of the specific intent. Within a territorially 
delimited area defined by the perpetrator's effective control, the destruction was 
substantial and the community at Srebrenica was emblematic of the Bosniak group as a 
whole.111  
 
2.3.2.4. “As Such” 
 The fourth mental element, “as such,” is distinguished from the other three, in the 
opinion of many scholars, in that it is an element of motive rather than intent.112 That is, it 
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is an element of why something is done, rather than the intent to do something. “As such” 
was incorporated as a part of the mental element of genocide in the Convention as a 
compromise measure between those who insisted that the Convention include a 
specification of motives for destruction to qualify as genocide and those who staunchly 
opposed the inclusion of any mention of intent, fearing it would enable states or 
individuals to avoid the attribution of responsibility by simply claiming that they targeted 
a group for destruction, in whole or in part, for other motives.113 Given how the Court 
distinguishes ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide on the alleged basis of intent, that is 
arguably what has happened. States differed profoundly on whether “as such” included or 
excluded motive when voting for or against its inclusion and hence its meaning remained 
to be determined by subsequent state practice or jurisprudence.114 What is clear from the 
debate on the phrase in the travaux preparatoires is that the stakes of this debate are 
nothing less than the meaning of genocide and the power of that word to stigmatize and 
render unlawful forms of state violence different from the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews, 
Roma, and others. New Zealand insisted on an enumeration of motives in order to avoid 
rendering unlawful military violence directly and deliberately targeting civilian 
populations, such as nuclear weapons or ‘strategic bombing.’ The United Kingdom, 
which incidentally had engaged in strategic bombing against Germany on a massive 
scale, insisted that military action targeting civilians with the intent to destroy a group in 
whole or in part would in fact amount to genocide; the UK thus opposed an enumeration 
of motive.115 
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Scholars are as divided as the states were when they adopted the phrase. One 
scholar interprets “as such” as an element of motive referring to the targeting of members 
of the group on the basis of their membership within the group, that is, on the basis of 
their identity. The motive of genocide is a discriminatory motive targeting the group 
through, necessarily, attacks upon its members.116 Another interprets “as such” merely to 
require that the intent be directed toward the group, without requiring any specific 
motive.117 The International Law Commission Commentary on the phrase however has 
this to say: “The intention must be to destroy the group "as such", meaning as a separate 
and distinct entity, and not merely some individuals because of their membership in a 
particular group.”118 This reading introduces difficulties into the determination of the 
intent to commit genocide on the basis of inference. For what can distinguish an attempt 
to destroy “some individuals because of their membership in a particular group” and the 
intent to destroy a group “in part”? What pattern of manifest actions could demonstrate 
such an additional mental requirement? Substantiality? Qualitative significance? What is 
the group “as a separate and distinct entity” apart from the individuals that compose it?  
The Court’s adoption of this interpretation of the ILC opens the door to finding 
that genocide can consist of the total destruction of a group of people in a limited 
geographic area but not its partial destruction within an area defined by the opportunity of 
the perpetrator. The Court states that:  
It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they 
belong to that group, that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory 
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intent. Something more is required. The acts listed in Article II must be 
done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part. The 
words “as such” emphasize that intent to destroy the protected group.119 
The Court nods toward the fact that the intent of genocide embraces destruction in part. 
But when it here restates the intent of genocide to emphasize the determination of its 
meaning effected by the phrase “as such,” it drops the language of “in part.” This is in 
fact a constant of the discourse of those who support the Court’s interpretation of the 
meaning of genocide.120 The interpretation effectively becomes one of intent not to target 
individuals on the basis of their membership in the group and thereby to target the group 
itself on the basis of its identity, but to target the group in its totality. The way this 
interpretation avoids the legal error of rendering the language of “in part” superfluous 
and “in whole” redundant is to introduce a purely spatialized interpretation of “to 
destroy… in part,” i.e. that genocide as destruction “in part” is the total destruction of a 
group within a limited geographic area rather than its partial destruction over a wider 
area. And that interpretation itself depends on a requirement that “to destroy” refers to the 
physical and biological destruction of the targeted group both in means and form.  
 
2.3.3. Putting It Together 
 The Court had latitude of interpretation in how it could construct the intent of 
genocide, “to destroy a group, in whole or in part, as such.” The way it chose to construct 
each of the four elements, when taken together, enabled it to produce its finding that 
                                                
119 ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia, Judgment, sec. 187. 
120 See Milanović, “State Responsibility for Genocide,” 559; Milanović, “State Responsibility for 
Genocide: A Follow-Up,” 672. 
  
 
51 
genocide as destruction “in part” of a targeted group refers to the total destruction of a 
part of a group within a limited geographic area rather than the partial destruction of the 
group over a wider geographic area. First, the Court chose to interpret “to destroy” to 
refer exclusively to the physical or biological destruction of a group. Judgments of the 
ICTY had differed on whether the destruction of the group could also refer to its social 
dissolution effected through its partial physical, biological destruction. German national 
courts had embraced this latter interpretation; the Court insisted on the former. Second, 
the Court rejected Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions regarding a negative 
construction of the targeted group as non-Serbs. The positive definition of Bosniaks and  
Croats as groups falling within the definition of protected groups under the Convention 
was not however a matter of dispute between the parties, but the particular nature of the 
multiethnic Bosnian group would have implications for the Court’s interpretation of “to 
destroy.” Third, the Court interpreted “in part” according to a tripartite criterion of 
substantiality, opportunity, and significance that referred to a spatially delimited portion 
of the group sizable enough, or symbolically or functionally significant enough, to impact 
the group a whole. Fourth, the Court interpreted “as such” to refer to an intent to destroy 
the group as a separate and distinct entity rather than to a discriminatory motive targeting 
the group on the basis of its identity. When these are combined, “as such,” referring to 
“as a separate and distinct entity,” operates upon “in part” to require the (total) 
destruction of a geographically delimited portion of that group, biologically and 
physically as the Court insists. At Srebrenica, the targeting of the male population 
destroyed the ability of the community at Srebrenica as a distinct entity to biologically 
reproduce, thus meeting the Court’s definition of genocide. Had an equal or greater 
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number of persons been targeted, but not in the calculated, gender selective manner they 
had been, the Court would likely not have considered this genocide.  
Had the Court interpreted destruction to refer to an intent to destroy a group as a 
socially reproducing entity, it may have been able to find that the killings and other 
abuses targeting other localized communities, and indeed of the Bosniak group as a 
whole, amounted to genocide. As it stands, the position taken by the Court runs counter 
to that of one of the most oft-cited scholars of the Convention. Robinson had this to say 
about the meaning of “to destroy” a group “in part”:  
Genocide is not necessarily characterized by the intent to destroy a whole 
group; it suffices if the purpose is to eliminate portions of the population 
marked by specific racial, religious, national, or ethnic features.... the 
intent to destroy a multitude of persons of the same group because of their 
belonging to this group, must be classified as Genocide even if these 
persons constitute only part of a group either within a country or within a 
region or within a single community, provided the number is 
substantial.121 
Even subsequent to the Judgment, its implications for what genocide is are not fully 
appreciated. For example, Jessberger upholds the position that “in part” can refer to the 
destruction of the intellectual or spiritual leaders of a group and can be considered 
genocide in some circumstances.122 Yet the ruling made it very clear that the form of the 
destruction of the group must be physical and biological. Destruction of the elite may 
contribute to the social dissolution of the group, but this would not be genocide in the 
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Court’s view. The Court had considered Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions 
concerning killings in the camps and in towns other than Srebrenica that were overrun, 
places where the atrocities often specifically targeted at the social, political, intellectual, 
cultural, and religious elite of the Bosniaks and Croats, but rejected the argument that 
these atrocities amounted to genocide. Consequently, the Court has put forth its view that 
such targeted killings designed to weaken a group by impacting its social functioning and 
reproduction should be considered to instead amount to ‘persecution’ as a crime against 
humanity. For the Court, the intent to destroy a group in part as such is revealed by acts 
on a small scale that, if reproduced on a larger scale, must lead to the imminent physical, 
biological destruction of the group as a whole. 
 
2.4. Inferring Genocidal Intent 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions asserted that genocidal intent could be 
inferred on the basis of the overall pattern of atrocities committed during the conflict. By 
implication, it asserted that even if genocidal intent could not be inferred from the 
manifest pattern of acts that, in their relation to each other, constitute specific events, 
when these events are considered in relation to each other genocidal intent could be 
inferred. Spatially and temporally, Bosnia and Herzegovina argued that the similarity of 
acts dispersed in space and time could prove the existence of a conscious plan or policy. 
By adopting this line of reasoning, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions were 
consistent with the jurisprudence of the ICTY. In its Rule 61 hearing on the indictment 
issued by the Prosecutor, a hearing to determine if there was a reasonable chance that the 
evidence available supported the Prosecution’s accusations, the ICTY Trial Chamber in 
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Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić held that there were reasonable grounds to believe 
that the two indicted officials may have been guilty of genocide.123 The initial indictment 
was restricted to crimes committed in the camps. The Trial Chamber encouraged the 
Prosecutor to broaden the indictment, based on its belief that the specific intent of 
genocide could be inferred from the “totality” of the acts of ethnic cleansing.124 Because 
it was concerned with command responsibility, the Trial Chamber asserted that it had to 
examine whether “the pattern of conduct of which it is seised, namely “ethnic cleansing,” 
taken in its totality, reveals such a genocidal intent.”125 And that: 
The intent which is peculiar to genocide need not be clearly expressed. As 
this Trial Chamber has noted in the above mentioned Nikolić case, the 
intent may be inferred from a certain number of facts such as the general 
political doctrine which gave rise to the acts possibly covered by the 
definition in Article 4 [of the ICTY Statute, on genocide], or the repetition 
of destructive or discriminatory acts. The intent may also be inferred from 
the perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators 
themselves consider to violate, the very foundation of the group—acts 
which are not covered by the list of [enumerated acts]…126 
In several rulings, the ICTY has upheld the reasoning expressed by the Trial Chamber in 
Mladić and Karadžić.127 Indeed, the ICTR and the ICTY have often determined the 
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criminal liability of individuals by first establishing a general criminal context of 
genocide before determining whether the accused’s conduct contributed to that 
genocide.128 It is consistent also with the Elements of Crimes adopted by the International 
Criminal Court. The elements of the crime of genocide for each actus reus includes: “The 
conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against 
that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.”129  
The Court however rejected Bosnia and Herzegovina’s arguments that genocidal 
intent could be inferred from the pattern of atrocities, from individual acts considered 
within their broader context. It did so both because of the way it examined particular 
incidents and because of the way that it constructed the relationship between the intent of 
genocide and that of “ethnic cleansing.” The Court took three lines of approach to 
rejecting Bosnia and Herzegovina’s arguments. First, the Court considered some 
evidence of the general political doctrine of the Serb nationalist forces. There was no 
explicit official statement of an intent to commit genocide (unsurprisingly) so the Court 
took into consideration a statement of strategic goals of the Serb nationalists in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.130 This statement called for the territorial separation of different ethnic 
groups. The Court’s reasoning is however less than convincing when it dismisses this as 
evidence of intent. It states that separating populations through forceful expulsion need 
not involve an intent to commit genocide. The statement is thus abstracted from its 
context and its content analyzed, again, abstractly. Simply because a plan of ‘ethnic 
purification’ need not necessarily involve genocide is no argument that an actually 
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existing one did not.131 The Court sidesteps the essential issue when it constructs the 
terms with which the statement should be evaluated as a binary opposition of forcible 
expulsion and destruction (unqualified) of the targeted group.132 The question in this case 
is one of partial destruction as a means of forcible expulsion. The Court again indicates a 
propensity to efface the “in part” element of the special intent of genocide; as noted 
above, one it reintroduces only as total destruction in a limited area. Evidence the Court 
did not take into consideration during its discussion are the numerous statements of the 
political leader of the Serb nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radovan Karadžić, 
and the top military commander, Ratko Mladić. The former publicly threatened the 
Bosniak population with annihilation in the event of war and the latter, again publicly, 
explicitly used the term “genocide” to describe the political-territorial project of the Serb 
nationalists in the event of war, advising the political leadership of the necessity of 
disguising their genocidal intent from the international community.133 
Second, after dismissing evidence of intent in the form of written or verbal 
expressions, the Court addressed the question of inferring intent on the basis of the 
manifest pattern of acts.134 The Court had inferred intent in the case of the massacres at 
Srebrenica. The spatial and temporal intensity of the acts, considered in relation to their 
effect upon the targeted population, was enough for the Court to ascribe genocidal intent 
to the perpetrators. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions concerning the overall pattern 
of atrocities committed during the duration of the conflict indicated a different line of 
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argument concerning spatiality and temporality. It was the similarity of acts dispersed in 
space and time that gave evidence of a conscious plan or policy evidencing intent to 
destroy the Bosniaks, in whole or in part, as such. The Court’s rejection of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s submissions states: 
Turning now to the Applicant’s contention that the very pattern of the 
atrocities committed over many communities, over a lengthy period, 
focussed on Bosnian Muslims and also Croats, demonstrates the necessary 
intent, the Court cannot agree with such a broad proposition. The dolus 
specialis, the specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, has to 
be convincingly shown by reference to particular circumstances, unless a 
general plan to that end can be convincingly demonstrated to exist; and for 
a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would 
have to be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent.135 
The Court indicates its acceptance of at least some of what the Trial Chamber upheld in 
Karadžić and Mladić. The ICJ affirmed that “ethnic cleansing” could amount to genocide 
and that whether it did or not could be determined via inference on the basis of the 
manifest pattern of acts. It did not however simultaneously take into consideration 
important contextual evidence such as the repetition of discriminatory acts or the 
commission of acts falling outside the actus reus as proof of intent. By insisting that 
genocidal intent be proven in regard to “particular circumstances,” the Court reasserted 
its approach to the question of genocide of analyzing specific incidents in isolation from 
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each other.136 Its allowance that the manifest pattern could provide evidence of specific 
intent only if it could point to such intent bears scrutiny for it relates to how the Court 
constructed the relationship of the specific intent of genocide to other intents. In short, the 
Court considered an intent to secure control over territory by targeting members of a 
particular protected group, even if those measures include the destruction of substantial 
numbers of the targeted group, as a separate intent—potentially—from the intent to 
destroy in whole or in part. Except in cases conforming to the Court’s definition of total 
physical or biological destruction in a limited area, killing and other crimes in the service 
of terroristic expulsion constitutes acts committed with a separate rather than further 
intent. Or, at the very least, the two intents in such cases cannot be distinguished solely 
on the basis of the manifest pattern of acts. The total destruction of a localized 
community does not inherently demonstrate an intent to destroy the group as a whole, as 
opposed to merely forcibly expelling it, more than more spatially dispersed killing does. 
It does however demonstrate an intent to destroy that (geographically defined) part as a 
distinct entity. 
The Court’s third line of argument, that in numerous cases the ICTY had failed to 
indict or convict officials and agents of the Serb nationalist forces for genocide, is 
particularly problematic as a refutation of the argument from pattern.137 The personal 
sphere of responsibility of particular individuals cannot be confused with the overall 
pattern of acts in the service of the Serb nationalist project.138 A detailed examination of 
each case would be required to determine how much of the overall context of the conflict  
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each took into consideration, in conjunction with the scope of the individual’s own acts. 
The fact that the Court has reached judgment in this case prior to any verdict by the ICTY 
on the responsibility for genocide of the two paramount leaders, Karadžić and Mladić, 
both indicted for genocide in relation to acts committed elsewhere than at Srebrenica in 
July1995, cannot be ignored.139 The Court’s particular spatialization of the definition of 
genocide reached in this Judgment may very well eventually influence the ICTY in that 
case. 
In conclusion, although the Court affirms that contextual evidence can be 
probative for establishing the requisite intent of genocide, the Court considers each 
contextual element in isolation from the others. The explicit statements of officials of the 
Serb nationalist forces are considered abstractly or not at all. And it considers the 
manifest pattern of acts in isolation from other evidence. The Court’s spatialized 
construction of the specific intent of genocide, arrived at before it considers the argument 
from pattern, runs directly counter to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions. That the 
Court considers persecutory extermination as, except in very specific circumstances, 
evidence of an intent separate from that of genocide (that of forcible expulsion as a crime 
against humanity) serves to negate any possibility of inference, given the Court’s 
exclusive standard of inference. 
 
2.5. Implications and Further Questions 
Not to put too fine a point on matters, but as this was a legal proceeding the 
Court’s findings are not a verdict on the ontology of genocide as a social and material 
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event as such, but a finding on genocide as a legal construct. Genocide is something that 
exists outside of the law, but the discussion of genocide within the Court’s decision, and 
how it exists within the Convention, is precisely as a legal construct. Obviously this legal 
construct is not without social and material effects, either for the punishment of 
individuals or the assessment of reparations for states or the obligations to intervene it 
imposes upon third parties, but these do not exhaust its socio-material aspects. When 
taken into the realm of law, the question of genocide is a question of what can be proven 
within the evidentiary requirements of particular institutions, those imposed by particular 
courts in particular cases, and those of particular legal regimes more generally.  
That said, insofar as the Court pronounced judgment in this case on genocide as a 
legal construct, I will venture some conclusions based on the Court’s findings as to its 
views on what genocide is, grounded in a consideration of the concrete spatiality of the 
events in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court’s findings were not just a reflection of what 
happened in the Bosnian conflict but, importantly, of what evidence the Applicant and 
the Respondent submitted in this case and the probative value the Court chose to accord 
that evidence. Keeping in mind these dually intertwined aspects of ontology and 
epistemology forces one to recognize a degree of tentativeness in any conclusions, a 
tentativeness that derives from the Court’s vague, ‘oracular’ mode of pronouncement.140 
The Court simply summarized briefly the conflicting submissions of the parties to the 
case and then affirmed that the actus reus of genocide had been committed on a massive 
scale but that it had not been proven with the requisite intent. Though it demanded that 
genocidal intent be proven in regard to “particular circumstances,” it did not pronounce 
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judgment on specific incidents. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina presented evidence 
that Serb nationalist forces had perpetrated massacres elsewhere than at Srebrenica in 
July 1995 that those massacres exceeded the Srebrenica crime in the total number of 
victims relative to the size of the population affected. It did this specifically in relation to 
Hambarine, a community of 3,000 where 1,000 people were allegedly killed, and 
Kozarac, a community of 15,000 where evidence showed that 5,000 may have been 
killed.141 When the Court rejected Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions that these 
evidenced genocidal intent, it did not specify whether it was not satisfied that the casualty 
figures were satisfactorily proven, or, if proven, that they failed to meet its spatialized 
definition of destruction. 
What the Court may have found in this case, assuming it accepted as proven that 
killings to such an extent actually occurred—and again it gives no clear indication either 
way—is the following: First, that killings and other atrocities that may have totally 
destroyed smaller communities do not amount to genocide because each locality was 
itself too small for its destruction to be regarded as substantial, even if the number of 
victims in the aggregate equals or outnumbers that at Srebrenica. The Court demands that 
genocidal intent be proven in regard to specific events, not events taken in their aggregate 
as Bosnia and Herzegovina had argued.  
Second, killings that destroy only a portion of a population within a given locality, 
even localities of a size equivalent to Srebrenica and even killings targeting a portion 
larger than that targeted there, would not amount to genocide if they were not gender or 
age-targeted in a manner evincing an intent to destroy the community as a biologically 
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reproducing collectivity. Otherwise some members would remain, able to biologically 
reproduce and reestablish the community. The question of where a line might be drawn in 
such cases where even non-biologically selective killing would inflict such massive 
damage on an affected localized community as to be considered genocide perhaps 
remains to be seen. The Court did affirm in this case that the destruction of a part of a 
population must be physical and biological to qualify as genocide without allowing that 
the portion of the population might be partially destroyed, biologically. In a future 
hypothetical case, where perhaps as many as nine out of ten persons of a community were 
destroyed, the Court might choose to find that the remnant that remains is enough to find 
the community had not been biologically destroyed. The community might have been 
rendered economically unviable, perhaps no longer able to defend their possession of 
land from others, perhaps socio-naturally unviable in the case of communities that must 
wrest their existence in direct struggle with the forces of nature, but this may not amount 
to genocide in the view of the Court. If such destruction did not result in the displacement 
of persons from the community into conditions where the physical biological existence of 
its members could not be secured, it may, in the Court’s view, amount only to persecution 
as a crime against humanity.142  
Third, given that the Court did not find genocidal intent proven in relation to 
killings and other crimes at the camps, it is fairly certain that the Court has adopted the 
view that interpreting “as such” to refer to a distinctive part of a group means that the 
distinctive part refers to a spatially or geographically defined subset of the population and 
not to a socially defined subset of the population. Thus liquidating 8,000 persons from a 
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targeted group numbering in the millions within a restricted geographic area amounts to 
genocide if it totally destroys the group within that area but killing 80,000 members of 
the group’s perceived leadership distributed over the group’s territory does not. The 
Court provides some latitude for its future judgments when it affirms that “in any 
particular case” it would examine its threefold criterion of substantiality, opportunity, and 
importance to meet the “in part” requirement along with “all other relevant factors.”143 
On its requirement that the destruction of the targeted group be physical and biological in 
its form and not just physical and biological in its means there appears little room for 
movement. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The answer to the question of how the Court could rule a single massacre 
genocide, but not the larger campaign of violence claiming many times more lives, has 
two parts. First, the Court, using precedent established by the ICTY, takes advantage of 
the overlap between the definition of crimes against humanity in the 1945 Charter of the 
IMT-Nürnburg and the definition of genocide in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. Its 
construction of the crime against humanity of “persecution” allows it to rule that the 
deliberate and systematic extermination of a part of a group as such need not constitute 
genocide. Ethnically, nationally, or religiously discriminatory extermination, the willful 
destruction of a part of a group, may only amount to the lesser crime of persecution. 
What enables the Court to get around the apparent contradiction of denying that the 
deliberate destruction of part of a group amounts to genocide, an act that appears to 
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conform to the plain meaning of to destroy a group in whole or in part, is the Court's 
particular spatialization of the definition of to destroy “in part.” The Court maintained 
that killing in a geographically limited area may qualify as genocide. And that genocidal 
intent can be inferred only if that killing wholly destroys a geographically delimited part 
of the group as a biologically reproducing collectivity. Acts committed with the intent to 
physically, biologically destroy a part of the group in order to effect the disappearance of 
the entire group as a biologically and socio-culturally reproducing entity did not, for the 
Court, constitute genocide. This then is how the Court established that genocide as 
destruction in part means the total destruction of a part of the group within a 
geographically limited area, rather than the partial destruction of the group over a wider 
geographic area. This construction of the intent of genocide obviously contributed to the 
Court’s finding on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions that the overall pattern of 
crimes could give evidence of genocidal intent. The overlap in the manifest pattern of 
acts of persecution as a crime against humanity and genocide allows the Court to assert 
that, in regard to killings and other crimes other than at Srebrenica, genocidal intent 
cannot be exclusively inferred. The aim of “ethnic cleansing,” even if implemented in 
part through persecutory massacre, serves as a separate intent rather than a motive of 
genocide as destruction of a group in part as such. Finally the Court’s ‘oracular’ mode of 
pronouncement renders any conclusions about its implications for future cases tentative. 
Yet the Court’s insistence that the form of a targeted group’s destruction and its 
insistence on considering incidents of possible genocide in isolation from each other 
likely means that genocide as destruction in part in its future judgments will refer to 
large, localized massacres and not to entire campaigns of atrocity. The precedent 
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established will likely prove binding upon all subsequent international jurisprudence and 
has further determined the legal structure of opportunity and constraint for states resolved 
to use human rights abuses to further territorial objectives. It also profoundly affected the 
ability of the Court to find Serbia responsible for genocide and related crimes, a matter 
we turn to in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
ESTABLISHING THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 One of the most groundbreaking aspects of the decision of the Court in this case 
was that it upheld for the first time the principle that a state could be held responsible for 
genocide. The Court however was forced to derive the obligation of a state not to commit 
genocide from the text of the Convention via inference. Under the Convention signatories 
explicitly undertake to prevent and to punish genocide, but not to refrain from 
committing it themselves. Most of the substantive articles of the Convention address the 
criminal punishment of individuals; state responsibility is mentioned in only one article, 
an article of a jurisdictional rather than a substantive nature. This characteristic of the text 
enabled Serbia to mount several counterarguments to the position ultimately taken by the 
Court. In a measure of how contested the principle of state responsibility for genocide 
remains, a large minority of justices were moved to author separate opinions voicing their 
disagreement with the majority and endorsing one or more of Serbia’s arguments. To the 
extent that justices attempted to fashion a decision that would enjoy a modicum of 
consensus among the great powers and other states of the world, the scale of this dissent 
has implications for the stringency of the requirements for attribution in the rest of the 
decision. 
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3.2. State Responsibility in the Judgment of the Majority 
The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the case had been 
established precisely because the two parties to the case, both signatories of the Genocide 
Convention, differed on whether the Convention embraced the principle of state 
responsibility. Bosnia and Herzegovina argued that the Convention did not exclude any 
form of state responsibility, including for the commission of genocide.144 In contrast, 
Serbia argued that a state itself could not commit genocide. It could only be legally held 
responsible for breach of its obligations to prevent and punish genocide committed by 
individuals, obligations set forth in Articles V through VII of the Convention.145 It rather 
tellingly excluded from its argument Article IV that requires states to punish 
“constitutionally responsible rulers.”146 The principles of international responsibility 
encoded in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility assert that state responsibility is 
engaged by the official acts of its rulers.147 Recognizing this established principle of 
international responsibility, Serbia offered a subsidiary argument that state responsibility 
could only be established through the international criminal conviction of an individual 
whose position of responsibility could engage state responsibility.148 Serbia further 
argued that the only sanction states faced were declaratory judgments to the effect that 
they had violated their obligations.149  
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 As an international agreement the Convention consists mainly of provisions 
relating to the legal sanction of individuals. But there is an explicit mention of state 
responsibility for genocide in one article of the Convention. That is in Article IX, the 
compromissory clause establishing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction for disputes 
between signatories. The Article strongly supports Bosnia and Herzegovina’s position as 
it reads in its entirety:  
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those 
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other 
acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court 
of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. [emph. 
added]150 
The Article endorses the notion of state responsibility for both genocide and its ancillary 
offenses such as conspiracy or complicity. However the Court took the position that the 
article was of a jurisdictional nature and so it alone could not establish that a state could 
be held responsible for committing genocide. It found the source of the obligation not to 
commit genocide in Article I of the Convention, by which contracting parties commit 
themselves to prevent and to punish genocide. The Court held that, by necessary 
inference, it would be “paradoxical” for a state to be obligated to punish and prevent but 
not to commit that same wrongful act.151 In locating the obligation not to commit 
genocide in Article I, the Court asserted that Article I was of an operative and not merely 
preambular nature. As a result, the Court also held that the obligation of states to prevent 
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the crime of genocide was not limited to those imposed by Articles IV through VII 
relating to the punishment of individuals.  
   
3.3. Serbia’s Counterarguments 
Even though the Convention explicitly mentions state responsibility for 
(committing) genocide, Serbia produced three arguments on behalf of its contention that 
the Convention did not in fact embrace state responsibility. It is worth reviewing these 
arguments because fully one third of the justices of the Court were moved to write 
separate or dissenting opinions that would endorse various among them. First, Serbia 
appealed to the nature of genocide as a crime and reigning principles of international 
responsibility. It asserted that to hold a state responsible for genocide under the 
Convention would amount to holding it criminally responsible and that international law 
did not provide for the criminal responsibility of states. In rejecting this argument, the 
Court agreed that international law did not uphold that form of responsibility for states 
but that a state would still be held responsible for violations, that responsibility would 
simply consist of ordinary international responsibility, not criminal.152 Second, Serbia 
appealed to the preponderant focus of the substantive provisions of the Genocide 
Convention as an agreement. It argued that the Convention was solely an instrument of 
international criminal law, intended for the punishment of individuals. The bulk of the 
articles specifying state obligations do in fact refer to measures for the prosecution, 
extradition, and punishment of individuals. The Court however rejects this argument on 
the basis of the duality of state and individual responsibility recognized in the Rome 
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Statute of the International Criminal Court and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 
The Commentary of the ILC on Article 58 of its Articles on State Responsibility asserts 
that:  
[T]he question of individual responsibility is in principle distinct from the 
question of State responsibility. The State is not exempted from its own 
responsibility for internationally wrongful conduct by the prosecution and 
punishment of the State officials who carried it out.153 
The Court insisted upon its reading of Article I as an operative and not 
preambular article. When Article I is read in conjunction with Article III, the 
Convention imposes obligations on states that are distinct from those it imposes 
on individuals. Serbia’s argument failed on the basis of the text of the Convention 
read in light of established rules of state and individual responsibility. Third, it 
attempted the same argument as above only attempting to ground it this time in 
the drafting history of the Convention, the travaux preparatoires.154 The Court 
noted that in the drafting history the rejection of certain amendments concerning 
state responsibility did not indicate a rejection of state responsibility as such, but 
only the rejection of the criminal responsibility of states.155 Serbia’s arguments 
were thus rejected and the Court affirmed that the Convention embraced a non-
criminal notion of state responsibility. 
In conclusion, the Court rejected Serbia’s arguments against the 
responsibility of states for the commission of genocide and ancillary offenses, 
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based on the text of the Convention and principles of international responsibility. 
In doing so, it affirmed that as a document the Convention established both 
individual and state responsibility and that the state responsibility it established 
was noncriminal in nature. Serbia attempted to exploit the fact that state 
responsibility is only alluded to in one article of the Convention. Its presence in 
only one article is a measure of how contested the notion of state responsibility 
was during the drafting process.156 How contested it remains is reflected in the 
support for Serbia’s arguments by judges opposed to the majority’s ruling. Since 
their opinions incorporate the notion of an as yet not existing international regime 
of state criminal responsibility, I will next address what distinguishes such a 
regime from the one that currently exists. 
 
3.4. The Criminal Responsibility of States Versus Ordinary State Responsibility 
Even though state criminality is not currently an accepted feature of the 
international regime of state responsibility, it is a notion that has at times had significant 
support among states. These states have supported the idea that whether considered as 
violations of norms so fundamental that no derogation is ever permitted (jus cogens)157 or 
violations of universal obligations (obligations erga omnes)158 there are certain wrongful 
acts that are of such gravity that they are fundamentally different than other wrongful 
acts. These acts concern not only the states directly involved but the international 
community as whole because they pose a fundamental challenge the normative structure 
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of the international order. Genocide is an example.159 A provision for state criminal 
responsibility had been included as Article 19 of the ILC’s 1996 Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, but the ILC dropped this article in subsequent drafts and it does not 
appear in the final text officially adopted by the UN in 2001, the ILC Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The inclusion of the Article 
was so strenuously opposed by some states that it threatened to undermine the entire 
project of drafting articles on state responsibility.160 
The ILC’s final Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, James Crawford, 
intervened in the debate over the article to assert that it did not establish a true regime of 
criminal responsibility and that in fact there was no support even among proponents of 
Article 19 to establish such a regime.161 According to Crawford, a true international 
regime of criminal responsibility for states would have to include five elements: First, 
there would have to be properly defined international crimes in accord with the principle 
of nullem crimen sine lege. Second and third, there would have to be an adequate 
procedure for investigation and a system of due process. Fourth, there would have to be 
sanctions that would exist “over and above any ‘tortious’ or ‘civil’ liability” owed to 
particular persons or entities.162 And fifth, there would have to be a system by which state 
could expunge itself of guilt and revert to a noncriminal status. The proposed Article 19 
had lacked any of these elements and so the question remained whether it was simply 
using the term “crimes” to refer to very serious breaches of obligations owed to the 
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international community of states rather than only wrongs toward a particular state or 
states.163  
Even though the notion of state criminality proved divisive enough to potentially 
sabotage the entire project of drafting agreed upon principles of international state 
responsibility, the concept of recognizing breaches of obligations of extraordinary 
seriousness was not entirely abandoned. The final draft of the ILC Articles contains two 
paired articles, 40 and 41, that establish the obligations that arise from serious breaches of 
peremptory norms of international law. These no longer include any notion of punitive 
sanction upon the state committing such a breach, but instead impose obligations upon 
the members of the international community of states in regard to such violations. States 
must endeavor to lawfully bring an end to and to not recognize as lawful any situation 
created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm.164 This goes beyond the obligation 
imposed by Article 16 not to provide aid or assistance in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act. A state not directly involved in bringing about an unlawful 
state of affairs still has obligations in regard to such situations.  
Crawford maintains that there is no inherent problem with the concept of 
“international crimes.” He notes in particular that the crime of genocide is almost always 
carried out by states. The problem is rather a lack of appropriate institutions to enforce 
such a regime of international responsibility.165 Be that as it may, questions remain as to 
how suitable it is to apply the regime of ordinary international responsibility to a crime 
such as genocide. One author has remarked that the Court in upholding such an 
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application has created the notion of “civil genocide.”166 As will be seen below in 
Chapter IV on reparations, a civil regime of liability for genocide given existing 
principles of international responsibility had direct implications for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s ability to obtain financial compensation as reparation for Serbia’s 
breaches of its obligations under the Genocide Convention. 
 
3.5. Separate and Dissenting Opinions on State Responsibility 
The finding of the Court that a state itself could be held responsible for genocide 
was one of its most contested findings. Fully one-third of all the Judges issued separate or 
dissenting opinions voicing their disagreement. Each of these contrary opinions embraced 
one or more of the arguments propounded by Serbia. The bases of the arguments put 
forth, their soundness even, is a measure of the commitment of the justices to the aims 
and purposes of the Convention relative to other concerns. In addition, the justices in 
these separate and dissenting opinions also make important points about the inherent 
limitations of the Genocide Convention and the International Court of Justice for 
implementing a regime of state accountability for genocide.  
In his Separate Opinion Judge Owada endorses Serbia’s argument that the 
Convention is only an international criminal law document establishing individual and 
not state responsibility. Judge Owada agrees with the majority that a state is obligated not 
to commit genocide but that since this obligation is not explicitly stated in the text of the 
Convention it falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court, under the Convention at least. 
The principle of attribution that establishes state responsibility for genocide is a matter of 
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customary international law and not of the Convention. He acknowledges that Article IX 
refers to state responsibility, but because Article IX is compromissory and not substantive 
in nature, its reference to state responsibility is merely declaratory.167 Article IX only 
refers to state responsibility but it does not establish it. Judge Owada’s argument is that it 
is an unjustified infringement on state sovereignty to read into a treaty an obligation that 
is not explicitly stated. However, if states are not free to commit genocide as a matter of 
customary international law and that this understanding preceded and underwrote the 
Convention, it is difficult to understand how it would be an unjustified infringement of 
state sovereignty to interpret the Convention in light of this. The Convention cannot be 
understood to take away a right that does not exist. He refers to the travaux preparatoires 
to suggest that states did not understand that agreeing to the Convention with the 
language of Article IX would commit them not to commit genocide and to assume 
responsibility for it under the Convention. Instead he asserts that the reference establishes 
the jurisdiction of the Court in matters of state responsibility for genocide under 
customary international law and not under the Convention itself.168  
Judge Skotnikov for his part also endorses the majority opinion that a state can be 
held responsible for genocide. Like Owada he rejects the notion that a state can be held 
responsible for directly committing genocide, but that he maintains that it can be found 
responsible via attribution. Unlike Owada, he does not argue that state responsibility via 
attribution falls outside the scope of the Convention. His insistence that there is no 
obligation on states not to commit genocide, only an obligation on individuals not to 
commit genocide and if they do and are state officials the responsibility of the state is 
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engaged, may sound like a distinction without a difference. But it enables Judge 
Skotnikov to proceed with an argument about the proper international legal division of 
labor between the ICJ and international criminal tribunals. He argues ultimately that it is 
impossible to find that genocide has been committed without an individual being 
convicted of genocide or a related offense as defined by the Convention.169 
 His argument is based on the nature of genocide as a crime. He upholds Serbia’s 
argument that genocide is intrinsically a crime and that to hold that a state could commit 
an act that in terms of individual responsibility would be a crime is to endorse the notion 
of state criminal responsibility. No such form of state responsibility is generally held to 
exist. Therefore, to uphold state responsibility for genocide as a general form of 
international responsibility would be to “decriminalize” genocide. Because genocide as a 
crime necessitates the finding of individual responsibility, determining that genocide has 
in fact been committed lies outside the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Only the International 
Criminal Court or ad hoc tribunals established by the Security Council are competent to 
determine that genocide has been committed. Only if an international criminal tribunal 
has established that genocide has been committed by individuals can the ICJ then use 
such a finding to determine whether the international responsibility of a state is engaged 
or not. He thus endorses another of Serbia’s arguments, that the Court may not find a 
state responsible for genocide in the absence of the conviction of an individual for 
genocide or a genocide related offense. However, Judge Skotnikov insists the ICJ must 
not simply accept the findings of the ICTY but must subject them to judicial review and 
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reject them if it determines that they do not adequately conform to the requirements of 
the Genocide Convention as the Court interprets it.170  
For Skotnikov this review is necessary because the jurisdiction of the ICJ is 
limited to the application of the Genocide Convention. The statutes of the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia incorporate 
Articles II and III of the Convention verbatim into their articles on the crime of genocide, 
but the statutes also contain additional provisions not found in the Convention. These 
statutory provisions have been applied to the crime of genocide and thus have given rise 
to jurisprudence that could not have been derived from the application of the Convention 
alone. In the two convictions for genocide related offenses that the Court cites as proof 
that genocide had been committed at Srebrenica, those of General Krstić and Radovoje 
Blagojević, both individuals convicted were convicted of aiding and abetting genocide, a 
crime that does not exist among the ancillary offenses of Article III of the Convention.171  
Why it should matter if an individual’s liability is characterized as aiding and 
abetting or complicity is not immediately evident. In either case it is established that 
genocide has been committed. Skotnikov makes clear his reasoning however when he 
states that the intent necessary for a crime to constitute genocide is a mental element that 
must be established in relation to an individual perpetrator, not to acts or events 
themselves. Thus the absence of a conviction of any individual for genocide means that 
an event itself cannot be characterized as genocide. And further, a conviction for an 
ancillary offense not found in the Genocide Convention places its affirmation that 
genocide had been committed outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. Aiding and 
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abetting in the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence is essentially a conviction for complicity 
where the Tribunals were not satisfied that it had been proven that the convicted shared 
the specific intent of genocide with those who committed the physical acts of genocide.172 
Skotnikov takes this roundabout way to denying one of the central tenets of the Judgment 
of the majority, that a state can be found responsible for genocide in the absence of an 
individual criminal conviction for genocide.173 The ICJ was highly dependent upon the 
ICTY and its findings of fact in the current case. Enormous resources and a particular 
power relationship between Serbia and the international community enabled the ICTY to 
operate. Imposing this requirement, while in many respects sensible given the limitations 
of the Court, makes it even more difficult to find a state responsible for genocide. 
Judge Tomka in contrast endorses Serbia’s argument that the principle of state 
responsibility is wholly excluded from the Convention. He insists that the Convention is 
solely an international criminal law instrument. He upholds Serbia’s argument that a 
state’s obligations under the Convention extend only to fulfilling measures relating to the 
punishment of individuals as specified in Articles IV through VII. Like Serbia he 
supports his position with reference both to the fact that the bulk of its substantive 
provisions concern only individual responsibility and through reference to the drafting 
history. He notes that during the drafting, amendments incorporating the notion of state 
(criminal) responsibility were repeatedly rejected.174  
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How then does Tomka deal with the reference to state responsibility in the 
compromissory clause? Tomka makes a point deriving from consideration of the precise 
moment in the drafting history that the amendment for what became Article IX was 
proposed, discussed, and adopted. This occurred only when the statutory provision for an 
international tribunal, as opposed to relying solely on national courts of the state upon 
whose territory genocide had been committed, had been removed from the draft 
convention. Some states supported the language in Article IX because it represented a 
compromise on their desire to incorporate a notion of state criminal responsibility (the 
United Kingdom and Belgium), while for others it was acceptable as a substitute only for 
an international criminal tribunal judging individual responsibility (France and Brazil). 
His argument is that since the provision for an international tribunal was later added back 
in, the inclusion of the notion of state responsibility in Article IX cannot be interpreted as 
assent on the part of signatories to the principle.175 Although his argument is invaluable 
for suggesting that the amount of support that existed among states in 1947 for state 
responsibility was even less than it might first appear, the fact remains that these states 
signed and ratified the treaty as written.  
Judges Shi and Koroma in their Joint Declaration also support Serbia’s argument 
that the Convention wholly excludes state responsibility for genocide. They endorse 
Serbia’s arguments that the Convention is an international criminal law instrument, the 
provisions of which are directed solely toward the punishment of individuals. They even 
interpret the commitment in Article IV to punish state leaders as a conscious attempt to 
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exclude the possibility of state responsibility via attribution.176 Genocide moreover is a 
crime and to hold a state responsible would be to hold it criminally responsible. Even 
though the majority Judgment made it clear that Serbia’s responsibility was civil or 
tortious they repeatedly insist on this point. When rejecting the possibility of reparations 
for genocide, Judges Shi and Koroma even refer to punitive damages, an essential 
component of an international regime of criminal responsibility but one the majority on 
the Court did not contemplate. The majority went to great lengths to apply civil or 
tortious standards to the award of reparations, but the Judges are loathe to give the notion 
of civil responsibility even scant consideration. Unlike Tomka however, they support the 
majority’s conclusion that the Convention imposes an obligation to prevent genocide that 
is not limited to the measures to punish individuals specified in Articles IV through 
VII.177  
Finally, Judge ad hoc Kreća, appointed to the Court to represent Serbia, endorses 
the Respondent’s position that the Convention excludes state responsibility and echoes 
Serbia’s main arguments. He rejects the possibility of inferring a state responsibility not 
to commit genocide from Article I of the Convention, arguing that it is impermissible on 
the basis of general rules of international legality because doing so would impose on 
states an obligation that they have not explicitly agreed to. The Convention in his 
interpretation provides only for the prosecution of individuals. He also argues that since 
genocide is a crime, to hold a state responsible would be to hold it criminally 
responsible.178  
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To summarize, six judges of the fifteen on the bench disagreed with the finding of 
the majority that the Convention established a direct obligation on states not to commit 
genocide. Four of these six judges concurred with Serbia that state responsibility as such 
was wholly excluded from the Convention. For these judges the Convention is solely an 
instrument of individual criminal accountability. Two of the six, Skotnikov and Owada, 
repudiated direct state responsibility but accepted the possibility of state responsibility 
via attribution. However, Judge Owada argued that the mention of state responsibility in 
the jurisdictional clause established that the International Court of Justice could 
adjudicate state responsibility for genocide, but under customary law rather than the 
Convention, placing it outside the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. For his part, Judge 
Skotnikov ruled that the Court could under the Convention adjudicate state responsibility, 
but that it could not establish that genocide had occurred. Only the conviction of an 
individual for genocide or a related offense under Article III of the Convention by an 
international criminal tribunal such as the ICTY could. Given the Court’s limitations and 
the nature of genocide as a crime, only a criminal tribunal could through convicting an 
individual. Though these judges did not prevail in their efforts to exclude or severely 
curtail the possibility of the Court finding a state responsible for genocide, they would be 
able to carry their opposition into the Court’s efforts to establish Serbia’s responsibility 
by supporting standards of evidence and attribution that would make it very difficult, if 
not impossible, to find a state responsible for genocide. Insofar as justices less opposed to 
the principle than these would seek to craft a ruling that would enjoy a modicum of 
international consensus, the strenuousness of this opposition cannot but have had an 
effect.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
 The finding of the Court that a state itself could be held responsible for genocide 
was an important advance in fulfilling the aims and purposes of the Convention. 
Genocide is almost always committed by and through a bureaucratic state apparatus. The 
distribution of culpability within such structures is not adequately captured by a singular 
focus on individual responsibility.179 Adjudicating state responsibility can play an 
important role in transitional justice. Judicial processes could serve the purpose of 
establishing a narrative of events that would capture more than could be achieved solely 
through a focus on individuals.180 The possibility of reparations can serve as a deterrent 
and sanction for culpable structures that would remain in place even if some responsible 
officials were prosecuted and punished. It is too easy at present for a state to simply hand 
over an individual leader while leaving the organizational structures responsible for 
genocide in place. Reparations can also redress some of the damage inflicted upon a 
targeted group. Moreover, the stigma of being judged responsible for genocide can also 
serve as an important deterrent for a state.181  
 The Court in this case found that a state could be directly responsible for genocide 
in addition to attribution from the criminal conviction of an individual. However it was 
forced to establish the state’s obligation not to commit genocide and related offenses via 
inference rather than via any explicit reference in the text of the Convention. The obvious 
unease of many states during the drafting of the Convention, the concern that they 
themselves and not just the defeated Axis powers could be found responsible for 
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genocide, finds expression in the Convention’s lack of specificity or substantive 
engagement with the matter of state responsibility. That unease still exists and finds 
expression in the numerous opinions dissenting from the majority’s ruling on state 
responsibility. That unease would carry forward and influence the Court’s application of 
the principle of responsibility, the matter we turn to next.  
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CHAPTER IV 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE ITSELF 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 The Court was tasked with determining whether Serbia was responsible for 
breaches of the Genocide Convention as a result of its involvement in the conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. It therefore had to grapple with Serbia’s conscious political-
territorial strategy of attempted legal immunization, the formation of the Republika 
Srpska and its army, the VRS, as formally separate entities. The Court had determined 
that only the Srebrenica massacres amounted to genocide, so its inquiry into the 
attribution of responsibility was restricted solely to those events. Based on its 
interpretation of Article I, the Court had determined that a state’s obligations included 
obligations not to commit genocide, to refrain from committing any of the ancillary 
genocidal offenses, and to undertake measures to prevent genocide beyond those relating 
to the punishment of individuals. Genocide and the ancillary offenses in Article III of the 
Convention were formulated in terms of criminal law. The Court therefore had to 
translate these into appropriate standards of international responsibility. Because the 
responsibility to prevent had to be inferred, the Convention offered no specific guidance 
as to what this responsibility might consist of. The Court was therefore on very novel 
legal ground. However the Court would proceed, its findings were bound to be the 
subject of controversy.  
The Court took a stepwise approach to examining the question of Serbia’s 
responsibility: first for the crime of genocide itself, then the other genocidal offenses of 
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Article III such as complicity, and then the obligations to prevent and to punish genocide. 
In the Court’s view, a positive finding of responsibility for genocide would obviate the 
need to determine whether Serbia had committed ancillary genocidal offenses of Article 
III. It reasoned that conspiracy and incitement would be subsumed by responsibility for 
genocide and that attempt and complicity would each logically contradict it. It did not 
find Serbia responsible for either genocide or the ancillary offenses; regardless of how it 
would have determined Serbia’s responsibility for offenses under Article III, it would 
have addressed whether Serbia had complied with its concurrent obligations to prevent 
and punish the crime of genocide under Article I. The Court found Serbia responsible for 
failure to prevent and failure to punish. Yet it did not award Bosnia and Herzegovina 
reparations in the form of monetary compensation; it offered only declaratory 
satisfaction. In this chapter I will consider how the Court addressed the question of 
Serbia’s responsibility for genocide itself. In subsequent chapters I will consider how it 
addressed the secondary forms of liability—the ancillary genocidal offenses, failure to 
prevent, failure to punish—and the issue of reparations. The Court achieved its verdict 
exonerating Serbia of responsibility for genocide itself by not seeking evidence relevant 
to the case, by dismissing the probative value of an acknowledgement of responsibility by 
Serbian leaders, and through the standards of evidence and attribution it imposed for the 
various tests of responsibility it applied and how it chose to treat the formal separate 
political-territorial status of the Republika Srpska and its organs. 
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4.2. Admission of Responsibility by Serbian Authorities 
Before the Court moved to an in depth examination of the issue of Serbia’s 
responsibility for genocide it summarily dismissed what would ordinarily be considered 
one of the most compelling forms of evidence: a public declaration acknowledging 
responsibility by officials of the accused state. The declaration was made by the Council 
of Ministers of the Serbia and Montenegro following the airing of a video on Serbian 
television depicting members of the military formation the “Scorpions”182 torturing and 
executing Bosniak prisoners taken during the conquest of Srebrenica, the Council of 
Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro issued a public declaration that:  
Those who committed the killings in Srebrenica, as well as those who 
ordered and organized that massacre represented neither Serbia nor 
Montenegro, but an undemocratic regime of terror and death, against 
whom the majority of citizens of Serbia and Montenegro put up the 
strongest resistance.183 
The meaning of the statement that the perpetrators of the Srebrenica massacres 
“represented” the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević is open to some interpretation. It 
nonetheless implies a degree of connection that would in all likelihood give rise to 
complicity at the very least. The statement, through its reference the anti-Milošević 
protests,184 acknowledges the responsibility of the Serbian government, the 
“undemocratic regime of terror and death” in its formulation, to whatever degree. But the 
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Court dismisses it as a “political” declaration that could not be a legal admission of 
responsibility since that would go against Serbia’s submissions to the Court both before 
and after the statement.185  
The Court’s stance clearly relies on a unitary understanding of the state as actor. 
States are not monoliths however but assemblages of organs and persons that can and do 
work at cross-purposes knowingly or unknowingly. It is entirely possible—in fact it 
seems likely—that the Council of Ministers made the statement without consulting 
Serbia’s international legal advisors and without being fully cognizant of the legal 
consequences that would follow from such an admission. In his Dissenting Opinion, 
Judge Al-Khasawneh took note of the context and intention of the statement, the desire of 
a new post-Milošević government to distance itself from the previous regime and 
affirmed its probative value, in keeping with established ICJ jurisprudence regarding 
statements of public officials of a party to a case that are unfavorable to its cause.186 
Having dismissed the probative value of the statement of the Council of Ministers, the 
Court then settled down to analyze the other evidence and arguments brought forward by 
the parties concerning Serbia’s responsibility for genocide.  
 
4.3. Three Tests of Responsibility for Genocide 
The Court applied three separate tests of responsibility to determine if Serbia’s 
responsibility for breaches of Article III (a), the obligation not to commit genocide, was 
engaged by the Srebrenica massacres: the involvement of de jure organs, de facto organs, 
and direction or control over non-state organs. These three tests of responsibility sought 
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to ascertain, respectively, whether individuals or organs of Serbia having the status of 
official state organs under its internal law were directly involved in the massacres, 
whether organs merely lacking official recognition as organs of Serbia but operating as 
such were involved, or whether non-state organs committed genocide at Srebrenica while 
acting upon Serbia’s instructions or under its control. The political-territorial separation 
of the Republika Srpska from Serbia made a variable contribution to each test. Its most 
significant contribution was to Serbia’s avoidance of attribution on the basis of the 
conduct of de jure organs. It both rendered the conduct of the Republika Srpska forces 
not attributable, and it raised the bar for the evidence that Bosnia was required to submit 
to prove Serbia’s responsibility was engaged even by the participation of Serbia’s own 
official organs in the massacres. Second, that political-territorial separation was alone not 
enough for Serbia to avoid attribution of responsibility under the de facto organ test. The 
degree of operational autonomy enjoyed by the VRS and other Republika Srpska forces 
was necessary for Serbia to avoid attribution under this test, given the threshold of 
attribution adopted by the Court. Third, the Republika Srpska’s separate political-
territorial status established a precondition for the application of the direction and control 
test, as it did for the de facto test, but did not contribute to Serbia’s avoidance of 
responsibility. Here the spatio-temporal delimitation—augmented by the Court’s 
abstraction of the acts of killing from the sequence of events of which they were a part—
enabled Serbia to avoid attribution. In discussing each of these tests below, I expand on 
the question of the latitude of interpretation the Court had in relation to each. 
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4.3.1. De Jure Organ Test of Responsibility 
The Court first addresses the most direct form of state responsibility for genocide, 
when it is committed by the state through one or more of its own organs. Article 4 of the 
ILC Articles on State Responsibility declares that the conduct of any organ of the state 
will engage the responsibility of the state as a whole. That organ can be an organ of the 
central government or that of a territorial unit of the state, and it derives its status as an 
organ from the state’s internal law.187 The Republika Srpska was not a territorial unit of 
Serbia according to its internal law. So proving Serbia’s direct responsibility for the 
commission of genocide would require proving that official organs of Serbia participated 
in the genocidal massacres, either as complete units or as individuals serving with the 
Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS), and that that conduct could be attributed to Serbia. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina attempted to establish Serbia’s responsibility on two bases: that 
individual officers of the Serbia-controlled Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) served with the 
VRS and that the purported paramilitary unit, the “Scorpions”, was in fact an organ of 
Serbia under its internal law. That the Court did not find Serbia responsible on this basis 
is, broadly speaking, the result of two factors. First, the Court chose to rely on an abstract 
assumption, that of regarding the Republika Srpska effectively as an independent state 
despite its extraordinary dependence on Serbia and the fact that it was not a recognized 
state according to international law. And second, there is the contingent circumstance of 
the probative evidence available to the Court given the timing of the Judgment relative to 
ongoing trials at the ICTY and the Court’s dependence on the ICTY to establish matters 
of fact. 
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 In its first attempt to prove the direct involvement Serbia via de jure organs, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina asserted that officers serving in the VRS remained officers of 
the VJ. It drew attention to the role that Serbia took in the administration of officers of 
theVRS via the VJ’s 30th Personnel Center that handled their pay, promotions, and 
pensions—including it alleged of the commander of the VRS, Mladić. Some officers of 
the VRS even retained their rank within the VJ. Despite the evidence this provides of the 
Republika Srpska’s lack of essential state capacity, the Court took note of all of this and 
determined that it amounted merely to support of the Republika Srpska. It does not 
conclude that these officers thereby remained organs of Serbia. It maintains that “in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary,” these officers were to be considered agents of the 
authority of the Republika Srpska.188 The Court says Mladić’s status as an officer of the 
VJ was not proven, a point debated by Judge ad hoc Mahiou. Mahiou points out that in 
1994 Mladić was promoted as an officer within the VJ, something that would make little 
sense if he were not an officer of the VJ.189 Because VRS commanders were appointed to 
their positions by the Republika Srpska, the Court insisted they were to be considered 
formally subordinated to its authority.190 Had the Republika Srpska not been a formally 
separate political territory the Court would not have been able to make this assertion. 
The Court chose to rely on this abstract assumption without an attempt to engage 
with the concrete reality of the actual relationship between the VRS and the political 
authorities of the Republika Srpska and to justify its position. The subordination it cites 
was in scant evidence at the time of the massacres. Mladić at that time was openly 
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defying the authority of Karadžić, President of the Republika Srpska. The two had long 
been at odds. Karadžić had broken with Milošević in 1994 and feared Mladić as a rival, 
as the latter retained his close ties and demonstrated personal loyalty to the leadership in 
Belgrade. Karadžić had taken the opportunity presented by VRS losses of territory in 
western Bosnia and Herzegovina and attempted to remove Mladić from his position of 
command just weeks before the takeover of Srebrenica. Mladić simply refused to go and 
by exposing Karadžić’s impotence emerged the stronger of the two. Mladić continued to 
work closely with Milošević while Milošević publicly snubbed the Karadžić, 
demonstrating the absence of real sovereignty of the Republika Srpska vis-à-vis Serbia.191  
At the time of the Srebrenica massacres, Mladić was conferring closely with Milošević 
while Karadžić was unaware of their meetings.192  
To understand the relationship of the VRS and the Republika Srpska it is helpful 
to recall the attitude toward political authority of its parent army, the JNA. The JNA in 
the 1980s began to put about that it was Yugoslavia’s ‘seventh republic.’ At a time when 
significant power had been devolved to the constituent republics of Yugoslavia, the 
federal army let it be known that it saw itself as having, at the very least, coequal status 
with them in the formation of federal policy. It had established the political economic 
basis for its autonomy in the 1970s through the development of a military industrial 
complex that earned significant revenue from arms exports. Its vision for Yugoslavia was 
to undo the constitutional changes that had brought about the devolution of powers to the 
republics and to recentralize Yugoslavia in a new political and military order. This it felt 
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was necessary to prevent the dissolution of the federal state.193 At the time of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, the JNA disregarded orders from the federal political 
authorities in pursuit of its own agenda of first attempting to keep the federation together 
and then to carve out a Greater Serbia in alliance with the leadership of the Republic of 
Serbia and radical right Serb nationalists.194 The JNA pursued its own agenda as an organ 
of the federal state and did not see itself inherently subordinated to the constituent 
republics, separatist parastates, or even other organs of the federal government such as 
the presidency. The military chose its own masters as it saw fit, its attitude evoking 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the war machine.195 It is unsurprising that the 
culture of military autonomy of the JNA would continue in the VRS.  
Also, there was a deep affinity between the leadership of the VRS and the 
political and military leadership of Serbia that did not exist between the VRS and the 
political leadership of the Republika Srpska. The leadership of the VRS and Milošević’s 
Serbia emerged out of the Communist structures and social milieu of the former 
Yugoslavia. In contrast, the paramilitaries and the political leadership of the Republika 
Srpska were composed of anti-Communist dissidents who identified with the monarchist 
far right, the Chetniks, that had been defeated by the Communist Partisans during the 
Second World War. Memories of his own family’s losses during the bitter conflict 
between Chetniks and Communists during the Second World War had made Mladić 
reluctant to wear the neo-monarchist cap of the VRS uniform.196  Milošević had ridden to 
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power by co-opting the nationalist sentiments and agenda of the anti-Communist far 
right, but the relationship between the nationalist socialists and the monarchists was 
marked by periods of both political conflict and cooperation.197 The fraying relationship 
between Mladić and Karadžić is simply another example. The nationalist far right 
provided Milošević with a sought after degree of plausible deniability but were discarded 
when they challenged his authority and direction. 
But if it cannot simply be assumed that the VRS was subordinated to the political 
authorities of the Republika Srpska, how can one then characterize the relationship 
between the VRS and the political authorities of Serbia. Was the relationship of support 
so close as to make the VRS an organ of Serbia? What was the relationship between the 
VRS and VJ? Some sources concur with the ICJ in its judgment that the VRS maintained 
a significant degree of effective autonomy from Serbia and the VJ.198 Yet Carla Del 
Ponte, who has had access to the unredacted minutes of the Supreme Defense Council of 
Serbia, has declared that they prove that Serbia directed and controlled the war effort in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and, moreover, that units of Serbia’s Interior Ministry Police 
participated in the preparations for the massacres.199 Though the Court often relies on the 
ICTY to establish facts and their legal characterization, it does so selectively. It does not 
cite the finding of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Brdjanin that the 
establishment of the VRS was “ merely a ploy” to disguise Serbia’s continued illegal 
intervention.200  
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Bosnia and Herzegovina’s second effort to prove Serbia’s responsibility through 
the conduct of de jure organs was to assert that the supposed paramilitary unit, the 
“Scorpions,” was in fact a de jure organ of Serbia’s Interior Ministry Police. The Court, 
however, did not regard the evidence produced by Bosnia and Herzegovina convincing. 
Bosnia was able to produce evidence that the unit had that status in 1991 during the war 
in Croatia, but not evidence that they retained that status in 1995 at the time of the 
massacres. It also produced intercepts of internal communications of Republika Srpska 
officials in which they referred to the “Scorpions” as a unit of Serbia’s Interior Ministry 
Police (MUP). The Court dismissed this evidence because it did not emanate from Serbia 
itself and so could not be considered probative of the unit’s status according to Serbia’s 
internal law. The Court concludes by citing a principle it derives from the ILC Articles 
that the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of another state is attributable to that 
other state.201 Even if it had been proven that the “Scorpions” were a de jure organ, the 
Court would not have automatically attributed their conduct to Serbia. It would have 
required proof that they were not ‘seconded’ to the Republika Srpska. 
That Serbia was not found responsible on the basis of acts of the “Scorpions” was 
a result both of this legal finding and evidentiary matters relating to the willingness and 
capacity of the Court to determine matters of fact. The Court as noted had not chosen to 
seek to obtain the unredacted minutes of the Supreme Defense Council of the FRY. The 
unredacted minutes are a part of the evidence in two ongoing cases before the ICTY, each 
of officers of de jure organs of Serbia charged with responsibility for crimes committed 
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These cases could shed important light on both the overall 
relationship between the VJ and the VRS and whether the “Scorpions” were in fact de 
jure organs of Serbia. The Court acknowledges one of these, The Prosecutor v. Jovica 
Stanišić and Franko Simatović202, could definitively prove the status of the 
“Scorpions.”203 It does not acknowledge the other, The Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić.  
The ICTY Indictment of Momčilo Perišić, the Chief of the General Staff and most 
senior officer of the VJ during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provides a portrait of 
a degree of functional integration between the VRS and VJ that defies simple 
categorization.204 The picture that emerges is of an articulated assemblage of military 
machines joined for a common purpose with an ontological status as such that may not be 
simply reducible to the either/or of an organ of the parastate or the parent state. The 
indictment indicates that officers transferred freely back and forth between the VRS and 
VJ, a highly anomalous situation for the militaries of separate states. The indictment 
alleges that many high ranking officers of the VRS, including General Mladić, retained 
their rank within the VJ and that their promotions as officers of the VJ had to be 
approved by Belgrade regardless of any promotion they might have received in the VRS. 
Though the Court dismissed its significance when Bosnia had been able to submit 
evidence, the handling of the promotion of Mladić by the Supreme Defense Council of 
the FRY suggests that the VJ maintained overall authority. Notions that VJ personnel 
were ‘seconded’ to the VRS must be seen in this light. According to its rules of evidence, 
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the Court would not assign probative value to an ICTY indictment. But if a final 
judgment in the Perišić case had been rendered before the ICJ rendered judgment in the 
Bosnia v. Serbia Genocide Case, the latter may have turned out very differently. Given 
the details of operational realities provided the Supreme Defense Council records that the 
Court did avail itself of, simply assuming a discrete separation of command responsibility 
between the VRS and VJ on the basis of the (provisional) separate political territoriality 
of the Republika Srpska and Serbia would appear to amount to a manifestation of what 
John Agnew has described as the ‘territorial trap.’205   
 
4.3.2. De Facto Organ Test of Responsibility 
The second test of responsibility, responsibility on the basis of the conduct of a de 
facto organ, is designed to assess whether the fact that an organ lacks official status as an 
organ of state under its internal law is in reality a purely fictitious arrangement for the 
purpose of avoiding the attribution of responsibility. The separate political-territorial 
status of the Republika Srpska acts here as a precondition for the application of the test. 
The test requires proving that a relationship of complete control exists between the state 
and the alleged de facto entities. To avoid attribution an organ, in this case a parastate, 
must exhibit a degree of autonomy from the state sponsoring it. So while it is at the same 
time an expansion of the regime of accountability, it incorporates a higher threshold of 
attribution than the test of responsibility for de jure organs, where it is simply enough to 
prove that an organ has that status officially. Even if a de facto organ acts contrary to 
instructions state responsibility is still engaged. Although the de jure test excluded the 
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possibility of considering the VRS or Republika Srpska in their entirety as an organ of 
Serbia, here Bosnia and Herzegovina attempted to argue precisely that. And it argued that 
various paramilitary formations, including the “Scorpions”, were if not formally at least 
de facto organs of Serbia.206 
This second test of responsibility goes beyond the principles encoded in the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility upon which the Court otherwise relies. It is derived 
instead from the Court’s own prior jurisprudence in the 1986 case concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America). To prove that persons or organizations are de facto organs of a state requires 
proving that the relationship was one of “complete dependence” of the individual or 
organ upon the state in question.207 The Court interpreted the test of “complete 
dependence” to mean that the relationship of dependence of the Republika Srpska and 
VRS with Serbia meant that, despite how necessary aid from Serbia was to their 
operations, at no time could the former demonstrate an ability to fail to submit to 
influence or pressure. The Court alludes to the resistance of the Republika Srpska to 
pressure from Milošević to surrender territory in return for a peace agreement; it does not 
engage with the degree of pressure employed. It summarily concludes that VRS and the 
Republika Srpska forces could not be considered “mere instruments” and were therefore 
were not de facto organs.208 Given the concern that the Milošević regime had 
demonstrated to immunize itself from the attribution of responsibility for crimes—
through the use of non-governmental paramilitaries and the formation of the VRS—it is 
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not hard to imagine that at least the appearance of a degree of autonomy on the part of the 
VRS was quite welcome, and perhaps entirely deliberate. 
 
4.3.3. Direction or Control Test of Responsibility 
The application of the third test of responsibility, responsibility on the basis of 
direction or control of a non-state organ, accepts as valid the separate political-territorial 
status of the Republika Srpska, but, like the de facto organ test, this test does not regard 
that alone as sufficient to immunize Serbia. However, it differs from the de facto test in 
that it does not require an Applicant to prove that a particular overall relationship exists 
between a state and an at least formally non-state organ. Whether the Republika Srpska 
had or could exhibit autonomy at any point is irrelevant for this test. The focus instead is 
on the relationship between the two in regard to specific conduct, and only that 
conduct—in this case the Srebrenica massacres. Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to 
prove that Serbia either directed or instructed the Republika Srpska to carry out the 
massacres or that in carrying out the massacres it acted under Serbia’s direction or 
control. The latitude of interpretation available to the Court consisted in the variable 
thresholds of attribution it could have applied. The Court adopted a threshold of 
“effective control” over specific operations from its own prior jurisprudence in the 
Nicaragua v. United States of America case. Bosnia and Herzegovina advocated two 
other thresholds, the first based on a differing understanding of the particular ontology of 
genocide as a complex aggregate of acts and the second an argument of the need to 
account for the concrete specificity—social, political, territorial—separating the 
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Nicaraguan and Bosnian conflicts. The Court rejected Bosnia’s arguments and insisted 
upon its “effective control” test from Nicaragua.209 
The basis for this test of responsibility is ILC Article 8 “Conduct directed or 
controlled by a state,” which states that:  
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of 
a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact 
acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State 
in carrying out the conduct.210 
The ILC Commentary on Article 8 specifies that acting ‘on the instructions of’ and 
‘under the direction of’ and ‘under the control of’ are disjunctive without specifying 
exactly how these terms differ (§7). It is clear however that responsibility can be engaged 
in the absence of explicit instructions that a non-state organ carry out wrongful conduct. 
The Commentary explains that the responsibility of a state will be engaged if it directed 
or controlled the specific operation in which the wrongful conduct occurred and that 
conduct was integral to the operation (§3). The Commentary does specify further at §7 
that “each case will depend on its own facts, in particular those concerning the 
relationship between the instructions given or the direction or control exercised and the 
specific conduct complained of.”211  
To prove Serbia’s responsibility on the basis of this test, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
would have had to prove either that the massacres were carried out under the instructions 
of Serbia or that Serbia directed and controlled the seizure of the enclave and the 
                                                
209 Ibid., sec. 407. 
210 Crawford and ILC, The International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility. 
211 Ibid., 113. 
  
 
100 
massacres were an integral part of the seizure as an operation. If Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were to prove that Serbia exerted direction or control over the seizure of the enclave, the 
question remains as to whether the Court would find Serbia’s responsibility engaged 
based on a whether the massacres were considered an integral part of the seizure of the 
enclave or not. As Hartmann points out, post-seizure massacres were entirely predictable 
and were an established part of the operations of Serbian nationalists after seizing control 
of territory.212 To determine if the massacres were integral the Court could have resorted 
to the kind of generalization it relied on to distinguish genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing.’ It 
could have separated out forced deportation from the other crimes constitutive of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and declare only deportation integral to the operation of seizure. Or the Court 
could point to the specificity of its definition of genocide as destruction in part, raising 
the standard of proof enormously by asserting that massacre of that nature was 
unprecedented and therefore not integral.  
 When the Court considered the evidence it moves back and forth between 
consideration of evidence for direction or control over the operation of the seizure of the 
enclave itself and more specifically the massacres. Where it finds evidence suggesting 
that the seizure of the enclave was “coordinated” with Serbia, it declares evidence 
concerning participation in preparation for the massacres as more significant for its 
purposes.213 It concludes by citing a source that finds no compelling evidence of control 
or direction by Serbia over the seizure of the enclave and finds its responsibility therefore 
not engaged. In short, the Judgment at this point is not at all clear on whether the 
massacres were to be considered an integral aspect or not of the seizure. It would 
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however return to the question when it addressed Serbia’s responsibility for complicity 
where it finds that the massacres need not be considered integral to the seizure of the 
enclave. 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina had attempted to argue for two different but closely 
related thresholds of attribution to be applied in the direction and control test of 
responsibility other than the Court’s threshold of effective control over specific 
operations. The first was to argue for an application of the effective control test to the 
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina taken as a whole and the second was to argue for a 
standard of overall rather than effective control to be applied to specific operations. The 
Court rejected both of these ILC Articles but examining these arguments affords an 
opportunity to consider how adequate the effective threshold is in light of both the 
ontology of genocide and the specific modality of the grave crimes in the Bosnian 
conflict. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first argument for effective control over the whole of 
the campaign of atrocities was based on a particular conception of the ontology of 
genocide, that genocide was a property of the whole that emerged from individual acts in 
their ensemble. This is of course not different from arguing that the property of genocide 
as a specific effect on a group emerges from the aggregate of multiple singular crimes 
applied to a more spatially and temporally concentrated instance, such as the multiple 
rapes and murders and mutilations perpetrated at the fall of Srebrenica. But effectively 
what Bosnia and Herzegovina was arguing through this alternative threshold was that acts 
can be spatially and temporally dispersed and still amount to genocide as destruction in 
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part.214 However, the Court’s entire methodology repudiates Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
approach. It had required that genocidal intent had to be inferred in relation to specific 
acts, not acts taken in their ensemble.215 Here the Court insisted that the particular nature 
of the crime of genocide alone did not justify any deviation from ILC principles insisting 
on effective control over specific operations.216 It asserts that these principles reflect 
customary international law, though this point is debatable.217 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s closely related second argument for a different 
threshold of control, one based on “overall” rather than “effective control,” maintained 
that the circumstances that separated the Bosnian conflict from the Nicaraguan conflict 
were legally significant and required a different threshold of control.218 This argument 
was originally produced by the justices of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadić 
case.219 The overall control test required only that Serbia provide substantial support and 
overall direction to the Republika Srpska and the VRS but not explicitly order particular 
crimes or exert control over specific operations. To justify an interpretation that departed 
from the standard adopted by the Court in Nicaragua v. United States of America, the 
Appeals Chamber in Tadić  appealed to, inter alia, geographic differences between the 
two cases. The shared territorial objectives combined with the existence of deep ethnic 
and social ties between the Republika Srpska and Serbia created a commonality of 
immediate and strategic interest that obviated the needed for explicit instruction or 
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effective control over specific operations. It noted also the nature of the political and 
military control that Serbia exerted over the Republika Srpska, a degree of control that 
became fully evident during the Dayton-Paris peace negotiations when Serbia not the 
Republika Srpska negotiated the end of the conflict on terms binding for the latter.220 If 
Milošević’s government had not exerted operational control over the massacres 
themselves, it would be consistent with a strategy of legal immunization seen in the 
‘division of labor’ between the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries during the early stages of 
the Bosnian conflict. What the overall control test amounts to as the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber acknowledged is a different standard for de facto organ status than the Court’s 
‘complete dependence’ threshold. The Court rejected the overall control threshold of 
attribution derived from the Tadić Appeal Chamber Judgment, stating simply that it 
stretched “almost to the breaking point” the connection that must exist between the 
actions of a state’s organs and its responsibility.221  
Even though the Court may have based its rejection of overall control on the ILC 
Article 8 and Commentary and its settled jurisprudence as expressed in Nicaragua, 
Cassese maintains that neither of these is consistent with customary international law.222 
The ICJ and the ILC are outliers in this sense.223 Cassese notes that it is the ICTY’s ruling 
on state responsibility in Tadić—which holds that effective control applies only to 
individuals and overall control to organized groups such as paramilitaries—is reflected in 
state practice, case law, and opinio juris. He cites case law of the European Court of 
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Human Rights (ECtHR), reports of UN organs including the Secretary General, and 
international arbitral and claims commissions. He bases his argument also on an 
application of the customary law principle expressed in ILC Article 7 on state 
responsibility, that the acts of an entity empowered to exercise elements of governmental 
authority are attributable to a state even if that entity contravenes instructions.224  
Significantly, two of the examples that figure into Cassese’s argument as ‘armed 
groups’ to which the overall control test applies are in fact separatist parastates, the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Transdniestria breakaway region of 
Moldova. In the case of Northern Cyprus, the ECtHR ruled that actions of the separatist 
administration were attributable to Turkey, despite its claims that Northern Cyprus had 
formally separate political status. As the ECtHR stated in Cyprus v. Turkey:  
Where a Contracting State exercises overall control over an area outside 
its national territory, its responsibility is not confined to the acts of its 
soldiers or officials in that area but also extends to acts of the local 
administration which survives there by virtue of its military and other 
support. 225 
Talmon suggests that the ECtHR is propounding a third threshold of attribution in 
addition to overall and effective control, that of ‘overall effective control’ whereby 
control over territory, instead of control over the subordinate authorities themselves, 
becomes the basis for the attribution of responsibility.226 The role of the Turkish military 
and state in establishing and maintaining the borders of Northern Cypress, of securing the 
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territorial prerequisite of its existence, absent any explicit instructions in specific matters, 
engages Turkey’s responsibility. Cassese however interprets the ECtHR rulings to refer 
in fact to control over the authorities.227  
The reference in the ECtHR Judgment to Turkey’s soldiers and officials illustrates 
a relevant difference between the Republika Srpska and Serbia case, the formal presence 
of the Turkish military and government in Northern Cyprus. But that the dependence of 
Northern Cyprus on Turkey for its survival is an element that engages Turkey’s 
responsibility is nonetheless significant. Cassese’s second example is compelling for its 
greater similarity to the Republika Srpska. The European Court of Human Rights in its 
2004 Judgment in the case of Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, was called upon 
to determine which state’s responsibility (Moldova or Russia) was engaged by the 
conduct of the separatist parastate of Transdniestria and found that: 
[T]he Court considers that the Russian Federation’s responsibility is 
engaged in respect of the unlawful acts committed by the Transdniestrian 
separatists, regard being had to the military and political support it gave 
them to help them set up the separatist regime and the participation of its 
military personnel in the fighting. In acting thus, the authorities of the 
Russian Federation contributed both militarily and politically to the 
creation of a separatist regime in the region of Transdniestria, which is 
part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova.  
The Court also notes that even after the ceasefire agreement of 21 
July 1992 the Russian Federation continued to provide military, political 
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and economic support to the separatist regime… thus enabling it to 
survive by strengthening itself and by acquiring a certain amount of 
autonomy vis-à-vis Moldova.228  
Russia’s responsibility is engaged despite Transdniestria’s formally separate political-
territorial status and proof of complete dependence is not required. In the cases of both 
Transdniestria and Northern Cyprus the issue is not whether either is in a state of 
complete dependence upon their respective sponsor, as in the ICJ’s standard for de facto 
organ status (which, again, derives from its Nicaragua ruling), nor is it a question of the 
wrongful conduct being carried out according to the instruction or direction of the 
sponsor. Rather responsibility is engaged through how instrumental the sponsor was in 
the coming into being and then continued existence of the separatist entity. As with 
Cyprus, the Russian military is still present in Moldova, but Russia does not occupy 
Transdniestria in the same way that Turkey occupies Northern Cyprus. It is therefore a 
much closer parallel to the relationship between the Republika Srpska and Serbia.   
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s arguments concerning the need for law to consider the 
ontology of genocide as a crime and the specific modality of genocide in the context of 
particular conflicts are compelling. However, as the Court insisted, its effective control 
threshold of attribution reflects the ILC Commentary on Article 8 and upholds its prior 
jurisprudence. These two are of course intrinsically linked.229 In this sense the outcome of 
the application of the direction and control test of responsibility is a product of the 
constraints imposed by existing law and principles of legal attribution. This is not to say 
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that the Nicaragua decision, from which these were derived, was not itself the product of 
a prior geopolitics involving proxy warfare and the desire of states to immunize 
themselves from the attribution of legal responsibility. However, the Court could have 
chosen an approach to the Articles on State Responsibility that would, as Cassese 
suggests, read Article 8 in conjunction with Article 7.230  Support for a parastate or de 
facto state is at once support for an armed insurrection and an exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. It is empowering an armed group to exercise elements of governmental 
authority while remaining under the overall control of the sponsoring state. Such an 
approach would have brought the Court into harmony with customary international law 
as reflected in the practice of the ECtHR.231  
The differing practice of the ECtHR and even organs of the UN points to a degree 
of fragmentation in the global regime of international responsibility and indicates that the 
legal constraints faced by the Court were institution specific. This divergence in the 
practice of the ECtHR and the ICJ illustrates the importance of the geographic scope of 
participation in multinational juridical institutions. Participation in the ECtHR is limited 
to the 47 members of the Council of Europe and the law it adjudicates is that body’s 
European Convention on Human Rights.232 The ICJ operates at a global scale and is 
charged with maintaining international peace. Lacking any enforcement power, it acts, 
and in fact is structured to function, as an arbitral court whereby decisions must reconcile, 
and be reconciled to, the parties to the dispute and the international community of states 
as a whole. In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights is established to define 
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Europe as a particular region within the global order. The harmony between the ICTY in 
Tadić and the ECtHR can be seen as reflecting that the ICTY was not charged with 
maintaining peace between major and lesser powers but with punishing individuals for 
crimes in a specific conflict in a specific region. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 To grapple with the legal responsibility engaged by Serbia’s massive and 
indispensable support for the ethnoterritorial separatist project of the Republika Srpska, 
given that that support had enabled the latter to commit genocide, the Court applied three 
tests of responsibility. The manner that the Court chose to treat the formal political-
territorial separation of the Republika Srpska affected each of these tests by creating 
extremely high standards of proof for attribution. For the first test, responsibility of de 
jure organs, the Court chose to treat the Republika Srpska as a sovereign independent 
state. It insisted that even if it could be proven that organs of Serbia participated in the 
massacres, in the absence of evidence to the contrary they would have to be assumed to 
operating under the authority of the Republika Srpska and their conduct would be 
attributable to it. Producing such evidence as the case illustrates is exceedingly difficult 
and, except where a state has been defeated in war and directly occupied, likely 
impossible. For the second test, responsibility for de facto organs, the Court demanded 
that the Republika Srpska demonstrate no capacity to not comply with the wishes of 
Serbia. States wishing to immunize themselves from responsibility need only provide 
such a degree of autonomy to their proxies, or at least give the appearance of such 
autonomy. For the third test, responsibility on the basis of direction or control, the Court 
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insisted that it be proven that Serbia either instructed the Republika Srpska to perpetrate 
the massacres at Srebrenica or that Serbia exerted control over the operation to seize the 
enclave, and the genocidal massacres were an intrinsic part of that operation.  
The Court’s stringent requirements, though consistent with its own prior 
jurisprudence, illustrate the fragmentation of the international regime of state 
responsibility. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently found that an 
essential relationship of aid and support between a separatist parastate and its state 
sponsor engages the responsibility of the latter for the wrongful conduct of the former. In 
contrast, through the stringent requirements of these tests of responsibility, the Court has 
established the efficacy of parastate formation as a means of avoiding the attribution of 
legal responsibility for genocide itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
110 
CHAPTER V 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: COMPLICITY AND OTHER ANCILLARY  
OFFENSES UNDER ARTICLE III 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Having failed to find Serbia’s involvement in the Bosnian conflict engaged its 
direct responsibility for the commission of genocide at Srebrenica, the Court then 
proceeded to address the question of whether Serbia was responsible for any of the 
ancillary genocidal crimes of Article III: conspiracy, direct and public incitement, 
attempt, or complicity and again failed to find Serbia responsible. These are forms of 
participation in the crime of genocide other than actually committing any of the actus 
reus of genocide as defined in Article II and therefore constitute secondary forms of 
liability.233 Its treatment of the first three offenses is cursory and offers little guidance on 
how to translate these criminal law categories into a regime of state responsibility. The 
Court did grapple with this issue in regard to complicity. It again chose to apply to the 
relationship between Serbia and the Republika Srpska international rules of responsibility 
devised for interstate relations, effectively choosing to regard the parastate as a de facto 
state. It translated complicity into the ILC requirements for international responsibility 
for provision of aid and assistance, which it chose to interpret as requiring certain 
knowledge of the perpetrator’s genocidal intent. Making a positive finding of fact on 
when the VRS formulated its genocidal intent that dramatically narrowed the spatial and 
temporal window of Serbia’s potential responsibility, the Court found this requirement 
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had not been satisfied. The almost one-third of the Justices who dissented asserted that it 
had in fact been proven that Serbia had the requisite awareness.  
 
5.2. Ancillary Offenses Other Than Complicity: Conspiracy, Incitement Attempt  
 
The Court’s treatment of the first three ancillary offenses is less significant to an 
understanding of the implications of the Judgment for the international regime of 
responsibility than its ruling on complicity. The Court summarily dismissed these charges 
without engaging with what it would mean to translate these criminal law offenses into a 
regime of state responsibility. Yet the manner of its treatment of these issues affords an 
opportunity to highlight that the outcome of the case was not the result of a 
straightforward application of the law but also of the particular approach of this Court to 
issues of law.  
The Court does not rule on the offense of attempt to commit genocide. This is 
presumably because, as the Court noted, Bosnia and Herzegovina had not made any 
submission in that regard.234 For the two offenses it did consider, conspiracy and direct 
and public incitement, the Court decided that it would have to examine the question of 
Serbia’s responsibility only in relation to Srebrenica.235 For conspiracy, it asserted that it 
would not have to rule on the offense because it had not found that the commission of 
genocide at Srebrenica could be attributed to Serbia. But if genocide as the Court ruled 
could be committed in a localized area, there is no logical reason Serbia could not have 
conspired to commit genocide elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Producing evidence 
to support such an accusation is entirely another matter but the Court dismisses 
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conspiracy without considering evidence. For direct and public incitement, the charge is 
dismissed on the basis of lack of evidence, but the Court again restricts itself only to the 
massacres at Srebrenica “as is appropriate.”236 (Though it does mention in passing a lack 
of evidence for incitement to commit genocide elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.) 
Since the ancillary offenses are inchoate and do not require that incitement actually 
succeed in inciting anyone,237 there is no logical or legal reason to restrict examination of 
the charge to an instance of the actual commission of genocide, anymore than there 
would be in the case of conspiracy.  
The spatiotemporal delimitation of the characterization as genocide only to acts 
committed at Srebrenica dramatically narrowed the window of the potential attribution of 
responsibility to Serbia. But for offenses other than complicity, that alone should not 
have excluded consideration of responsibility for ancillary offenses in relation to acts 
elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court’s high standard of proof and threshold 
of attribution would of course have posed great difficulties in proving conspiracy or 
attempt, particularly as the Court refused to attempt to obtain the documents of the 
Supreme Defense Council and restricted itself to inferring intent based on manifest acts. 
The nature of conspiracy and attempt as forms of responsibility falling short of the actual 
commission of genocide would have made truly daunting to prove them on the basis of 
manifest acts. This would of course not be true of direct and public incitement. 
Evidentiary issues aside, the Court’s jurisprudence in relation to ancillary offenses is 
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curious and is no doubt a source of the perception that the verdict was “rushed” with an 
air of “half-heartedness.”238 
 
5.3. Complicity   
 Complicity as an ancillary offense is of a different order than the previous three. It 
necessarily involves a direct connection with the actual commission of genocide.239 It is 
not an inchoate offense that could be determined, in reference to this case, through 
consideration of acts elsewhere than at Srebrenica. That necessary linkage with 
commission means that here again the Court’s effective spatiotemporal delimitation of 
the characterization of acts as genocide contributed significantly to Serbia not being 
found responsible. However, that alone was not enough to allow Serbia to escape being 
found responsible for complicity. First, the Court had to decide how to translate the 
criminal offense of complicity into rules of international state responsibility. It chose to 
regard the political-territorial entity of the Republika Srpska as, de facto, a state. This 
allowed it to apply a stringent standard for attribution derived from the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility. Second, the Court took over a debatable finding of fact from the 
ICTY on when the perpetrators formulated their genocidal intent that even further 
constricted the window of Serbia’s potential responsibility. 
First, the Court chose to translate the criminal law offense of complicity into the 
terms of existing principles of state responsibility by finding that complicity was 
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analogous to ILC Article 16, “Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act.” As the Court acknowledged, that Article was not “directly relevant” 
because it concerns relations between states.240 The Republika Srpska was not a state 
under international law, but because the Court chose to treat it as such, the parastate 
formation strategy made its contribution. Had the Court not decided to treat the 
Republika Srpska as a de facto state, the Court may have had to engage more concretely 
with situations not envisioned or addressed by the Articles on State Responsibility. These 
Articles, in preparation for 40 years, do not encompass the realities of the 21st century, in 
particular the prominence of non-state actors,241 or as I would argue, parastate actors. For 
customary law principles, the Court could have turned to state practice and judicial 
precedent for separatist territorial political entities that are highly dependent and 
functionally integrated in important ways with their sponsors. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled in several cases on state responsibility in such 
situations.242 This judicial practice is important because genocide is ultimately a brutal 
form of territoriality and there is little if any precedent on the matter of state 
responsibility in territorial disputes.243 Alternately, it could have developed, as it did in 
Nicaragua, its own new approaches to state responsibility that go beyond what is 
encoded in the ILC Articles.244 Instead, the Court demonstrated its preference to approach 
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fundamental issues at a high level of abstraction, an approach that enabled it to apply an 
ILC article “not directly relevant.”245  
Article 16, which the Court did elect to apply, reads in its entirety: 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for 
doing so if: 
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State. 
The Court interpreted the rather broad language of “with knowledge of the 
circumstances” in relation to genocide to mean that it had to be proven that Serbia had 
“full knowledge” of the perpetrators’ specific intent to commit genocide, as the Court 
defines it.246 It did so with reference to the ILC Commentary on Article 16 that stipulates 
three conditions that limit a state’s responsibility under the article: the state must be 
aware of the circumstances that make the act committed internationally wrongful; the 
state must intend for the assistance to further the commission of the wrongful act and that 
act must have actually been committed; and the act must have been wrongful if the state 
had committed it itself.247 The first and third of these correspond to the explicit 
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provisions of the Article. The second, the requirement that it should intend to facilitate 
that wrongful act, is not actually an explicitly stated provision of the Article.  
When the Court applied these requirements to the evidence provided by the 
parties, it did not find it conclusively proven that the first condition, awareness, was 
satisfied.248 It therefore did not rule not rule on the condition of intent in the provision of 
aid and assistance. The question of whether a state providing aid and assistance must not 
only be aware of the perpetrators’ specific intent but also share that intent was raised by 
the Court but not addressed.249 Had it done so and affirmed that requiring the sharing of 
specific intent was in keeping with the ILC Commentary on Article 16, intent would have 
piled on intent in the ILC’s highly stringent regime of state responsibility. Such a 
requirement would have imposed a staggering burden of proof on any Applicant. Because 
it did not rule on the requirement, it is not clear if providing aid and assistance while 
aware of the perpetrator’s intent would be sufficient to infer that an accomplice state 
intended that it be so used. In a future case, the ICJ may require additional proof to 
satisfy its intent requirement. Just satisfying an ‘awareness of the circumstances’ 
requirement that demands certain awareness of the intent to commit the crime of 
genocide alone imposes a standard of proof that would be very difficult to meet, not least 
because the Court has defined genocide very specifically. It is not enough that a state 
intend that its aid or assistance be used to commit ethnically targeted massacres, but 
ethnically targeted massacres targeted in such a way as to biologically or physically 
destroy a localized community. Applied in this case, the Court imposes a requisite 
standard of knowledge that effectively requires that it be proven that the state providing 
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aid and assistance, Serbia, be aware of a legal characterization that would not be made 
until twelve years in the future, an ex pre facto requirement likely unprecedented in 
international jurisprudence.  
The Court’s translation of complicity into the terms of Article 16 means that 
though Serbia was formally judged for responsibility for complicity, in fact it was not. 
The Court’s application of Article 16 differs in several respects from the crime of 
complicity as it exists in international criminal law.250 The Court comes up with a two-
fold definition of complicity in genocide in both its material and mental elements. The 
material element for the Court must be an act of commission, a positive act. The mental 
element requires certain knowledge that the aid or assistance provided will be used in the 
commission of a crime.251 First, ICTY and ICTR case law has established that 
responsibility for complicity can be engaged by acts of omission as well as commission 
in certain circumstances. Reference to those specific circumstances would distinguish 
between these acts of omission as complicity and mere failure to prevent. Second, the 
mental element of complicity, harboring the intent to provide aid or assistance in the 
commission of a crime can be engaged not only when there is certain knowledge that a 
specific act will be committed with the aid or assistance but when there is knowledge of a 
high possibility that the act will be committed. Providing aid or assistance with such 
‘knowledge of the circumstances’ in international criminal law would engage 
responsibility on the basis of recklessness, or dolus eventualis.252 The Court’s ruling that 
the provision of aid or assistance with knowledge of the grave likelihood that it will be 
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used in the commission of a crime is not complicity thus makes ‘complicity’ for the 
purposes of state responsibility very different from complicity as that term is normally 
used. Given the Court’s Judgment in this case, a state may avoid the attribution of 
responsibility for complicity by providing aid or assistance in the commission of 
genocide while deliberately leaving itself without certain awareness of the perpetrators 
intentions, even though circumstances indicate the grave risk that those receiving the aid 
or assistance will use it to commit genocide. 
Finally, the Court narrows the window of Serbia’s potential responsibility even 
further by making a positive finding of fact that further circumscribes the temporal 
window for Serbia’s potential awareness of the VRS’s genocidal intent. The Court 
determined that the decision to eliminate the male population at Srebrenica was made 
after the seizure of the enclave.253 Earlier at §295 the Court had reached this conclusion 
“fortified” by the findings of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Krstić and Blagojević. 
Therefore, aid or assistance provided for the takeover of the enclave is automatically 
excluded from consideration for the attribution of responsibility for genocide and the 
massacres are abstracted from the sequence of events that were their necessary precursor 
and with out which they could not have occurred. However, while the Krstić Trial 
Chamber found that the decision to exterminate the male population at Srebrenica was 
taken after the seizure of the enclave,254 the Blagojević and Djokić Trial Chamber found 
that the seizure of the enclave and the massacres were “all parts of one single scheme to 
commit genocide of the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica.”255 Moreover, the recently 
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amended indictment of Radovan Karadžić at the ICTY suggests that the Tribunal may 
now be in possession of evidence proving that this prior finding of the Court—that the 
decision to commit genocide was made before and not after the seizure of the enclave—is 
in fact mistaken.256  
Four of the fifteen judges on the Court disagreed with the majority and insisted 
that Serbia was responsible for complicity in genocide, a degree of dissent almost 
equaling those who objected to the Court’s findings on state responsibility. Judges Keith 
and Bennouna both issued Declarations agreeing that Serbia was not responsible for 
genocide but affirming that it was responsible for complicity in genocide. Each cited the 
continual relationship of aid and assistance Serbia provided the VRS and Republika 
Srpska and differed with the majority on whether the facts proved that Serbia had the 
requisite knowledge. Judge Al-Khasawneh and Judge ad hoc Mahiou maintained that 
Serbia was responsible for genocide itself but, if failing to find it responsible as a 
principle, there was sufficient evidence for the Court to find Serbia responsible for 
complicity. 
Judge Keith in his Declaration asserted that the necessary intent of complicity in 
genocide was the provision of aid and assistance with knowledge of the direct 
perpetrator’s genocidal intent. The complicit state need not share the specific intent of 
genocide with the perpetrator.257 Regarding the facts establishing Serbia’s responsibility, 
he cited the evidence of how close relations were between Mladić and Milošević as the 
former was committing the massacres. The day the massacres are believed to have begun, 
Mladić was in Belgrade meeting with Milošević. Milošević subsequently played a key 
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role in negotiations concerning the conduct of VRS forces toward the population of the 
now captured Srebrenica.258 This proof of close interaction of the leaderships of the 
Republika Srpska and Serbia, coupled with the conclusively proven provision of 
substantive material and other aid both before and after the massacres, is enough to 
satisfy the mental and material elements of complicity even during the majority’s 
narrowed temporal window of potential responsibility.  
In a similar manner, Judge Bennouna put forth a separate opinion that challenges 
the majority’s evaluation of the facts proving Serbia’s continued provision of aid and 
assistance while being aware of the Republika Srpska’s genocidal intent. In doing so, he 
does not challenge the majority’s legal construction of the requisite awareness of the 
direct perpetrator’s intent necessary to find Serbia responsible for complicity in genocide 
and that necessary to engage responsibility for failure to prevent. The requirements of the 
text of the Article for (a) the provision of aid or assistance with (b) awareness of the 
circumstances making the conduct wrongful were met in his opinion. Regarding the first 
requirement, Judge Bennouna asserts that “ongoing political, military and financial 
support existed before, during and after the massacre at Srebrenica.”259 In addition to the 
close interaction of Mladić and Milošević, he cites other evidence of ongoing aid and 
assistance that continued during the massacres, aid and assistance that also establishes 
that Serbia should have had the requisite awareness of the VRS’s intent to commit 
genocide. He cites the presence of VJ officers at VRS headquarters at Hans Pijesak and 
the participation of the “Scorpions” in the massacres. Regardless of whether the latter 
were de jure organs or not, he regards their close ties with Serbia’s Interior Ministry 
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Police (MUP) fully proven. For him it would be inconceivable that either the VJ officers 
at VRS headquarters or the “Scorpions” would not have kept their superiors or sponsors 
in Serbia fully informed of the decision to commit genocide and the necessary 
preparations being taken. And because the “Scorpions” directly involved in perpetrating 
the massacres at Srebrenica, the material element of complicity is amply satisfied. 
Effectively, like Judge Keith, Bennouna does not abstract the massacres from the overall 
continuum of events. The ongoing provision of aid, coupled with awareness during the 
specific temporal window asserted by the majority, is sufficient to establish complicity. 
Two Judges who voted against the majority decision that Serbia was not 
responsible for complicity produced Dissenting Opinions that emphasized their belief that 
Serbia was responsible for genocide as a principal. Judge Al-Khasawneh made little 
effort to distinguish Serbia’s potential secondary responsibility from its responsibility as 
a principal. His arguments aim mainly at establishing Serbia’s responsibility for genocide 
and then only parenthetically refer to how the same facts could establish its responsibility 
for various ancillary offenses including complicity.260 Judge ad hoc Mahiou on the other 
hand made some effort to establish Serbia’s separate responsibility for complicity while 
still asserting his conviction in its responsibility for genocide itself. He found the Court’s 
distinction between responsibility for complicity and failure to prevent based solely on a 
difference between awareness of the certainty of commission and the grave risk of 
commission “hard to comprehend.”261 Serbia’s awareness of the grave risk of genocide, 
activating its responsibility to prevent, should have caused it to cease aid and assistance 
to the Republika Srpska and VRS. For him, its failure to do so and its continued provision 
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of aid and assistance ex post facto constitute complicity.262 He also refuses to abstract the 
massacres from the overall continuum of events. He asks rhetorically, “Must one have 
acted only ‘at the critical time’, as indicated in paragraph 423, to be an accomplice to 
genocide? Is it really possible to massacre over 7,000 persons in an improvised or 
spontaneous way, without some degree of advance preparation and planning?”263 His 
critique of the Court’s use of its constrictive definition of genocidal intent to restrict the 
spatio-temporal frame of Serbia’s potential responsibility draws its strength from the 
scale and complexity of the crime and the demands this imposes upon the bureaucratic 
structures capable of committing it. His citation of ex post facto support applies some of 
the same notions of responsibility utilized in the command responsibility mode of 
liability in the ICTY’s jurisprudence on joint criminal conspiracy. Although Mahiou is a 
past president of the ILC, his views on state responsibility put him closer to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights than the ILC or the ICJ majority in 
this case. He differs from the majority both in his evaluation of the facts concerning 
Serbia’s provision of aid while in possession of awareness of the VRS’s genocidal intent 
and concerning its construction of the material and mental elements of the offense of 
complicity. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, even though explicitly alluded to in Article IX of the Convention, 
the Court’s finding that a state could be held responsible for offenses formulated in terms 
of criminal law in Article III of the Convention constituted an expansion of the 
                                                
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid., sec. 127. 
  
 
123 
international regime of state responsibility.264 Yet the Court’s formulation of the requisite 
standards of proof for attribution acted to severely constrain the likelihood of finding a 
state responsible. The Court’s treatment of ancillary offenses other than complicity was 
peremptory; future cases before the ICJ will formulate the application of international 
principles of responsibility for these offenses. The determination that Serbia was not 
responsible for complicity was the result of applying a threshold of responsibility more 
stringent than that which exists in international criminal law. The Court applied a 
principle of state responsibility from the ILC Articles that required that a state providing 
aid or assistance do so not with knowledge of the grave risk of that aid or assistance 
being used in the commission of genocide but with certain knowledge that it would be so 
used. The Court was able to do this because it chose to treat the parastate of Republika 
Srpska as de facto a state for the purposes of the attribution of international 
responsibility. This despite the fact that the Republika Srpska was effectively sidelined at 
the time of the massacres and its ostensible army, the VRS, was closely coordinating its 
activities with the leadership of Serbia. Instead of engaging with the international legal 
implications of the VRS as a military formation with likely greater autonomy from the 
Republika Srpska than from Serbia, the Court had resort to the international legal fiction 
of the sovereign territorial state. The ILC codification of principles of international 
responsibility upon which it relied has not kept up with rapidly evolving international 
relations between states and non-state and parastate actors, even though customary 
international law to a degree has. The relationship of relative power between the VRS 
and the two political entities was a reflection of the Republika Srpska’s dependence on 
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Serbia’s aid and assistance and the limited real capacities of the Republika Srpska 
government. That aid however was without legal consequence for Serbia’s responsibility 
for complicity. Serbia was exonerated of responsibility for complicity both because the 
Court chose to abstract the genocidal massacres from the continuum of events and 
because it further narrowed the window of Serbia’s potential responsibility by taking over 
a debatable finding of fact from the ICTY on when the VRS formulated its genocidal 
intent.  
Two of the four dissenting Judges did not contest the majority’s construction of 
the requirements to prove complicity but insisted that it had been proven that the Serbian 
leadership did have the requisite awareness of the VRS’s genocidal intent. Judge ad hoc 
Mahiou on the other hand insisted that Serbia’s responsibility for complicity was engaged 
when it became aware of the grave risk of genocide, yet continued its aid and assistance 
to the Republika Srpska. Mahiou’s position fills a gap in the structure of international 
legal accountability opened up by the majority’s Judgment, a gap that can be more fully 
appreciated after consideration of the Court’s ruling on the obligations to prevent and to 
punish genocide and that on the award of reparations for breach of those obligations, 
matters we turn to next. 
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CHAPTER VI 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE I, FAILURE TO 
PREVENT AND FAILURE TO PUNISH, REPARATIONS  
 
6.1. Introduction 
Having failed to find Serbia guilty of any offense under Article III of the 
Convention, neither genocide nor any other ancillary offense such as complicity, the 
Court turned to the matter of Serbia’s responsibility under Article I of the Convention, 
the obligations to prevent and to punish. Here the Court upheld that Serbia was 
responsible for breaches of these obligations. On this basis, Serbia became the first state 
in history to be judged in breach of its obligations under the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Yet the Court at the same time 
refused to award Bosnia and Herzegovina financial compensation as reparation for this 
breach and instead awarded it only declaratory satisfaction. For obligations under Article 
I the Court adopted a lower threshold of attribution than for offense under Article III, but 
then subsequently coupled that with an almost impossibly high threshold of proof for the 
award of reparations. The threshold of attribution imposed by the Court for reparations 
was not simply pregiven in law and is of dubious suitability for establishing a regime of 
international accountability for genocide. 
 
6.2. Failure to Prevent 
Failure to prevent, like complicity, requires that genocide actually have been 
committed. Serbia’s potential responsibility for breach of this obligation was limited, 
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spatially and temporally, to those few days in July of 1995 in the environs of the town of 
Srebrenica. The separate political-territorial status of the Republika Srpska posed no 
barrier to the attribution of responsibility for the failure to prevent. The Court had already 
found during the Preliminary Objections stage that the obligation was not limited to 
Serbia’s own territory.265 Serbia’s efforts to sustain the existence of the separatist 
parastate it had helped bring into being constituted instead the basis for it having a 
particular responsibility to prevent. Any degree of autonomy on the part of the Republika 
Srpska is irrelevant, as the obligation to prevent is one of conduct and not result. The 
Court’s reasoning for this is particularly salient for any analysis of its later finding on the 
award of reparations. For the Court, a state cannot justify a failure to act by claiming that 
genocide would have occurred anyway because this would be “generally” difficult to 
prove, and the combined efforts of multiple states would likely be necessary to actually 
effect prevention.266 
In an implicit recognition perhaps of the potential overlap of the material element 
of failure to prevent and complicity given its constrained definition of complicity, the 
Court endeavors to distinguish the two offenses. Most crucial to finding Serbia 
responsible for failure to prevent rather than complicity was that the Court imposed a 
very different standard of knowledge for each. The Court determined that the obligation 
to prevent begins as soon as a state learns that there is a serious risk of genocide being 
committed. The breach of the obligation to prevent begins only when the genocide itself 
begins, but the onset of the obligation to prevent occurs earlier. This is in stark contrast to 
its requirement of certain knowledge for the attribution of responsibility for complicity. 
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But the Court further distinguishes the two in a manner that raises questions about a 
potential gap in the international regime of responsibility opened up by the Court’s 
delimitation of these offenses. The Court states that breach of the obligation to not be 
complicit is one of commission, while breach of the obligation to prevent is one of 
omission.267 Stated differently, the obligation to not be complicit is a negative obligation, 
a party must refrain from certain acts, while the obligation to prevent is a positive 
obligation, a state must perform certain acts. 
One must recall again that for the Court, a state may provide aid and assistance 
while being fully aware of the serious risk that that aid will be used for the commission of 
genocide, but this will not be considered complicity. Only if it provided aid or assistance 
once it did have certain awareness of the perpetrators’ genocidal intent would its 
responsibility for complicity be engaged. But would provision of aid or assistance with 
knowledge of grave risk be considered failure to prevent? The Court is not at all clear on 
this issue. It does not specify what measures Serbia would have to have taken to comply 
with its obligation to prevent given its prior conceptualization of breach of the obligation 
to not be complicit as one of commission and breach of the obligation to prevent as one 
of omission. Ceasing to provide aid as a measure of prevention would appear to be a 
negative act, one of omission. But one could just as reasonably consider that this would 
constitute the exertion of influence in order to prevent and therefore constitute a positive 
act. But again, the Court does not specifically address what measures Serbia should have 
taken to fulfill its obligation to prevent. As it stands, the Court may consider the positive 
act of providing aid or assistance with knowledge of the likelihood of it being used to 
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commit genocide constitutes merely failure to prevent. It does not explicitly say so 
however. Its insistence on distinguishing between acts of commission constitutive of 
complicity from acts of omission constitutive of failure to prevent leaves room for some 
doubt. The same act, the positive act of providing aid with knowledge of grave risk, 
would have to be regarded as a negative act of omission to be judged as failure to 
prevent. That would appear to beggar the entire distinction that the Court felt it so 
important to make. Applying rules of interpretation to the Judgment that the ILC devised 
for the interpretation of treaties, it would be manifestly absurd for the Court to determine 
that provision of aid and assistance with knowledge of the grave risk would fall into a 
legal void between complicity and failure to prevent.268 It is reasonable to assume that the 
Court considered the act of continuing to provide aid and assistance with knowledge of 
the grave risk as partly constitutive of Serbia’s failure to prevent. 
Turning to the facts of the case at hand, the Court found that Serbia violated its 
obligation to prevent because it was in a unique position to influence the VRS and 
Republika Srpska and because it possessed the requisite awareness of the grave 
likelihood of genocide being committed. The Court refers to the “strength of the political, 
military, and financial links” between Serbia and the Republika Srpska establishing the 
requirements of its obligation to prevent.269 Those links are not reducible entirely to the 
substantial and indispensable aid and assistance that Serbia provided, yet that aid was 
undoubtedly a source of major influence. The Court notes Serbia was bound by 
Provisional Orders of the Court from 1993 requiring it to ensure that genocide was not 
committed, not only by its own organs or those it directed and controlled but also by 
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those over whom it had influence. And finally, the Court noted the existence of evidence 
that Serbia had the requisite awareness, including a statement of Milošević to General 
Wesley Clark that he had warned Mladić not to “do this” in reference to the Srebrenica 
massacres.270 The Court found that there was no evidence Serbia took any measure to 
prevent the genocide at Srebrenica, though it was aware of the grave risk.271 The Court 
did not specify how Serbia could have discharged its obligation to prevent, it simply 
notes that it did not take any action. 
The Court thus applied a less stringent standard for the existence of an obligation 
to prevent as opposed to that which must exist for attribution of responsibility for 
genocide. The relationship must be one of “influence” rather than “complete dependence” 
or “effective control.” This is coupled with a less stringent standard of knowledge with 
respect to the intent of the perpetrator than that for complicity, likelihood rather than 
certainty. However, a definition of failure to prevent that is so broad as to include 
positive acts of aid and assistance as well the negative act of failing to exert power or 
influence over a course of events that one is not otherwise making a substantial material 
contribution to enable effectively opened up a vast lacuna in the regime of international 
legal responsibility for genocide.  It does so by grouping together of acts of commission 
and acts of omission of a very different nature. Some authors nonetheless regard the 
Court’s reading of an obligation to prevent in Article I that exceeds the expressly stated 
obligations of Articles IV through VIII to be “revolutionary.”272 This expansive reading 
of the obligation to prevent imposes duties upon states that may enhance the likelihood of 
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states acting to prevent genocide outside the juridical realm, that is, politically and 
militarily.273 
The Court’s application of the Convention to the obligation to prevent was limited 
by its jurisdiction ratione personae in this case, that is to Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as parties to a dispute under Article IX. But in establishing the conditions 
through which Serbia’s responsibility to prevent was incurred, it did nonetheless 
articulate some general principles that could be used to establish the responsibilities of 
other states in relation to the Bosnian conflict, including the home states of some of the 
Judges on the Court’s bench and even the United Nations itself. It did not, however, 
explicitly address these. Much like the abortive Use of force cases initiated by Serbia in 
response to the NATO bombing campaign of the Kosovo War, the Court would have to 
rule on these individually after the initiation of specific proceedings by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The possible legal responsibility for failure to prevent of other parties to the 
conflict, including those that intervened in the guise of keeping (a nonexistent) peace or 
providing humanitarian assistance, remains to be adjudicated. And it likely never will. 
Both Judges Tomka and Skotnikov disagreed with the majority’s finding that the 
obligation to prevent genocide is not territorially limited, asserting that the obligation to 
prevent is limited to the state’s own territory or extraterritorial areas over which it 
exercises jurisdiction. Tomka reasons that the obligation to punish as specified in Article 
VII is territorially restricted, and that it is therefore legitimate to interpret the obligation 
to prevent as territorially limited.274 He further asserts that, beyond territory over which a 
state exercises jurisdiction, the obligation to prevent is limited to persons or groups over 
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which the state exercises control rather than influence.275 Without specifying the requisite 
degree of control, which Tomka does not do, that requirement would seem to erase the 
distinction between responsibility as a principal and responsibility as an accomplice. 
Tomka does assert that there is no evidence that Serbia exerted control over the 
Republika Srpska and that since the VRS decided to perpetrate genocide only after the 
seizure of Srebrenica, it could not have prevented genocide anyway. Of course the ICTY 
did find that Serbia exerted ‘overall control,’ and given the proven awareness of the grave 
risk of genocide, Serbia had time to act to prevent. His Opinion is an example of the 
lengths some justices were willing to go to circumscribe the application of the Genocide 
Convention. Tomka’s entire reasoning appears to uphold the norm of territorial 
sovereignty as more important for the maintenance of global order than the obligation to 
prevent genocide. Except when one considers that the most effective measures Serbia 
could have taken to prevent genocide would have involved ceasing to violate Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s territorial sovereignty. For his part, Skotnikov held that the obligation to 
prevent was not limited to the prosecution of individuals, but that, simply, the 
responsibility for failure to prevent was engaged when genocide was committed on 
territory over which a state has jurisdiction or control and not by persons or organs whose 
conduct was attributable to it. The duty to prevent is, moreover, one of result, not 
conduct.276 Judge ad hoc Kreća asserts that an obligation to prevent is inconsistent with 
criminal law norms and that the obligation to prevent is a social and political, and not 
legal, one.277 Needless to say, however the majority may have been concerned to limit the 
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effectiveness of the Convention as a tool of state accountability, they did not find the 
reasoning of Tomka, Skotnikov, or Kreća convincing. 
 
6.3. Failure to Punish 
 A matter of secondary importance is the application of the Convention to Serbia’s 
failure to punish the crime of genocide. It is of secondary importance only because it 
pales in significance in regard to the impact of Serbia’s other violations of the Genocide 
Convention that the Court considers ‘failure to prevent.’ However, for one author, its 
failure to punish makes Serbia an ex post accomplice in genocide.278 In contrast to the 
obligation to prevent, provisions relating to the obligation to punish are spelled out in 
Articles IV through VII that constitute the bulk of the Convention’s operative articles. 
Article VI of the Convention establishes that persons charged with genocide are to be 
tried by the national courts of the state upon whose territory the crime was committed or 
by an international tribunal. Since the Republika Srpska was a formally separate political 
entity not a part of the territory of the FRY, Serbia was not obligated to try even its own 
nationals for genocidal crimes.279 Bosnia and Herzegovina was the state responsible to try 
Serbian nationals implicated in genocide. The Court did however have to address whether 
Serbia was obligated to cooperate with the ICTY. Being a signatory to the Convention 
alone was not enough to establish that obligation. The jurisdiction of the tribunal is 
limited by the text of Article VI of the Convention to Contracting Parties who have 
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accepted its jurisdiction. Serbia had agreed to cooperate with the ICTY as a part of the 
Dayton peace agreement it had signed in December of 1995, so the Court did not have to 
establish any other basis upon which Serbia could be considered to have accepted the 
ICTY’s jurisdiction. The Court accordingly found Serbia in breach of its obligation to 
punish for its failure to cooperate with the ICTY in the arrest and extradition of indicted 
suspects, including General Mladić. It will be for a future case to address the issue of a 
state’s acceptance of the jurisdiction of an international tribunal in the absence of the 
explicit assent given by Serbia in signing the Dayton peace agreement. 
 
6.4. Reparations 
Upon finding that Serbia was in fact guilty of failure to prevent and failure to 
punish genocide, the Court turned to the matter of just reparations, the sanction given the 
Court’s notion of ‘civil’ liability for genocide. Because the jurisdiction of the Court was 
limited to the crime of genocide, the Court was not in a position to award damages for 
anything other than the Srebrenica massacres. Serbia’s complicity in and commission of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity on Bosnian soil, however destructive, were 
beyond what the Court could assess reparations for. The Court’s constrained definition of 
genocide therefore had the effect of automatically limiting Serbia’s potential financial 
liability. But, as with other matters, the outcome of the case was the result of the Court 
making legal choices that were by no means predetermined or constrained simply by the 
law as written. True to form, while the Court had given with one hand—expanding upon 
the legal regime of state responsibility by finding that Article I imposed distinct 
obligations on states, obligations moreover not limited to its territorial jurisdiction—the 
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Court now took with the other. It imposed a likely impossible-to-meet standard of proof 
that, leading to a minimal form of reparation, effectively renders failure to prevent almost 
consequence-free for states in breach of that obligation.  
The Court had to determine what form of reparation to award Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Reparation could consist of either restitution, compensation, or satisfaction 
or some combination of all three, in order to “so far as possible wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”280 Restitution in the case of 
mass murder is clearly impossible; there is no way to bring back the dead. In territorial 
terms, the form of restitution that Bosniak leaders have demanded is the dismantling of 
the political territorial situation created by the crimes against them, the establishment of 
the Republika Srpska.281 But because the Court separated the massacres (as genocide) 
from the seizure of the enclave (as, potentially, a crime against humanity), it did not even 
consider this form of restitution—minimally the return of Srebrenica from the Republika 
Srpska to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court weighed then whether 
compensation or satisfaction or both would be appropriate. ILC Article 31, “Reparation”, 
specifies that an Applicant is entitled to reparation for material and moral damages 
caused by a wrongful act. Compensation according to the ILC is the appropriate form of 
reparation for any financially assessable damage to either property or persons. 
Satisfaction is intended as a supplemental form of reparation for any injury that cannot be 
remedied by either restitution or reparation. These injuries often constitute symbolic 
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affronts to a state that do not result in material or moral damage to property or persons.282 
The Court in this case however decided that it could not award compensation for Serbia’s 
breach of its responsibility to prevent the Srebrenica massacres and instead awarded 
satisfaction in the form of a declaration that Serbia was responsible for breaches of its 
obligations.283 
The failure to award financial compensation and instead declaratory satisfaction 
was a direct result of the standard of proof imposed by the Court to the issue of the injury 
caused by Serbia’s failure to prevent. Regarding the existence of an obligation to prevent, 
the Court had upheld that a state could not argue that it was not obligated to intervene 
because, even if it had employed all means at its disposal, the genocide would have 
occurred anyway. The Court reasoned that this would be “generally difficult to prove” 
and that the efforts of several states might be required to achieve prevention.284 However, 
for the award of reparations the Court reverses itself and requires that there be proven a 
sufficiently “direct and certain causal nexus” between the failure to prevent and the 
damage resulting from that breach. The relevant passage of the decision reads in full:  
The question is whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal 
nexus between the wrongful act, the Respondent’s breach of the 
obligation to prevent genocide, and the injury suffered by the Applicant, 
consisting of all damage of any type, material or moral, caused by the 
acts of genocide. Such a nexus could be considered established only if 
the Court were able to conclude from the case as a whole and with a 
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sufficient degree of certainty that the genocide at Srebrenica would in 
fact have been averted if the Respondent had acted in compliance with 
its legal obligations.285 
The Court requires the Applicant to prove a counterfactual—to prove that if something 
that had not been done had been done then something that had occurred would not have 
occurred—surely a difficult task and one that imposes a daunting burden of proof. While 
the Court appears to be imposing a rigorous standard of proof upon an Applicant, one 
consistent with its previous determination of the standard of proof required given the 
gravity of genocide, it is in fact imposing a particular standard of causality, one that 
excludes instances of concomitant causality.286 As noted above in its jurisprudence on the 
obligation to prevent, this is a requirement that may be impossible to meet in some 
instances of genocide. It is also not simply derived from either the work of the ILC or 
customary law principles of state responsibility. There is no single accepted standard of 
causality in international law for the attribution of responsibility for breach of an 
obligation. In fact, in the Corfu Channel case where the United Kingdom was awarded 
financial compensation for damage to persons and property caused by Albania’s failure to 
prevent the laying of mines, mines that had in fact been lain by Yugoslavia, the Court did 
not reduce Albania’s responsibility on the basis that the damage could not be solely 
attributed to its act of omission.287 Although the ILC, noting the multiplicity of standards 
of causation in customary law, asserts that the standard of causation may vary with a 
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given breach of obligation,288 there is no intrinsic reason to assert that in the case of 
genocide a state is not liable for reparation in the form of compensation in an instance of 
concurrent causation. For some the Court’s position may have created an “impression of 
arbitrariness” that made the Judgment seem “rushed” and with an air of “half-
heartedness;”289 for others it reeks of an imperious tendentiousness. 
Does it matter if the Court finds a state responsible for ‘failure to prevent’ rather 
than ‘complicity’ if the regime of responsibility is civil and not criminal? The stigma 
associated with complicity would likely be higher. But the sanction the Respondent 
would face is the same in any case, reparation of one form or other. It could matter 
significantly though given that the Court had defined that failure to prevent is an act of 
omission while complicity is an act of commission. Proving the damage that results from 
each could in fact pose very different obstacles and be subject to differing standards of 
proof. But could there be any overlap in the material element of both offenses? Could the 
provision of aid and assistance with knowledge of the grave risk of genocide constitute a 
failure to prevent? The Court did not specify what exactly Serbia would have to have 
done to meet its obligation to prevent. A future Court could in fact find that what would 
constitute complicity in criminal law could constitute failure to prevent in the regime of 
state responsibility. But the standard of causality the Court imposed could yet prove an 
insuperable barrier. It is an integral and necessary component of the Court’s effective 
neutralization of the Genocide Convention as a tool of state responsibility. A direct and 
certain causal connection between the failure to prevent of one party and the commission 
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of genocide by another may prove in most circumstances impossible to demonstrate. The 
complexity of socio-material causation alone is enough to render it unlikely. 
To sum up, while the Court had decided that the obligation to prevent genocide, 
“to contribute to restraining in any degree” its commission, is not dependent on the 
certainty of whether that intervention would succeed in its aim, to assess reparations for 
breach of this obligation it upheld the opposite.290 An Applicant must prove the existence 
of a “sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus” between the accused state’s failure to 
prevent and the damages resulting from the commission of genocide by another (formally 
separate) actor.291 The Court must find that if the Respondent had fulfilled its obligations 
to prevent, then the genocide would not have occurred. The Court thus opened up another 
lacuna in the international regime of state responsibility. States can commit violations of 
the obligations imposed upon them by Article I of the Convention, yet escape any form of 
accountability other than a simple declaration that they failed to fulfill the obligation. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
Serbia’s avoidance of the attribution of responsibility for genocide and complicity 
in genocide placed its substantial, and indeed critically enabling, contribution to the 
Republika Srpska’s crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the heading of failure to 
prevent. Serbia avoided the charge of complicity because the Court imposed a standard of 
knowledge that required that the Serbian leadership have certain awareness of the VRS’s 
genocidal intent at Srebrenica. The standard of knowledge to engage the responsibility to 
prevent was considerably lower, knowledge of the likelihood rather than certainty. Had a 
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higher standard been imposed, Serbia would have avoided the attribution of responsibility 
under any heading except failure to punish. But while imposing standards of proof that 
made it most likely that a state providing substantial aid and assistance could (only) be 
found responsible for failure to prevent, the Court reimposed a difficult standard of proof, 
one proving a certain causal nexus between the failure to punish and the occurrence of 
genocide, for the award of compensation as reparation for the breach of failure to prevent. 
In doing so, the Court effectively imposed a standard of singular causality inconsistent 
with the multicausal nature of complex events like genocide. The result is an international 
regime of responsibility for genocide in which states adopting Serbia’s calculated 
strategy of parastate formation will most likely face only the consequence of a 
declaration by the Court that they have failed in their obligation to prevent genocide. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
“The sovereign territorial state claims, as an integral part of its 
sovereignty, the right to commit genocide, or engage in genocidal 
massacres, against people under its rule, and… the United Nations, for all 
practical purposes, defends this right.”292 
Leo Kuper 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Leo Kuper’s 1982 assertion that the UN for all intents and purposes defends the 
rights of states to perpetrate genocide might seem, from the perspective of the present, 
jaundiced and dated. There have been developments that would have been unthinkable in 
the immediate aftermath of Cambodia, East Timor, Bangladesh, Burundi. The leader of 
Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, died in a cell at the Hague while on trial before a United 
Nations tribunal for genocide and other crimes. Both Radovan Karadžić and Ratko 
Mladić have been arrested and extradited and are now being held and tried by that same 
tribunal, as have dozens of others. A UN Tribunal has been established for Rwanda and 
officials of the former Hutu supremacist regime have been convicted of genocide. An 
International Criminal Court under the auspices of the UN has been founded and is 
issuing indictments. Louise Arbour has written of an emerging “culture of accountability” 
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for grave violations of human rights. Where, then, should one situate this Judgment with 
regard to the advancement of a regime of accountability for genocide more generally? 
 
7.2. Context 
The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia marks the beginning of the reemergence after the long hiatus following the 
cessation of the tribunals at Nürnberg and Tokyo of the exercise of the juridical mode of 
power in relation to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The Tribunal 
was founded amid vocal demands that the UN Security Council lift the arms embargo. By 
founding the Tribunal, the Security Council deferred action on crimes against humanity 
and genocide into the future. It was a strategem to enable the continuation of a policy that 
contributed materially to the perpetration of those crimes.293 Even then the UN 
bureaucracy and some member states worked to limit its effectiveness.  
It was the dedicated work of the UN Security Council’s Special Rapporteur for 
war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cherif Bassiouni, that laid the groundwork for 
the establishment of the Tribunal.294 The UN bureaucracy however did its utmost to 
impede his work by denying him the necessary resources. It was only his dedication and 
his ability to leverage the resources available to him as an academic that he was able to 
get around these obstructions. When the Tribunal was founded, it was underfunded and 
such monies as it was allocated were not disbursed; the UN bureaucracy offering no 
explanation of why. It was the resolute activism of the officials of the Court, 
entrepreneurs of international justice, that rescued the Tribunal from irrelevance and 
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made it a force to be reckoned with.295 The Tribunal was eventually able to garner 
significant support from some states including the United States, but even the US has 
impeded the work of the Tribunal by withholding evidence when it felt it was in its 
interests to do so.296  
Even as the work of the ICTY nears completion, some regard its work as largely 
inadequate. Of the top military and political leaders of Serbia and Montenegro during the 
height of the violence during the crucial years of 1991 and 1992, the majority remain 
unindicted. The focus on Slobodan Milošević by the ICTY worked to individualize 
responsibility for the crimes of the Yugoslav wars to the detriment of an appreciation of 
the larger context and the involvement of state structures.297 When the ICTY ceases its 
work, responsibility for the prosecution of crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina will then 
belong solely to the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which heretofore has only had the competence to prosecute mid and low level offenders 
and faces significant challenges in its efforts to bring perpetrators to justice.298  
A significant backer of the Tribunal has been the United States, but the US has at the 
same time sought to otherwise impede the advancement of an international regime of 
accountability for grave human rights abuses. The US has been staunchly opposed to the 
International Criminal Court. The preference of powerful states such as the US for ad hoc 
tribunals that focus on specific conflicts and specific offenders like that at Nürnberg 
remains. Even such ad hoc tribunals have had their fierce opponents. And the principle of 
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state responsibility for genocide, as this case reveals, is still as contested as it was during 
the drafting of the Genocide Convention. In this context it is perhaps not surprising that 
the ICJ failed to significantly advance the regime of international accountability for 
genocide. But are the reactions of the judgments fiercest critics justified? David Scheffer 
has declared that in its Judgment the majority  “has discovered in spades” an “easy way 
for judges and lawyers to avoid state responsibility for genocide.”299 For Gibney, the 
Judgment “sends a disturbing message” that reads like “a primer on how to avoid 
responsibility altogether.”300 For Amabelle Asuncion, in the Court’s approach, the gravity 
of genocide has been “magically transformed into a legal shield which protects states 
from responsibility even as individual convictions are being handed down.”301  
 
7.3. Contours of the Judgment  
In this thesis I have indicated the degree of latitude the Court had in formulating 
its Judgment in order to advance an argument that the Judgment was crafted to exonerate 
Serbia of responsibility and produce a more constrained definition of genocide and 
regime of accountability more generally while at the same time affirming the judicial 
precedent that the massacre of Srebrenica did in fact amount to genocide. It is not that the 
crimes committed elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Serbia-controlled federal 
Yugoslav army or the forces of Serbia’s proxy parastate, the Republika Srpska, did not 
meet the “technical requirements” of genocide.302 The requirements the Court attributed 
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to the Convention did not preexist the Judgment; the Court devised them in the course of 
arriving at its decision. And they certainly are not ‘technical;’ they are inherently 
political. Where it relied on the precedent established by the ICTY, it did so 
selectively.303 
 
7.3.1. The Court’s Definition of Genocide as Destruction “In Part” 
 The Court produced a definition of genocide as destruction “in part” that 
maintains that it is the total physical or biological destruction of a geographically 
localized subset of a targeted group rather than the partial destruction of the entire group. 
The definition adopted by the Court is not inherently more compelling than the definition 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions. The Court’s effective spatialization of the 
definition for the purposes of inference created a boundary around the massacre at 
Srebrenica in July 1995. The Court made a finding of fact on when the leadership of the 
VRS formulated its genocidal approach that further constrained this spatio-temporal 
boundary to the period after the enclave had been seized. The result was to greatly limit 
the possibility that Serbia or any other actor in the tragedy would be found responsible.  
Abstracting the massacres from the sequence of events both before and after was 
a product of the Court’s interpretation of the requisite intent of genocide: “to destroy a 
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part, as such.”304 Even though 
there was disagreement within the ICTY, and sources of customary law indicated 
otherwise, the Court insisted that “to destroy” referred to the physical or biological 
destruction of a group in both means and form. Partial physical, biological destruction in 
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order to destroy a group as a socially reproducing entity had support within the judicial 
practice of the ICTY and German National Courts but the Court decided otherwise. The 
Court rejected Bosnia and Herzegovina’s submissions defining the targeted group 
negatively as non-Serbs and focused almost exclusively on Bosniaks. But neither the 
Applicant nor Respondent contested that the Bosniaks as a group fell within the 
Convention’s specification of protected groups. The Court’s tripartite criteria to define 
“in part” included substantiality, opportunity, and qualitative criteria. The portion of the 
group targeted must be significant enough to affect the group as a whole. Genocidal 
intent is inferred in relation to the part of the group that falls within the perpetrator’s area 
of control, not the entire group wherever it may exist. And the functional or symbolic 
importance of the portion targeted may help it meet the substantiality requirement. The 
Court found that the massacre at Srebrenica met all of these criteria. Even though only 
the male population of adults and older children were targeted and the female, aged, and 
younger children were forcibly expelled, the indiscriminate killing of this group was 
substantial relative to the population defined by the perpetrator’s control. That the killing 
was gender targeted meant that even though a fraction of the population there was killed, 
it was functionally critical for the biological reproduction of that population. In addition, 
even though the population at Srebrenica was small relative the population of Bosniaks as 
a whole, almost 40,000 persons of a population of 1.8 million, the Court found that the 
population of Srebrenica was symbolic of the Bosniak population as a whole. The final 
mental element, “as such,” when combined with all of the above, was crucial in allowing 
the Court to determine that only the massacre at Srebrenica amounted to genocide. “As 
such” could be interpreted to mean to target the group on the basis of its identity or it 
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could mean to target the group as a separate and distinct entity. The Court chose the 
latter, and while the difference may seem slight, when the Court combines this standard 
with its requirement of physical and biological destruction, the effect was to require the 
total destruction of the portion targeted. Other communities that may have been targeted 
substantially or were themselves substantial relative to the group were not wholly 
destroyed biologically or physically. 
The partial destruction of other communities may have been committed with 
genocidal intent, but the Court would not infer on the basis of the pattern of manifest acts 
that it was. That is because it distinguishes the intent to forcibly expel targeted 
populations from given territories, even if accomplished in part through the commission 
of the actus reus of genocide, from the intent of genocide. The intent to destroy a part of 
a population from a given territory as a means to expel the rest would seem to conform to 
the plain meaning of “to destroy” “in part.” The aim of forcible expulsion would appear 
to be a motive or further intent for the intent of genocide; that is, genocide is committed 
as a means to assert control over territory. But the Court upholds the position that 
ethnically targeted killing, even on the scale of massacres, constitutes only the crime of 
persecution—a crime against humanity committed with discriminatory intent. Only when 
the destruction is of the type stipulated by its construction of genocidal intent—the total 
physical or biological destruction of a localized part of a group—could the intent of 
genocide be assigned to “ethnic cleansing.” This then is how the Court rejected Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s submissions that the totality of the killing and other crimes targeting 
the Bosniak group amounted to genocide and that only the massacre at Srebrenica did.  
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7.3.2. The Contours of the Regime of International Responsibility 
The Judgment of the Court was momentous in that it was the first time in 
international law that it was found that a state could be held responsible for genocide. But 
at the same time it threw up daunting obstacles to a state actually being found responsible 
in the form of the standards of evidence and attribution that it imposed. On the face of it, 
the Court’s affirmation of the possibility of state responsibility for genocide, as opposed 
to the individual responsibility of state leaders or operatives, would appear 
uncontroversial. The compromissory clause, Article IX, that established the Court’s 
jurisdiction in the case clearly refers to “the responsibility of a State for genocide or for 
any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”305 Yet, more than one third of the judges 
on the Court voted against the Court’s finding that a state could be held directly 
responsible for genocide, four of them rejecting outright that the Convention embraced 
state responsibility for breaches of Article III.  
Because Article IX was of a jurisdictional nature, the Court was forced to derive 
the obligation not to commit genocide, conspiracy, attempt, incitement, and complicity 
via inference from Article I wherein states committed themselves to prevent and to 
punish genocide. That it had to do so is a reflection of how contested the principle of state 
responsibility was during the drafting of the Convention, something reflected in its text. 
The only direct mention of state responsibility is in Article IX; the bulk of the operative 
articles of the Convention deal only with state obligations relating to the prosecution and 
punishment of individuals. That hesitancy to acknowledge state responsibility is a 
reflection of the grave concerns that signatories to the Convention had that they might 
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themselves be found responsible. The massive internal repression in the Soviet Union, 
institutionalized racial discrimination in the US, the practice of total war by the Allies, all 
were concerns in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.306 Those concerns 
regarding the Genocide Convention evidently still remain. In the present Judgment, those 
who opposed the notion of state responsibility under the Convention in principle were 
able to join with others in imposing the Court’s stringent requirements for the attribution 
of responsibility. 
The specifics of this case relate to the responsibility of a state for the genocidal 
acts of armed forces it aids and supports and, by virtue of that support, acts through. 
Serbia, then acting as the FRY, had established in Bosnia and Herzegovina a Serb 
nationalist parastate that was formally separate from the FRY. Because the Charter of the 
United Nations prohibits the forcible alteration of state boundaries, states adopt such an 
approach when they intervene to partition the territories of recognized states, often on 
behalf of their own ethnic group. Examples include Northern Cyprus and Transdniestria 
in Moldova and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. Had the Republika Srpska not 
been a separate territory, there would have been no question of Serbia’s direct 
responsibility for the genocide at Srebrenica. The Court therefore applied three separate 
tests of responsibility to determine if Serbia’s responsibility was engaged despite the 
separate territorial status of the Republika Srpska. The Judgment grappled with the 
separate political territorial structuring specific to this case, but the implications of the 
Court’s findings extend to proxy warfare more generally. The closeness and intimacy of 
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the relations between the Republika Srpska and Serbia establish it as something of a limit 
case for the possibility of such state responsibility. 
In the first of the three tests, responsibility on the basis of the conduct of de jure 
organs, the Court determined that even if individual personnel or entire military units of 
Serbia were found to have participated in genocide, the Court would assume, absent 
evidence to the contrary, that these were ‘seconded’ to the Republika Srpska. Applying a 
standard of international responsibility for interstate relations to the relationship between 
a state and a dependent parastate, the Court determined that, absent evidence to the 
contrary, Serbia would not therefore be held responsible. Second, the Court also 
considered whether Serbia’s massive and essential support for the existence and 
operations of the Republika Srpska meant that the latter was a de facto organ of Serbia. It 
found that, if a parastate or other actor exhibits any margin of independence from its 
sponsor, it does not. Third, the Court considered whether Serbia’s responsibility was 
engaged by virtue of the direction and control it exerted over the Republika Srpska. Any 
derogation from Serbia’s overall control would not negate Serbia’s responsibility if it 
could be established that Serbia exerted control over specific wrongful acts. The Court 
found that an overall relationship of control was insufficient, that it had to be 
demonstrated that Serbia directed or controlled specific operations of which the 
prohibited conduct was integral part. The Court upheld here its own prior jurisprudence 
but diverged from the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights, which 
favored an overall control test. The Court found that states can knowingly provide aid 
and assistance for forces engaged in wrongful acts and not incur responsibility if it cannot 
be proven that those acts were specifically directed. By virtue of the sovereign territorial 
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state’s control over information, the requirements that the Court established for state 
responsibility for genocide make it unlikely that a state will be found responsible.  
The Court’s requirement’s for the remainder of the forms of responsibility—
complicity, failure to prevent and to punish—are no less daunting. The Court found that 
for a state to be held responsible for complicity by virtue of the aid and assistance it 
provides an actor that commits genocide, it would have to be proved that it did so with 
certain knowledge that the perpetrator would use that aid or assistance to commit 
genocide. Grave knowledge of the risk would be insufficient. By not finding that Serbia 
had the requisite knowledge, the Court did not decide in this case if a state must share the 
genocidal intent of the perpetrator to be found responsible for complicity or any of the 
other offenses of Article III. Almost one third of the Court’s justices disagreed with the 
majority on the standard of knowledge and held that Serbia should have been found 
responsible for complicity. The Court dramatically lowered its standard of knowledge for 
failure to prevent. As such, Serbia became the first state in history to be found 
responsible for breaches of its obligations under the Genocide Convention. Knowledge of 
the grave risk of genocide was sufficient. With characteristic vagueness, the Court did not 
specify that Serbia’s provision of aid and assistance constituted failure to prevent or what 
other positive measures it could have taken, noting merely that it did nothing. But when it 
came to the question of reparations, the Court again insisted on a standard of certain 
knowledge for the award of compensation. Bosnia and Herzegovina was awarded only 
declaratory satisfaction.  
Thus the standard of knowledge that the Court imposed has created an 
international regime of responsibility with two important gaps. The first exists between 
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complicity and failure to prevent. Providing material assistance for the commission of a 
crime, with knowledge of the grave risk that it will be so used, is grouped together with 
the negative acts of otherwise uninvolved states that fail to intervene. Such an 
aggregation fails to distinguish the specific mode of responsibility of the involvement of 
Serbia and other states engaged in parastate establishment or proxy warfare,ongoing acts 
of commission rather than merely acts of omission. The second gap concerns the award 
of reparations. Imposing a standard of absolute certainty for a causal connection between 
a specific act of omission constitutive of failure to prevent and the commission of 
genocide, given the complexity of causation that the Court acknowledges,307 means that 
almost all breaches of the obligation to prevent will result in the award of declaratory 
satisfaction rather than compensation. Combining the Court’s very specific definition of 
genocidal intent as the total physical and biological destruction of a localized community 
with these standards of knowledge results in a regime of state immunization rather than 
accountability. 
 
7.4. Implications 
The hope of many geographers such as myself is that we may bring the tools of 
spatial analysis to bear on the prevention of genocide and other grave human rights 
violations.308 The Court put forth its spatialized definition of genocide with an important 
caveat,309 but this Judgment can still serve as an indicator of which events the Court 
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would in any future case determine to be genocide and thus to which events the tools of 
geography could successfully be applied under the Convention. The Court’s prohibitive 
standards of inference are, on the other hand, quite firm and put into question the utility 
of spatial inference in many instances. The larger implication the Judgment may have for 
geographers and others is what it reveals about the degree of commitment to genocide 
prevention among the states of the world. The Bosnian genocide was not a case of a 
terrible eventuality that the world was all but helpless to prevent. It was a crime in which 
the perpetrators were emboldened to do their worst because they could count on powerful 
allies to tie the hands of their victims. The leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
tragically miscalculated, thinking that the values of Europe and their manifest 
commitment to them would not permit war. But the space of Europe as a space of 
sovereign nation-states at peace with each other was predicated upon significant violence 
perpetrated elsewhere and the repression of difference within. The Bosnians discovered 
to their dismay that they were outside the boundaries of the new Europe being 
constructed in the formerly Communist East. 
The Bosnian decision to initiate the case was a response to the critical exigencies 
of the moment. It was not an appeal that others come to its aid; it was an attempt to regain 
the right to defend itself, a right denied by the UN-imposed arms embargo. This case is 
not just about states pushing for a restrictive definition of genocide in order to avoid 
being dragged into costly and expensive interventions in far flung parts of the world for 
which they are ill-prepared. It is not about an expansive construction of the responsibility 
to prevent. It is a rather a case about how business gets done in the world at present. 
Some states carry out brutal acts of repression, while others provide them with material 
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aid and support. Others, at a minimum, have no intention of allowing their relations with 
states or groups carrying out these acts to be affected thereby. This case is thus about 
complicity. The enormous lacunae opened up by this judgment between responsibility for 
genocide, complicity in genocide, and failure to prevent serves to effectively neutralize 
the Convention as a tool of state accountability. 
  It is not as if that there was no case to be made or that Bosnia and Herzegovina 
failed to make that case. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s failure is owed in no small part to the 
obstacles thrown up by the Court. The Court failed to seek documents essential to the 
case and the Court established such stringent standards of proof that, unless these are 
overturned in subsequent adjudication, no applicant is likely to succeed in using the 
Genocide Convention as a tool of state accountability. The highest court in the world has 
thus failed to uphold the aims and purposes of the Genocide Convention. In this it merely 
followed the UN Security Council and the UN bureaucracy. So long as states in this 
world, both the most powerful and those less so, are resolved to employ grave violations 
of human rights either directly or by proxy as instruments of statecraft, the meaning and 
purpose of the Genocide Convention will not be fulfilled. Any hope for the institutions of 
international justice to obtain a degree of effective autonomy from the interests of 
individual states is, for now, misplaced.  
The exercise of juridical power to repress genocide may indeed be indispensable, 
however inefficacious it is in comparison to materially preventing crimes before happen 
or impeding those in progress. But the Court, despite its self-conception, is not a 
disinterested institution serenely applying the law, concerned only with transcendent 
principles of justice. It is a thoroughly political institution. It is composed of justices 
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selected and nominated by state representatives at the UN. It is states that provide the ad 
hoc tribunals, the ICC, and the ICJ with the resources to operate, and it is states that have 
the capacity to enforce their decisions. A truly effective regime of international protection 
of human rights will be dependent upon a profound transformation of the political values 
and political structuring of the states of the world. As desirable as democratization is, it is 
not a panacea. Democratic publics may prove just as prone to commit or be complicit in 
genocide as state elites. But challenging the insulation of foreign policy making from 
popular democratic input that currently prevails even in formally democratic states at 
least creates an opening for the mobilization of transnational civil society for genocide 
prevention to have some effect.  
At present, the Judgment of the Court in this case demonstrates both the 
limitations of current law and the unwillingness of the Judges of the International Court 
of Justice to interpret that law in a manner that advances a regime of prevention and 
punishment for genocide. Arbour has correctly identified the momentum that currently 
exists for the establishment of such a regime. The advancement of a regime of 
accountability for individuals in the sphere of international criminal law is a hopeful story 
that points to the necessity and possibility of continued struggle even in the face of 
obstruction by the UN and its member states. But the limits of that regime, and the result 
of this case, point to the daunting structural impediments that exist to the advancement of 
a truly effective regime of accountability for genocide. Subjecting this Judgment to a 
thorough critique is only one very small step in the direction of realizing an effective 
regime of state accountability. The harder question is envisioning just what an 
institutionalization of a juridical mechanism for the repression of genocide would look 
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like even in a more fully democratized international political system. Realizing such an 
institutionalization of constituted power may require more profound changes than simply 
establishing a court to regulate a world of sovereign territorial states. Ultimately, formal 
political arrangements have only a limited capacity to restrain the imbalances of power 
that derive from economic, social, or demographic factors. 
The sovereign territorial nation-state ideal derives its appeal from the promise it 
offers peoples of power and security. Attempts to realize its imagined correspondence of 
nations and territorial states motivate much contemporary genocidal violence, producing 
radical conditions of insecurity for some. Conflicts over territory occur within the larger 
context of a political and economic structuring of the world and the efforts by states to 
position themselves within particular distributions of power it produces. The most 
important contribution political geographers and others may be able to make toward the 
construction of a different order is to critically interrogate (purportedly) exclusive models 
of territorial sovereignty. Historic work examining the emergence and consolidation of 
the current system of partitioning territory and the non-exclusive sovereignty that 
preceded it,310 contemporary theorizations that question bounded conceptions of place,311 
analyses of formal attempts to practically realize alternatives,312 efforts to theorize other 
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alternatives,313 and attempts to grasp the partitioning of space within the fullness of socio-
spatial complexity314 all make valuable contributions toward this end. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
A SECOND LOOK: THE JUDGMENT’S INTERPRETATION OF GENOCIDE AS 
DESTRUCTION “IN PART” IN LIGHT OF 
LEMKIN’S ORIGINAL WORK 
 
Lemkin's Originary Definition  
  It is often taken as a given that the conception of the crime of genocide in the 
work of the man who created the neologism, Rafael Lemkin, is broader than the 
definition ultimately agreed upon by the drafters of the UN Genocide Convention.315 I 
argue that, despite important differences, that distance is not as great as is often supposed. 
Subsequent interpretations of the Convention, including that in the present Judgment, 
have established a degree of divergence that does not inhere within the text of the 
Convention. The Court’s interpretation in particular has produced a spatialization of the 
definition of genocide that is less than fully cogent and that does little to further the stated 
aim of the Convention, the prevention and punishment of genocide. Reading the 
Genocide Convention in the light of Lemkin's ideas, rather than the reverse, offers an 
important hermeneutic with which to overcome these deficiencies. I regard this move as 
legitimate given how central Lemkin's work was to the formulation of the Convention. 
Lemkin not only coined the neologism and campaigned vigorously for an international 
convention, he was one of three jurists selected to serve as an adviser for the UN 
Secretariat committee that produced the first draft of the Convention.316 Thus, Lemkin's 
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originary conception was taken up by state representatives at the UN and modified 
through a contested drafting process. His conception remains a valuable key to 
interpreting the meaning of the elements of the Convention’s statement of intent, in 
particular “to destroy” and “in whole or in part.” The majority’s Judgment depended 
upon a distinction between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide such that genocidal intent 
could be inferred if the destruction wreaked upon a targeted community would lead to its 
disappearance as a physically or biologically reproducing collectivity. Lemkin’s work, on 
the other hand, points toward the intrinsic link between territory, territoriality and 
genocide.  
 
Geopolitics, Biology, Culture, Territory 
 Both the Nazi genocidal project and Lemkin's dogged, desperate, and 
impassioned response drew upon competing geopolitical visions that emerged out of the 
'geopolitical panic' that seized Europe at the end of the 19th century, a panic triggered by 
the phenomenal rise of the continent-sized powers, the United States and Russia. The 
rapid economic changes created by increasing global economic integration and the 
specter that this new world economy would be dominated by a country such as the US 
whose economic might was based on its combination of technical industrial prowess and  
a massive territorial extent that enabled a degree of autarkism. The US’s territory granted 
it exclusive access to enormous resources and enabled it to sustain a large and growing 
population that could serve as both a source of labor and an internal market. This 
triggered a number of interrelated responses: European states began to close off their 
economies in a wave of nationalist protectionism while simultaneously embarking on a 
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mad scramble to seize colonial territories overseas. When the returns on the overseas 
empires proved too meager—not only to counter the US but now to match the economic 
might of a rising and increasingly aggressive power within Europe itself, Germany—
Europeans turned their attentions back upon Europe itself. They created a bipolar division 
whose purpose was to contain both German economic expansion and the Austro-
Hungarian territorial expansion to the southeast that abetted it. The challenge to the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire was not only external; internally it was beset by the rising 
nationalist sentiment of its Slavic subject peoples.317 The emergence out of the Ottoman 
empire of independent Slavic polities backed by Russia as well as Great Britain and 
France had already demonstrated, in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, that the effort to create 
nation-states in Eastern Europe could trigger enormous bloodshed. These new states 
scrambled to expand territorially, massacring ethnic minorities who could stand as a 
challenge to their nationalist territorial claims.318 
 In this context, two emerging geopolitical doctrines among many others emerged. 
One would influence political and military circles in Germany bent on territorial 
expansion—including eventually the Nazis—and the other would influence figures on 
both the nationalist right and the internationalist left in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 
elsewhere.319 It was the internationalist left version that would appeal to Lemkin.320 The 
other, the nationalist territorial expansionist, Lebensraum vision can be traced in 
Germany to the work of Friedrich Ratzel. Ratzel combined a biogeographic vision of 
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dynamic range expansion and contraction derived from his own spatial revision of Social 
Darwinism with romantic ideals of cultural, spiritual, and demographic vitality.321 Ratzel 
critiqued the idea that it was territory or soil alone that accounted for political and 
economic power; rather power emerges from this articulation of  socio-cultural 
dynamism and prowess and the material resources provided by territory. Expansionary 
pressure occurs when a given society's territorial extent does not match its socio-cultural 
vitality and territorial contraction occurs when a given society is enfeebled relative to its 
rivals.322 Although Ratzel initially stressed overseas colonial expansion in Africa, he 
eventually came to see Europe as the most appropriate site for territorial annexation.323 
He appears not to have shared the eliminationist biological racism of the Nazis, but rather 
to have favored the subsumption and eventual assimilation of other peoples engulfed by 
an expanding German realm.324 
 A contrasting vision was provided by Karl Renner, an Austro-Marxist who 
developed a particular variation on the concept of Mitteleuropa, a federation of central 
and southcentral European states.325 Whereas conservative versions of Mitteleuropa came 
close to Ratzel's vision in seeing the federation as a means to achieve the eventual 
subsumption and assimilation of non-Germans, Renner's was designed to meet the 
challenge posed by the rising nationalism of the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire by genuinely accommodating their ethnocultural aspirations for autonomy. 
                                                
321 Heffernan, “Fin de Siècle, Fin du Monde?: On the Origins of European Geopolitics, 1890–1920.” 
322 Ibid. 
323 Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 1840-1920; Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: 
The Politics of Writing Global Space. 
324 Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. 
325 Moses, “Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide.” 
  
 
161 
Renner held that maintaining common political and economic policies and structures also 
served their best interests in ways that small exclusive territorial nation-states could not. 
These nation-states would be too small to effectively compete economically and 
politically. And the effort to carve out state boundaries that would correspond to ethnic 
distributions was bound to produce bloody conflict given the intricate ethnic mosaic of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Renner's solution was to advocate a federative structure 
whereby representation and responsibility for political and economic matters would be 
based on existing territorial state units, while representation for decision making on 
cultural matters would be based on representation of non-territorial units ethnic-cultural 
affiliation.326 This vision was acclaimed by Lemkin, who cited it as an important 
influence upon his own thinking.327 
 Renner's federative geopolitical and geoeconomic vision articulated with 
Lemkin's own thinking on culture, biology, nation, and territory. Lemkin's particular 
contribution to international law—to extend protection to particular sorts of human 
groups, in contrast to the usual protection of states and individuals, is an outgrowth of his 
commitment to a vision of “the human cosmos,” an expression of romantic national 
cosmopolitanism.328 Lemkin based the Genocide Convention on an affirmation of a 
symphony of nations, “the human cosmos.” His was a national cosmopolitanism that 
maintained that it is nations, ethnic groups, religious groups that incubate the 
developments of high culture, which then diffuse to enrich the lives of humanity as a 
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whole.329 And at the same time, cultures were unique responses to the physical, biological 
needs of groups giving rise to socially integrative institutions and practices necessary for 
the survival of individuals. Thus both the socio-cultural and physical-biological 
reproduction of groups were intrinsically interrelated. The destruction of these integrative 
institutions and the difficulty of the process of assimilation to new ways and structures 
posed threats to the survival of individuals.330 Lemkin's pragmatic answer, in the absence 
of any hope of an immediate construction of a global federative structure along the lines 
proposed by Renner, was to argue for the establishment of a regime of international legal 
protection. The hope was that a structure of international law could serve as a substitute 
for an overarching political sovereign in the protection of the rights of minorities 
threatened by the homogenizing logic of the national territorial sovereign state.  
 
 Resituating Genocide in a Territorial Frame: Genocide as Colonial Territoriality 
 The practice of genocide, the ontology of what genocide is, has come to be 
understood by many in an aterritorial manner. That it is inherently designed to undo the 
bond between particular populations and territories is now often lost sight of; population 
is foregrounded and territory recedes into the background, when it is acknowledged at all. 
Thus in the Oxford Handbook on Genocide Studies, it is possible for a scholar to write of 
the distinction between 'ethnic cleansing' and genocide that “ethnic cleansing is related to 
genocide, but ethnic cleansing is focused more closely on geography and on forced 
removal of ethnic or related groups from particular areas.”331 I would argue instead that 
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the practice of genocide is no less focused on geography and the forced removal of 
groups from particular areas. The geographic dimension of genocide has been obscured if 
not occulted as people have based their understanding of what genocide is by relying 
solely on the text of the Genocide Convention and on a particular understanding of the 
Nazi Holocaust of the Jews as the paradigmatic instance that defines the crime. In the 
Convention, issues of geography are mentioned in the operative article on the 
requirement (or right) to prosecute the crime of genocide, but elsewhere the Convention 
is silent on territory, including in relation to genocidal intent. This was the result of a 
conscious effort to exclude the element of motive from the Convention,332 and has 
contributed to an understanding of genocide that is aspatial. This understanding appears 
to have influenced how legal authorities interpret the Convention.333 There is a tendency 
to interpret the Genocide Convention in a manner that upholds the Nazi genocide of the 
Jews as the ideal type of genocide against which all others must be measured. This 
genocide is thought to be motivated essentially by a spirit of animus toward the Jewish 
people; the specifically territorial dimension of that motive is lost. 
 
The Holocaust as Colonialism 
 Colonialism is an acquisitive form of territoriality. Colonial powers seek to extend 
their control over territory beyond the boundaries of their own state. If the object is to 
assert control over resources and labor in order to reorient the colonized land's economy 
to benefit the colonizer, it is known as extractive colonialism. If the aim instead is to 
displace the inhabitants of the colonized country from land that is to be handed over to 
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colonizers from the occupying power, that is settler colonialism.334 Actually existing 
forms of colonialism may include both in combinations that vary spatially and 
temporally. If the native inhabitants of the land being colonized mount sufficient 
resistance to either extractive or settler colonialism, the colonizing power may resolve to 
destroy these populations or a substantial part thereof. The vulnerability of settler 
populations to retaliatory attacks by native inhabitants and the fact that extractive 
colonialism often relies on native labor means in practice that it is likely the latter form of 
colonialism that will lead to massacres amounting to genocide.335 Extractive colonialism 
can lead to mass death as well. Native inhabitants may mount sufficient resistance to their 
loss of political territorial control that the colonial power deliberately seeks to destroy a 
substantial part of the resisting inhabitants. Mass death may also result if the regime of 
labor exploitation is sufficiently harsh, such as in the Spanish colonial mines in the Andes 
or during the transportation of African slaves to the Americas across the Atlantic.336 The 
social and economic disruption caused by the restructuring of the colonized territory's 
economy for the purpose of wealth extraction can also lead to mass starvation.337  
 Scholars have paid increasing attention to the territorial dimension of the 
Holocaust. Much of this literature seeks to situate Nazi terroriality within the frame of 
colonialism. Some for example regard the colonial genocide of the Herero population in 
German Southwest Africa (present day Namibia) as an important precursor of German 
imperial conduct in Eastern Europe. Scholars note also that the German effort to 
                                                
334 Wolfe, “Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time, and the Question of Genocide.” 
335 Ibid. 
336 Stannard, American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World. 
337 Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts  : El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World. 
  
 
165 
exterminate the Herero was at the same time not a radical departure from the supremacist 
and eliminationist thinking of other European colonial powers at that time.338 Explicit 
statements by prominent Nazis support the idea that the German conquest and partial 
settlement of Eastern Europe was a self-consciously colonial enterprise. The Nazi jurist 
Karl Schmitt, for example, explicitly sought to provide justification for German 
expansion in the East as just compensation for the inability of Germany to secure 
colonies in the non-European world.339  
 The contribution of David Furber and Wendy Lower make to the discussion is to 
situate an understanding of the specificity of antisemitism within Nazi coloniality in the 
East of Europe and within a framework of colonialism more generally.340 Based on the 
statements of those such as Hitler that cast the National Socialist movement as one of 
national liberation against a post-First World War situation of colonial subjection, they 
emphasize that the Nazi conquest of the east and the differential treatment of Jews and 
Slavs must be regarded as manifestations of the Nazi's dual conception of their conquest 
as both a colonial and anticolonial enterprise. The Jews of Western Europe were regarded 
both as agents of international capital and as Asiatic colonizers. The Jews of Eastern 
Europe, though relatively impoverished, were regarded as a source population from 
which the ranks of Western Jews were replenished through migration. The Nazis resolved 
therefor to completely exterminate them in order to 'liberate' Germany from its colonial 
status. In contrast, Furber and Lower argue that the Slavs of Poland and the Ukraine in 
were not regarded as a colonial threat but rather as a typical native colonial population. 
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Accordingly, the treatment of these Slavs varied across time and space. After a period of 
initial contest, the SS insistence on pursuing a policy of settlement colonialism of 
expropriation and displacement of the native Slavic population won out over the civil 
administration preference and the a policy of devastating the Slavic population was 
pursued. When the settlement enterprise in the East began to fail due to the inadequacy of 
local and settled German populations to replace the industrial labor of the Jews and the 
agricultural and the agricultural productivity of the Slavs and in the face of mounting 
armed partisan resistance, German policy eased and the emphasis returned to a regime of 
colonial extraction. Efforts to decimate the Slavic population were abandoned as their 
labor was now deemed more valuable to the German war effort than seizure of their 
land.341 In short, what the Nazi incursion into Eastern Europe embodies is that aggressive 
forms of nationalist territorial aggrandizement can cast themselves in geopolitical and 
geoeconomic terms as national liberation movements of oppressed peoples. These 
perpetrators justify territorial aggression as a defensive maneuver against a globalizing 
economy, one that would enable a state and society to remap circuits of resources, 
products, capital, and labor on a more autarkic basis. 
 
Lemkin's Conception: Colonialism and the Bio-geopolitical 
 While scholarship on genocide and colonialism captures an important aspect of 
Nazi crimes in occupied Eastern Europe, Raphael Lemkin, in his Axis Rule offers an 
understanding of the Nazi incursion into Eastern Europe that both embraces and extends 
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beyond the frame of colonialism.342 First, Lemkin shared the understanding of the 
German occupation as a form of colonialism. His Axis Rule is a detailed exposition of 
Nazi colonialism in Eastern Europe and of genocide as a practice of territoriality in the 
service of that colonial enterprise.343 Indeed, the frame of colonialism is central to 
Lemkin's entire body of work on the question of genocide. At the time of his death, he 
was at work on a manuscript on genocide in world history. Yet for Lemkin, the Nazi 
incursion into Eastern Europe was not simply an attempt to establish and maintain lasting 
direct control over territory, our classic understanding of colonialist territorial hegemony, 
though this was attempted. It was not simply a combined colonial and anticolonial 
enterprise in the minds of its perpetrators, pace Furber and Lower. Rather, Lemkin 
regarded the Nazi incursion as at the same time a sabotage mission on a grand scale, a 
bio-geopolitical assault directed both at the (intrinsically related) demographic and socio-
cultural basis of economic and political power, a gambit designed to further German 
interests even if direct territorial control of Eastern Europe were to be lost.  
 In Axis Rule, Lemkin uses terms such as “annihilation” and “destruction” of 
nations and ethnic groups to define genocide.344 But what does he mean by annihilation 
and destruction? And does he mean that such attempted annihilation or destruction of the 
targeted group is their total physical or biological destruction? At the outset of his chapter 
“Genocide,” Lemkin provides a succinct definition of the crime that signals that genocide 
is not an event but a process: 
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Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate 
destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all 
members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of 
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the 
life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. 
The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and 
social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the 
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal 
security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals 
belonging to such groups.345 
To answer the question of how exactly Lemkin understood annihilation it is necessary to 
examine this complex of measures by which the occupiers sought to achieve their aim. 
Raphael Lemkin's conception of genocide in his Axis Rule and other works can be 
usefully considered from the point of view of the aims and means of the crime. The 
codification in law of the practices of occupation provided Lemkin in Axis Rule with a 
means to ascertain the methods by which German policy was carried out and from these 
to infer what its aims were. He arrived at the conclusion that:  
The picture of coordinated German techniques of occupation must lead to 
the conclusion that the German occupant has embarked upon a gigantic 
scheme to change, in favor of Germany, the balance of biological forces 
between it and the captive nations for many years to come. The objective 
of this scheme is to destroy or to cripple the subjugated peoples in their 
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development so that, even in the case of Germany's military defeat, it will 
be in a position to deal with other European nations from the vantage point 
of numerical, physical, and economic superiority.346 
Lemkin clearly conceived of Germany's occupation policy as a continuation of the 
practice of total war with the aim of winning the peace even if the war should be lost. Its 
purpose was to secure lasting regional economic and political hegemony. This decisive 
alteration of the relative power of the home territory of the German state relative to the 
surrounding territorial states would thereby change Germany's position in the global 
hierarchy of power. This it sought to achieve by a territorial incursion that may prove 
temporary but that would wreak such destruction that it would enable the assertion of 
economic and political hegemony in the absence of direct territorial control. It is in other 
words a practice of neocolonialism.347 In this formulation, the attack upon “biological 
forces” has the intent either to destroy the targeted group or to cripple them in their 
development. Just what Lemkin means by development is suggested by his explication of 
the means by which the occupiers attempt to achieve their aim.  
 Lemkin clearly states that Germany does not seek to realize its goals solely 
through physical and biological attacks on the targeted groups. Rather, “genocide is 
effected through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of the captive peoples" 
in the political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, and moral fields.348 
Political attacks include the dismantling of institutions of self-government of occupied 
territories and peoples. It also includes ethnocratic measures of empowering some local 
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populations at the expense of others. (Separately, in his chapter on “Administration” he 
notes how the German occupiers divided the occupied territories in multiple 
administrative divisions sealed off from each other as a conscious territorial strategy to 
weaken and divide those occupied.349) The forcible displacement of occupied populations 
of non-Germans, the seizure of their land, and the settlement of ethnic Germans upon it is 
also classed as a political method of genocide. It therefore appears that this unbinding of 
peoples and territories, what is referred to by the contemporary expression of 'ethnic 
cleansing,’ is considered a means by which genocide is effected.  
 Within the social field, the occupiers mount their assault by disrupting the “social 
cohesion of the nation involved and killing or removing elements such as the 
intelligentsia, which provide spiritual leadership.”350 Social measures in other words take 
into explicit consideration the class structure of occupied peoples and the socio-cultural 
distribution of functions. Cultural measures enact restrictions on language use, education, 
and artistic expression—some to these designed to assimilate and others to assign some 
occupied peoples to a subordinate place in a class hierarchy. It also includes the 
destruction of national monuments, archives, and libraries. Economic measures are 
enacted to deprive targeted groups of the ability to sustain themselves physically and 
culturally and to elevate some groups over others.  
 Biological measures refer specifically to efforts to alter the demographic balance 
of territories through differential effects on birth rates. Physical measures aim at the 
“debilitation and even annihilation” of targeted groups and run the gamut from measures 
affecting health and nutrition to outright killing. Religious measures target institutions 
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and practices in so far as these are central to a people's identity. Moral measures divert 
the energies of a people into addictive and nonproductive activities and away from ideas 
and practices that could enable resistance. Lemkin describes the foregoing as practiced by 
the German occupiers as “an elaborate, almost scientific system.”351 The exact 
combination of methods and their intensity or severity is tailored to the specificity of 
particular territories and peoples. 
 William Schabas prefaces his discussion of Lemkin's conception of the means by 
which destruction is carried out by characterizing physical destruction of the group as the 
“ultimate or final stage in genocide.”352 I maintain that this is a mischaracterization of 
Lemkin's conception of genocide. Lemkin may have considered killing as an ultimate 
measure of genocide in terms of its gravity, however it does not appear that Lemkin 
necessarily considered the other attacks to be merely preparatory, designed to undermine 
the group's ability to resist the consummate act of killing. Indeed, when Lemkin does 
speak of stages of genocide, he asserts that it has two phases: the destruction of the 
“national pattern” of the oppressed group followed by the imposition of the “national 
pattern” of the oppressor. For this second stage, Lemkin critiques the use of the general 
term “denationalization” as well as more specific terms that name the pattern being 
imposed, such as “Germanization.”353 The reason he finds fault with these terms is that 
they address mainly the cultural, economic, and social aspects of genocide as he sees it, 
to the neglect of the biological aspect. For Lemkin, this latter aspect need not cause the 
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destruction of the group; rather it can cause its decline. Annihilation then in Lemkin's 
usage need not entail the outright physical destruction of the group, but the loss of its 
separate personality. Indeed, he states that the second stage, the imposition of the national 
pattern of the oppressor may be carried out upon the people and the territory, or on the 
territory alone, after the people have been removed.354 
 
The Relationship Between Biology and Culture in Lemkin's Definition of Genocide 
 Lemkin lays great stress on the physical, biological rationale underlying genocide. 
He describes Nazi occupation policy in Germany as a “giant scheme” to alter “the 
balance of biological forces.” Yet, at the same time he maintains that genocide consists of 
a synchronized attack on all aspects of life of targeted groups—social, cultural, 
economic, political—and not merely just measures to kill and injure and to prevent from 
reproducing. So while the aim of genocide as practiced by the Nazi regime is to wreak 
physical, biological destruction upon a people, it does this not only through physical and 
biological attacks but through attacks upon their culture and other aspects of their social 
existence. And the significance of such a destruction for humanity as a whole, whether 
that destruction is total or if it results in the permanent crippling of a group's 
development, is the cultural loss to humanity. Lemkin subscribed to notions of national 
cultural groups as possessed of individual personality and each contributing to a 
symphony of nations. For him, these groups incubated the ideas and practices for the 
progressive development of human civilization. At the same time, Lemkin's 
understanding of the importance of culture for individual human groups themselves was 
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informed by a functionalist understanding of culture as guaranteeing the biological 
survival of a people.  
 There are two distinct but linked notions of the relation of biological and culture 
in Lemkin's anti-genocide thinking and they are related to two different notions of 
culture, one that I will term the national popular and the other high culture. National 
popular culture is the constellation of practices of everyday life, both in terms of material 
production and in the production of social cohesion. These serve, in a functionalist sense, 
to ensure the biological survival of a people by providing a social structure that enables 
them to exploit the resources provided by the natural environment. National popular 
cultures are thus adapted, though not necessarily determined,355 by the realities of the 
physical environment that a people inhabits. An attack on this culture then has clear 
implications for the survival, or at the very least the flourishing, of a people. But then 
there is higher culture, the culture that is produced from a given people's national-popular 
culture and that reflects and embodies its specificity, which then diffuses to the rest of 
humanity to enrich its collective life. Now here biological existence is the necessary 
prerequisite of this cultural production. The preservation of the biological life of a people 
is justified in order to preserve its potential to produce just such contributions to higher 
culture. 
 Thus there is a degree of historic contingency and specificity in the emphasis on 
biology in the definition of genocide in Axis Rule. The importance of biological racism in 
Nazi ideology, and the practices of genocide that flowed from it, are but a specific 
manifestation of a more general phenomenon. Lemkin himself clearly privileges culture 
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in his definition of nations but at the same time acknowledges the interrelation of the 
biological and the social. An attack upon social structures has biological implications, 
and an attack on the biological will have cultural implications. The prevailing 
interpretation of the Genocide Convention represented in the Judgment, one that seeks to 
make a clear separation between not just the means by which genocide is carried out, but 
in the form of that genocide itself—biological-physical destruction as opposed to social-
cultural—is not one that Lemkin would embrace.  
 
Conclusion 
 The definition of genocide in the Convention is less expansive than Lemkin’s. It 
has a more restrictive enumeration of the actus reii of genocide and it does not embrace 
the notion of ‘cultural genocide.’ Yet Lemkin’s conceptualization of genocide remains 
critical for the interpretation of the Convention. The Convention offers little guidance on 
what destruction “in part” of a group means. The drafting history and the provisions of 
the Convention itself suggest that those who drew up the Convention shared Lemkin’s 
view that genocide was a term applicable not only to efforts at outright total 
extermination such as those targeting the Jews but at those measures targeting other 
colonized peoples that fell short of immediate total extermination. The inclusion of the 
infliction of mental harm as part of the actus reus of genocide was at the behest of the 
Chinese delegation that sought thereby capture the provision of opium to the Chinese 
population by the Japanese occupiers during the Second World War. Discussion of the 
proposal explicitly addressed the need for the Convention to embrace such colonial 
crimes that differed from the Nazi measures against the Jews, and that would therefore 
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include the measures targeting the Slavic populations of Eastern Europe described by 
Lemkin. To destroy a people “in part” can be interpreted as the deliberate infliction of 
damage calculated to permanently alter the balance of power between the perpetrator and 
victim groups, to cripple a group through partial destruction. Territorially, the objective 
can be to secure control over territory by displacing the targeted population or to target 
specific sectors of the population in order to effect their social dissolution and eventual 
dispersion or assimilation. This understanding of genocide as partial destruction differs 
from that produced by the Court in this Judgment. By interpreting partial destruction as 
simply partial destruction, and not only as localized total destruction, this understanding 
of genocide as destruction “in part” is both more faithful to the history of the Convention 
and more suitable to fulfilling the aim of the convention in light of contemporary 
realities. 
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